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Fou dlcial District Court - Elmore County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0001213 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
User: HEATHER 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
"' 
Code User Judge 
12/11/2012 NCOC JACKIE New Case Filed - Other Claims Lynn G Norton 
APER JACKIE Plaintiff: Nix, Cherri Lynn Appearance E lee David C. Epis 
Schlender 
JACKIE Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not David C. Epis 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Nix, Cherri Lynn (plaintiff) 
Receipt number: 0012573 Dated: 12/11/2012 
Amount: $96.00 (Cash) For: Nix, Cherri Lynn 
(plaintiff) 
DOSI JACKIE Summons: Document Service Issued: on David C. Epis 
12/11/2012 to Elmore County a Political 
Subdivision of the State; Assigned to Private 
Service-Attorney. Service Fee of $0.00. 
CHJG JACKIE Change Assigned Judge Lynn G Norton 
12/26/2012 RETN HEATHER Return Of Service Lynn G Norton 
DOSS HEATHER Summons: Document Returned Served on Lynn G Norton 
12/26/2012 to Elmore County a Political 
Subdivision of the State; Assigned to Private 
Service-Attorney. Service Fee of $0.00. 
12/27/2012 NOAP HEATHER Notice Of General Appearance Lynn G Norton 
1/15/2013 ANSW HEATHER Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint and Lynn G Norton 
Demand for Jury Trial 
1/16/2013 HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Lynn G Norton 
02/22/2013 02:30 PM) 
1/22/2013 ORDR HEATHER Order for Scheduling Conference and Order Re: Lynn G Norton 
Motion Practice 
1/23/2013 AFFD HEATHER Affidavit Supportin Motion for Partial Summary Lynn G Norton 
Judgment 
BREF HEATHER Brief Supportin Motion for Partial Summary Lynn G Norton 
Judgmetn 
NOTH HEATHER Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Partial Summary Lynn G Norton 
Judgment 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Partial Summary Lynn G Norton 
Judgment 02/22/2013 02:30 PM) 
1/28/2013 MISC HEATHER Statement of Facts Re: Motion for Partial Lynn G Norton 
Summary Judgment 
2/4/2013 STIP HEATHER Stipulation to Continue Motion Hearing and Lynn G Norton 
Amended Notice Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment ,.,, 
CONT HEATHER Continued (Motion for Partial Summary Lynn G Norton 
Judgment 03/18/2013 02:30 PM) 
2/15/2013 MISC HEATHER Defendant's Proposed Scheduling and Planning Lynn G Norton 
Dates 
2/19/2013 CONT HEATHER Continued (Scheduling Conference 03/18/2013 Lynn G Norton 
02:30 PM) 
l.'f'II 
Date: 11/25/2013 Fou udlclal District Court - Elmore County User: HEATHER 
Time: 11 :22 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 6 Case: CV-2012-0001213 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
Date Code User Judge 
3/4/2013 MISC HEATHER Defendant's Statement of Disputed Facts in Lynn G Norton 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
MEMO HEATHER Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
AFFD HEATHER Affidavit of Barbara Steele in Support of Lynn G Norton 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
3/11/2013 BREF HEATHER Plaintiffs Reply Brief Partial Summary Judgment Lynn G Norton 
3/18/2013 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Scheduling Conference Lynn G Norton 
scheduled on 03/18/2013 02:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter. P. Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 43 
DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Motion for Partial Summary Lynn G Norton 
Judgment scheduled on 03/18/2013 02:30 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: P. Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 43 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 12/03/2013 09:00 Lynn G Norton 
AM) *3 days* 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Lynn G Norton 
11/18/2013 02:30 PM) 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Status 10/21/2013 02:30 Lynn G Norton 
PM) 
3/19/2013 AFFD HEATHER Affidavit of Kristina Schindele in Support of Lynn G Norton 
Defendant's Factual Supplement in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
MOTN HEATHER Defendant's Factual Supplement in Opposition to Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
4/4/2013 NOTC HEATHER Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing Lynn G Norton 
Further Proceedings 
4/16/2013 MEMO HEATHER Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
4/26/2013 MOTN HEATHER Motion for Rule 54 (b) Certification Lynn G Norton 
MOTN HEATHER Motion for Rule 12(8) Permission to Appeal Lynn G Norton 
NOTH HEATHER Notice Of Hearing on Motions: Alternative Rule Lynn G Norton 
54(b) and Certification and Permission to Appeal 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/20/2013 02:30 Lynn G Norton 
PM) *Motion for Rule 54(b) Certificaton and 
Alternative Motion for Permission to Appeal* 
5/13/2013 MEMO HEATHER Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition ot Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiffs Motions for I.AR. Rule 12 Permissive 
Appeal and IRCP Rule 54(b) Certification 
rn 2 
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Time: 11 :22 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 6 Case: CV-2012-0001213 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
Date Code User Judge 
5/20/2013 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
05/20/2013 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: P. Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 13 *Motion for Rule 54(b) Certificaton 
and Alternative Motion for Permission to Appeal* 
5/21/2013 MEMO HEATHER Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiff's Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
6/25/2013 MEMO DONNA Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion Lynn G Norton 
for Summary Judgment 
MOTN DONNA Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Lynn G Norton 
6/27/2013 NOTH HEATHER Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion for Lynn G Norton 
Summary Judgment 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Lynn G Norton 
Judgment 08/05/2013 02:00 PM) *Defendant's 
Motion* 
7/3/2013 AFFD HEATHER Plaintiff's Affidavit Re: Motion for Stay: Rule 56(f) Lynn G Norton 
Motion 
MOTN HEATHER Motion for Stay: Defendant's Motion for Summary Lynn G Norton 
Judgment IRCP 56(f) with Supporting Affidavit of 
Cherri Nix 
NOTH HEATHER Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Stay Lynn G Norton 
7/5/2013 AMEN HEATHER Amended Notice of Hearing Lynn G Norton 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Stay 08/05/2013 Lynn G Norton 
02:00 PM) *Plaintiff's Motion* 
7/22/2013 MEMO HEATHER Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion Lynn G Norton 
for Protective Order 
MOTN HEATHER Defendant's Motion for Protective Order Lynn G Norton 
NOTH HEATHER- Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion for Lynn G Norton 
Protective Order 
7/23/2013 HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/05/2013 02:00 Lynn G Norton 
PM) *Defendant's Motion for Protective Order* 
CONT HEATHER Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment Lynn G Norton 
09/06/2013 02:30 PM) *Defendant's Motion* 
AMEN HEATHER Amended Notice of Heaimg Re: Defendant's Lynn G Norton 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
7/29/2013 MEMO HEATHER Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiffs Motion for Stay of Defendant's 
Summary Judgment 
7/31/2013 MOTN HEATHER Motion to Vacate Trial Setting and Re-Set Lynn G Norton 
BREF HEATHER Nix Brief Supporting Motion for Stay of Lynn G Norton 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
Date: 11/25/2013 
Time: 11 :22 AM 
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Fou dlclal District Court - Elmore County User: HEATHER 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0001213 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
Date Code User Judge 
8/5/2013 DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
08/05/2013 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: P. Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 29 *Defendant's Motion for Protective 
Order* 
DCHH HEATHER Hearing result for Motion to Stay scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
08/05/2013 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: P. Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 29 *Plaintiffs Motion* 
8/6/2013 NOTS HEATHER Notice Of Service of Discovery (Plaintiffs First Lynn G Norton 
Interrogatories, Request for Production of 
Documents, Request for Admissions) 
AFFD HEATHER Plaintiffs Affidavit Re: Opposing Motion for Lynn G Norton 
Summary Judgment; Admitted Requests for 
Admissions 
8/7/2013 MISC HEATHER Status Report Lynn G Norton 
8/8/2013 NOTS HEATHER Notice Of Service Re: Defendant's Responses to Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiffs First Request for Admissions 
8/16/2013 ORDR HEATHER Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Stay: Lynn G Norton 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
I.R.C.P. 56(f) 
STIP HEATHER Stipulation for Protective Order Lynn G Norton 
8/19/2013 NOTS HEATHER Notice Of Service Re: Defendant's Responses to Lynn G Norton 
Plaintiffs First Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Document 
8/20/2013 ORDR HEATHER Order Re: Stipulation for Protective Order Lynn G Norton 
8/23/2013 AFFD HEATHER Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton in Support of Lynn G Norton 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw and Amend 
Requests for Admission 
MOTN HEATHER Defendant's Motion for Withdrawal and Lynn G Norton 
Amendment of Admissions 
MEMO HEATHER Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion Lynn G Norton 
for Withdrawal and Amendment of Admissions 
NOTH HEATHER Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant's Motion for Lynn G Norton 
Withdrawal and Amendment of Admissions 
HRSC HEATHER Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/06/2013 02:30 Lynn G Norton 
PM) *Defendant's Motion for Withdrawal and 
Amendment of Admissions* 
!3/30/2013 REPL HEATHER Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Lynn G Norton 
Summary Judgment 
3/3/2013 NOTS HEATHER Notice Of Service Re: Defendant's First Lynn G Norton 
Supplemental Responses to Plaintiffs First 
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Fou dlcial District Court - Elmore County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0001213 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
User: HEATHER 

















































Notice Of Service Re: Defendant's First Set of Lynn G Norton 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production of 
Documents, and Request for Admission to 
Plaintiff 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Lynn G Norton 
Motion for Withdrawal and Amendment of 
Admissions 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lynn G Norton 
09/06/2013 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: P. Tardiff 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: 35 *Defendant's Motion for Withdrawal 
and Amendment of Admissions* 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lynn G Norton 
scheduled on 09/06/2013 02:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: 
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing 
estimated: *Defendant's Motion* 
Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Lynn G Norton 
Judgment 
Judgment 
Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton in Support of 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Lynn G Norton 
Fees 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 
12/03/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated *3 
days* 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled 
on 11/18/2013 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Status scheduled on 
10/21/2013 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
STATUS CHANGED: closed 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 10153 Dated 
10/16/2013 for 100.00) 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Lynn G Norton 
action 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Lynn G Norton 
Supreme Court Paid by: Nix, Cherri Lynn 
(plaintiff) Receipt number: 0010154 Dated: 
10/16/2013 Amount: $109.00 (Cash) For: Nix, 
Cherri Lynn (plaintiff) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Appeal Filed In District Court 
Notice Of Appeal 
STATUS CHANGED: Reopened 
r- ,. ~ 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Date: 11/25/2013 
rime: 11 :22 AM 
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Fou dicial District Court - Elmore County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0001213 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
Cherri Lynn Nix vs. Elmore County a Political Subdivision of the State 
Date Code User 
10/30/2013 MISC HEATHER Defendant-Respondent's Request for Additional 
Transcripts and Record 
10/31/2013 ORDR HEATHER Order Remanding to District Court for Final 
Judgment 
11/8/2013 ORDR HEATHER Order on Attorney Fees 
JDMT HEATHER Final Judgment 
User: HEATHER 
Judge 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
Lynn G Norton 
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E. Lee Schlender, Attorney at Law 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Idaho Bar #1171/Washington Bar#33921 
208-587-1999 
leeschlender@gmail.com 
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No. C\/-2D(.2.- l21::, 
COMPLAINT 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Jurisdiction Statement Applicable to All Cames of Action 
Plaintiff Cherri Nix is a citizen and resident of Elmore County, State of Idaho residing at 
Mountain Home, Idaho. Elmore County is a political subdivision of the State of Idaho. 
At all relevant times the Plaintiff was an employee of Elmore County. The amount in 
controversy is in excess of the minimum jurisdictional amount of money or tender as 
mandated by Idaho Statutory Law for a complaint to be tiled in a District Court. 
LYNN G NORTO~ 
Nix v. Elmore County / Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 




E. Lee Schlender, Attorney at Law 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Idaho Bar 11171/Washington Bar133921 
208-587-1999 
leeschlender@gmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 





DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Comes the Plaintiff above named herein and states as a Complaint again& EJmore County 
as follows: 
Jurisdiction Statement Applicable to All Causes of Action 
Plaintiff Cherri Nix is a citizen and resident of Elmore County, State of Idaho residing at 
Mountain Home, Idaho. Elmore County is a political subdivision of the State of Idaho. 
At all relevant times the Plaintiff was an employee of Elmore County. The amount in 
controversy is in excess of the minimwn jurisdictional amount of money or tender as 
mandated by Idaho Statutory Law for a complaint to be filed in a District Court. 
Nix v. Elmore County / Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 





1. Ms. Cherri Nix was wrongfully discharged and terminated on or about April 30, 
2012 by employees and /or elected officials of Elmore County including but not 
limited to Mr. Vence Parsons. A true copy of the Notice of Termination is attached 
hereto as exhibit A and by reference made incorporated herein. Plaintiff did 
properly serve a Notice of Tort Claim upon Elmore County on or about September 
27, 2012 in accordance with I.C. 6-906. No reply or other response has been made. 
2. Issuance of a Notice of Termination on April 30, 2012 and the termination of her 
employment was intentional· and in violation of the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy Manual as amended; it did not provide her with a Notice of Proposed 
Action; no hearing was held as mandated by the Personnel Policy Manual and 
she was wrongfully discharged in violation of that Manual. Ms. Nix's supervisor 
issued her a ''Notice of Termination" on April 30, 2012, stating that she "is 
hereby terminated effective this 30th day of April 2012" (emphasis in original). 
Indeed, Ms. Nix's employment, pay and benefits did terminate on that day. Yet, 
the Appeal Hearing policy states it is "Pre-Deprivation," that the employee is 
entitled to a hearing before "any final decision on discharge," and that the 
employee is to be provided a "Notice of Proposed Action" stating "the proposed 
personnel action" (emphasis added). Consequently, the Notice of Termination, 
and the actual termination of Ms. Nix's employment effective April 30, 2012, 
were premature and in violation of the County's policy. Ms. Nix should have 
been issued a Notice of Proposed Action infonning her of a proposal to terminate 
her employment. 
3. Although the Notice of Termination noted Ms. Nix's alleged failure to fulfill 
"performance requirements" and "problems with [her] performance," it did not 
.. include._any... specification_of_"char&eLoLany:_...."_e1<planation_j)_(_ the. employer's 
evidence" as required by the Appeal Hearing policy. 
4. The Personnel Manual of Elmore County and the established procedures of the 
County regarding Notice of Termination and due process prior to termination 
were not dependent upon Plaintiff having the status of a contract employee or 
one other than at will; her status at all times during her employment mandated 
certain procedures during and prior to discharge. 
5. Ms. Nix was stated to be on "probationary status" at the time of her discharge, 
which was in accordance with the plain meaning and use of that term in the 
Personnel Policy Manual, false. She had been employed for approximately five 
consecutive years; stating that she is on probation as per a disciplinary action is 
not provided for in the stated Manual or by the statutory language of Elmore 
Nix v. Elmore County / Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
December 10, 2012 
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County Rules and Regulations or the law of the State of Idaho. This was done 
intentionally to deprive her of a full hearing prior to discharge as required by the 
Manual and Idaho Law and was and is a contrivance, which damaged her as, 
stated herein. 
6. The Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing of 
the employment agreement with Plaintiff and as provided by the Employees 
Manual regardless of whether Plaintiff had a permanent employment contract or 
was an employee at will. 
7. Until such time as Plaintiff is terminated in accordance with the practice, policies 
and procedures of Elmore County she is entitled to receive full salary and 
benefits as and for damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
II 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
8. Plaintiff incorporates as substantive statements and claims in this Second Cause 
of Action all paragraphs and the statements contained in the First Cause of 
Action, paragraphs one through 9. 
9. The manual entitled Elmore County Personnel Policy contains detailed, specific 
conditions for employment and reasons for discharge and termination which 
negate the intention of Elmore County by using 'Magic Words' at the front of the 
manual to make all employees including Plaintiff, at will. For example: 
A. General Polices adopted include Equal Employment Opportunity, 
Veteran's Preferences, prohibition of nepotism and preferences for 
promotion from within. 
B. Rules of Employee Conduct include personal performance and behavior, 
workplace conduct allowed and prohibited. 
C. The Employee Classification, Compensation and Benefits section 
provides for employee classifications including when employees are 
considered probationary; compensation policies and benefits. Employees 
Nix v. Elmore County / Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
December 10, 2012 
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are classified as full time, part time, and casual. These classifications are 
specifically stated to control "hiring, promotion and transfer of full-time 
employees". Employee benefits include vacation leave, sick leave, 
holiday pay, disability leave, bereavement leave and accrual of leaves in 
accordance with ''terms of service" from one to twenty-one plus years. 
D. Employees who are no longer on probationary status enjoy benefits under 
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) as well as insurance 
coverage for health and disability as well as life insurance. 
E. Elmore County as per the Personnel Policy provides full time 
(permanent) employees the benefits of the Idaho Public Employees 
Retirement System of Idaho combined with Social Security. 
F. The Employee Evaluation and Discipline section provides specific 
procedures for evaluation, personnel files and discipline procedures. 
Fourteen categories of prohibited conduct are specified as well as a 
system for penalty and potential termination, for violation such as leave 
without pay, suspension, demotion, reprimand and finally, permanent 
dismissal. The categorization of prohibited conduct and the extensive list 
of duties of an employee taken as a whole, provide a detailed list of 
reasons for discharge after discipline, suspension or other penalty. 
Disciplinary procedures for full time employees include the right to an 
Appeal Hearing, notification of specific charges of misconduct or 
• ...... ~,....,.... .. ,., tnL • • -.Che • •L- 'ghttoJenol . ______ llD.pIOpet_ i-uu.u.u.u,u.CC~_nscnption_UL anngS, ~n . 5™-----
COunsel as well as a written decision after the due process hearing. 
G. The Separation from Employment section provides extensive due process 
and contract protection provisions for the employee who is no longer on 
probationary status as a new employee. Those include when '4separation 
from Employment'' is for a reduction in force, reinstatement preferences, 
evaluations and final evaluations, retirement policy, COBRA benefits, exit 
interviews and resignation. 
10. Plaintiff asserts that the Personnel Policy Manual, the other adopted Standard 
Nix v. Elmore County / Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
December 10, 2012 
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Policies are more than "guides"; they were and are enforced strictly and must be 
adhered to by both the employees and Elmore County. They were and are relied 
upon in every respect by both Elmore County and it's employees in the creation 
of the terms and conditions of employment. Accordingly, Plaintiff was not and is 
not, an at will employee having served for approximately five years prior to her 
termination; she was hired to perform specific duties with mandated procedures 
prior to termination for any reason; she was a contract employee (full time) of 
Elmore County. 
11. Plaintiff was deprived of the benefits and procedures to be afforded to her as a 
full time contract employee including her right to continued employment, salary 
and benefits past and future. As per I.C. 12-120 (3), Plaintiff is entitled to 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs. 
III 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. Plaintiff incorporates as substantive statements and claims in this Third Cause of 
Action all paragraphs and the statements contained in the First Cause of Action, 
paragraphs one through 9 and the Second Cause of Action paragraphs 10 through 
12. 
13. Ms. Nix was forced and required to keep "daily logs" and abide by ''task lists" 
which were not provided for by Elmore County Employee Manual rules or 
·· ·-· -· regulations;-whmanufactured andutilizedpurelrformaliciou purpose 
including providing the false premise of non-compliance for her discharge. 
These actions were intentional, without foundation in law or fact; were a 
defamation and demeaning and meant to be so; that they constituted intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and were in part, utilized for her wrongful 
discharge. 
14. Ms. Nix was not provided with a specification of charges or employers evidence 
for her discharge, in contravention of the Manual and Idaho Law. Improper or 
non-existent notices were issued of "hearings" which were a sham; which were 
or should have been known to be contrived and not based in fact or law, and 
which did deprive her not only of Due Process of Law but inflicted severe 
Nix v. Elmore County / Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
December 10, 2012 
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emotional distress and were violations of her vested rights as per the Elmore 
County Personnel Manual and existing Idaho Law. 
15. Ms. Nix was mandated by her supervisors and employers Elmore County to alter 
time records; that she complained and refused to do so; that in retaliation she was 
discharged and humiliated; all in violation of the Idaho Protection of Public 
Employees Act Further violations of the Act include her being discharged and 
damaged in retaliation for her requesting hearings and due process to be 
afforded. That she is entitled to all remedies and damages afforded by the Idaho 
Protection of Public Employees Act including damages, fees and costs. 
16. That the Personnel Manual language applicable to procedures for due process 
and hearing was distorted, illegally interpreted and manufactured so as to deprive 
Ms. Nix of her Due Process and employment rights as established by Idaho law 
and the Elmore County Personnel Policy. The intentional wrongful interpretation 
and application of regulation language was part of a plan and contrivance all of 
which is against public policy of the State of Idaho. 
17. That all of the above described misconduct resulted in the intentional and 
wrongful discharge of Ms: Nix which is against the public policy of the State of 
Idaho. 
WHEREFORE, PLAINIFF REQUESTS RELIEF AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That she be awarded all damages for past-accrued salary and benefits. 
2. That she be re-instated as a full time employee of Elmore County and entitled 
to all salaries benefits as such on a continuum of employment from and after 
the date of her termination. 
3. That the court enter an Order that Plaintiff was entitled to a hearing prior to 
discharge or termination in accordance with the Personnel Policy Manual of 
Elmore County; that her termination absent that hearing was and is a 
wrongful termination and discharge. 
4. That for the wrongful and intentional acts that caused her severe humiliation 
and injury, such damages as the court and jury deemjust 
Nix v. Elmore County / Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
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5. That for violation of the Idaho Whistleblower Act, such damages as to be 
determined by the court and jury as deemed just including exemplary 
damages, her fees and costs. 
6. That Plaintiff be awarded her reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred. 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A TRIAL BY JURY. 
Dated this/.,day of December 2012. 
Nix v. Elmore County / Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
December 10, 2012 
.016 
7 
September 26, 2012 
Ms. Barbara Steele 
E. Lee Schlender 
Attorney at Law 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
208-587-1999 
leescblender@gmail.eom 
Clerk of Elmore County 
Elmore County Commissioners 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Re: Notice of Tort Claim 
I.C. Sec.6-906 
Subject: Wrongful Discharge and Tort Claim of Cherri Nix 
Dear Ms. Steele: # 
You are being served by certified mail here~eipt return requested as well as being 
personally handed a copy of this letter, this Notice of Tort Claim as the official 
Secretary and Clerk of Elmore Coun.J~-...... --itical subdivision of the State of Idaho. 
I am the attorney for Cherri Nix ountain Home, Idaho and file this Clam with you on 
her behalf as her attome:'~1:t~e is originally signed by Ms. Nix and is therefore to be 
considered filed and seF her individually as well. 
:"ut1~~~~~i:,,~ ~~::.~~:! =:1:: 
but not limi~Mr~ Vence Parsons. A true copy of the Notice of Termination is 
attached~. 
o,£lfu• actions: Actions taken against Ms. Cherri Nix including intentional infliction 
o otional distress and violation of the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act 
began on or about January 6. 2011 by Mr. Da..n Collins and continued through to the final 
date of termination of employment A continuing tortious course of conduct occurred. 
Actions taken: Violations of the contract and common law vested rights of Ms. Cherri 
Nix include but are not limited to the following: 
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1. From and after January 6, 2011. Making false and defamatory statements 
regarding the quantity and quality of her work performance. Said statements were 
oral and in writing and were published with the knowledge that they were false 
and known to be false. Said statements were published by Mr. Dan Collins and 
Mr. Vence Parsons. 
2. Issuance of a Notice of Termination on April 30, 2012 and the termination of her 
employment was intentional and in violation of the Elmore County ~e~~ 
Policy Manual as amended; it did not provide her with a Notice of ~ 
Action; no hearing was held as mandated by the Personnel Policy M~d she 
was wrongfully discharged in violation of that Manual. /-
3. Ms. Nix was stated to be on ''probationary status" time of her discharge, 
which was in accordance with the plain meanin a use of that term in the 
Personnel Policy Manual, false. She had bee,~mr,loyed for approximately five 
consecutive years; stating that she is on p on as per a disciplinary action is 
not provided for in the stated Manual t, the statutory language of Elmore 
County Rules and Regulations or e~ of the State of Idaho. This was done 
intentionally to deprive her of a fldt"-earing prior to discharge as required by the 
Manual and Idaho Law and d is, a contrivance, which damaged her as, 
stated herein. o · 
4. ~required to keep "daily logs" and abide by ''task lists" 
ded for by Elmore County Employee Manual rules or 
-·-were manufactured and utilized purely for malicious purpose 
~n(?l~g __ the false premise of non-com~liance for her dischar~. _ These 
actio11z ~ intentional, without foundation in law or fact; were a defamation and 
deme~g and meant to be so; that they constituted intentional infliction of 
ellll~nal distress and were in part, utilized for her wrongful discharge. 
# 
5. Ms. Nix was not provided with a specification of charges or employers evidence 
for her discharge, in contravention of the Manual and Idaho Law. Improper or 
non-existent notices were issued of "hearings" which were a sham; which were or 
should have been known to be contrived and not based in fact or law, and which 
did deprive her not only of Due Process of Law but inflicted severe emotional 
2 Notice of Tort and Contract Breach Claim/Nix v. Elmore County Idaho/ 9-28-2012 
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distress and were violations of her vested rights as per the Elmore County 
Personnel Manual and existing Idaho Law. 
6. Ms. Nix was mandated by her supervisors and employers Elmore County to alter 
time records ; that she complained and refused to do so; that in retaliation she was 
discharged and humiliated; all in violation of the Idaho Protection of Public 
Employees Act Further violations of the Act include her being discharged and 
damaged in retaliation for her requesting hearings and due process to be affo~ 
7. That the discharge of Ms. Nix was not based upon actual J)Oq*~non-
performance of her duties but upon contrived and manufactured reaso~~es and 
lists which were false and known to be false. , 
7. That the Personnel Manual language applicable to Pl'OCC<llllllllllJ for due process and 
hearing was distorted, illegally interpreted and manutil~ftd so as to deprive Ms. 
Nix of her Due Process and employment rights as ealfli!1ti,ed by Idaho law and 
the Elmore County Personnel Policy. The inte.9t>1 wrongful interpretation and 
application of regulation language was part~Jlan and contrivance all of which 
is against public policy of the State of~ 
That all of the above described m · duct resulted in the wrongful discharge of 
· policy of the State of Idaho. 
8. Damages claimed by ~ half of Ms. Nix include but are not limited to: 
a. All lost wage~~efits from April 30, 2012 until paid or judgment is 
satisfied. O ~ 
-~ .. . ... ~ . . b. ~~=~y~::;.,w::~Actaprovidedo.-therein. 
;:4~ages for intentional infliction of emotional distress in a sum of not less 
~ than $100.000. 
~ 
d. Damages for punitive or exemplary amounts in a sum of not less than 
$100,000. 
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e. An amount for her attorney's fees and costs to be assessed by the court as per 
Idaho statutory and case law. 
9. The Name and address of the Claimant and Wrongfully Discharged Employee 
was and is at all times: 
!\,~ 
M. Cherri Nix 
43S South 2nd East 
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7 ~~ 
This Claim and Notice of Tort Claim is filed as per Idaho Code Sec ,Sand J.C. sec. 
6-906 and served upon the Clerk of Elmore County within 180 ~ ~e last date 
that the damages and wrongful discharge occurred. 
# 
E. Lee Schlender ~ C,P 
Idaho State Bar No. I 171 
0
.$, 





Date this 28 day of September 2012. 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474} 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attomeys at Law 
9SO W. Banoock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Email: kirt@nA.viorhales.com: iake@naylorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF TI:IE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, 
P .C., answers Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on file herein as follows: 
l. Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff's Complaint 
not herein specifically and expressly admitted. Defendant reserves the right to amend this and any 
other answer or denial stated herein, once it has had an opportunity to complete discovery regarding 
the allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1. 
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2. Answering the first sentence under the section entitled ''Jurisdiction Statement 
Applicable to All Causes of Action," Defendant is presently without sufficient information upon 
which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and so deny the allegations at present for 
lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
3. Answering the second sentence under the section entitled "Jurisdiction 
Statement Applicable to All Causes of Action," Defendant admits the allegations contained therein. 
4. Answering the third sentence under the section entitled "Jurisdiction 
Statement Applicable to All Causes of Action," Defendant admits Plaintiff was employed by Elmore 
County from June 1, 2007 to April 30, 2012. 
5. Answering the last sentence under the section entitled" Jurisdiction Statement 
Applicable to All Causes of Action," Defendant is presently without sufficient information upon 
which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and so deny the allegations at present for 
lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
6. Answering paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein. 
7. Answering paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits only that 
Plaintiffs employment was terminated on April 30, 2012. The remainder of this paragraph appears 
to contain Plaintiffs legal conclusions, and to the extent a response is required, Defendant denies 
said allegations. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2. 
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8. Answering paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this appears to contain 
Plaintiffs legal conclusions, and to the extent a response is required, Defendant denies said 
allegations. 
9. Answering paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this appears to contain 
Plaintiff's legal conclusions, and to the extent a response is required, Defendant denies said 
allegations. 
10. Answering paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this appears to contain 
Plaintiffs legal conclusions, and to the extent a response is required, Defendant denies said 
allegations. 
11. Answering paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein. 
12. Answering paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein. 
13. Answeringparagraph8ofPlaintiff'sComplaint, whichpurportstorepeatand 
incorporate prior allegations, and to the extent any response is required to such allegations, 
Defendant reasserts and incorporates by this reference ifs prior responses to all of such allegations. 
14. Answering paragraphs 9(A)-(G) of Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendant asserts 
the language contained in the Elmore County Personnel Policy manual speaks for itself. The 
remainder of the allegations contained in these paragraphs appear to contain Plaintiff's legal 
conclusions, and to the extent a response is required, Defendant denies said allegations. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL· 3. 
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15. Answering paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this appears to contain 
Plaintiffs legal conclusions, and to the extent a response is required, Defendant denies said 
allegations. 
16. Answering paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein. 
17. Answering paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits only that 
Plaintiff had daily logs and task lists as part of her employment. Defendant denies the remaining 
allegations contained therein. 
18. Answering paragraph 13 of Plaintifi's Complaint, Defendant admits only that 
Plaintiff had daily logs and task lists as a requirement of her employment. As to the remainder of 
the allegations, Defendant denies the same. 
19. Answering paragraph 14 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein. 
20. Answering paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein. 
21, Answering paragraph 16 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein. 
22. Answering paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein. 
23. Plaintiffs Complaint last contains what is commonly referred to as the 
Plaintiffs ''Prayer for Relief," and to the extent any answer is required thereto, Defendant denies the 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4. 
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allegations contained therein, denies that the Plaintiffhas stated any valid cause of action, or that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested therein. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
That Defendant has not been able to engage in sufficient discovery to learn all of the 
facts and circumstances relating to the matters described in the Plaintitl's Complaint and therefore 
requests the Court to pennit Defendant to amend its Answer and assert additional affirmative 
defenses or abandon affirmative defenses once discovery has been completed. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
That the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action against the Defendant 
upon which relief can be granted and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
That the Plaintiff has failed to act reasonably or to otherwise mitigate Plaintiff's 
damages, if any. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
That the Plaintiff is estopped to assert the claims and damages alleged in her 
Complaint by reason of her knowledge of the facts and circumstances regarding the transactions and 
events at issue and her conduct throughout the transactions and events, which conduct has been 
relied upon by the Defendant to its detriment 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 5. 
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FIFTH DEFENSE 
That the allegations contained in the Plaintiff's Complaint do not rise to the level of 
a deprivation of rights which are protected by the Constitution or any of the legal provisions referred 
to in the Plaintiffs Complaint 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
That the Plaintiff's causes of action for declaratory or injunctive relief are not ripe. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
That the Plaintiff's causes of action for declaratory or htjunctive relief are improper 
at this time, because the Plaintiff has stated a claim for damages in her Complaint and therefore has 
acknowledged that she has an adequate remedy at law. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
That the Defendant acted in a reasonable and prudent fashion satisfying any duty, if 
any, it owed under the rules, regulations, statutes, ordinances, customs, policies and usages of 
Elmore County, the State of Idaho and/or the United States of America. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
To the extent the Plaintiff is asserting state law claims against Defendant, some or 
all of such claims are barred by the failure of the Plaintiff to comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
To the extent that the Plaintiff is asserting state law claims, the liability, if any, of the 
Defendant for any state law claims or causes of action is limited pursuant to the provisions of the 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 6. 
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Idaho Tort Claims Act. In asserting this defense, Defendant is in no way conceding or admitting 
liability. 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
To the extent that the Plaintiff is asserting state law claims against the Defendant, 
some or all of such claims are barred since they arise out of and/or stem from activities for which 
the Defendant is immune from liability by virtue of the provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
TWELFl'H DEFENSE 
That Defendant is immune from liability because the acts or omissions complained 
of, if any, were done by Defendant in good faith, with honest, reasonable belief that such actions 
were necessary and lawful at the time they occurred. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
That some or all of the Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are barred by Plaintiffs 
failure to timely file her notice of claim as required by the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code 
Section 6-906. 
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE 
The damages, if any, as alleged by the Plaintiff were caused by the superseding, 
intervening conduct of other entities or individuals. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendant has been required to retain attorneys in order to defend this action and is 
entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to federal and state law and applicable Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
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WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment against the Plaintiff as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that the 
Plaintiff take nothing thereunder. 
2. That the Defendant be awarded its costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees 
pursuant to Sections 12-117 and 12-121 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. That judgment be entered in favor of Defendant on all claims for relief. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY th.at on the 15th day of January, 2013, I caused to be served, 
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
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E. Lee Schlender 
Schlender Law Offices 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Idaho Bar #1171/Washington Bar#33921 
208-587-1999 
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Attorney for Plaintiff Nix 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO 
Defendant. 
Case No. _2012-1213 
AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Comes now Cherri Nix, the Plaintiff herein being sworn on her oath and states as follows: 
1 . I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled proceeding. 
2. I was employed by Elmore County as a salaried, regular employee 
for approximately five years prior to my temlination and discharge 
by the county which occurred on April 30, 2012. 
At all times during my employment I performed my duties satisfactorily as the night 
janitor for several buildings in the Elmore County complex. I worked 
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alone, normally starting at 3:00pm and continuing into the night until 11:00pm to 
12:00am. I cleaned floors, urinals, toilets and office spaces. 
My performance was satisfactory in every respect even though the retiring supervisor 
subjected me to disciplinary action on February 1, 2012, stating in writing that I was now 
on "probationary status" for a year, or until February 1. 2013. 
See Exhibit A attached hereto. 
On February 16, 2012 my supervisor gave me a note. In part it states that I am not 
entitled to a hearing regarding my disciplinary action. 
See Exhtoit B attached hereto. 
3. At all times relevant to my employment Elmore County adopted and implemented the 
Elmore County Personnel, referenced by the county as the "ECPP". That reference is 
used in this affidavit. 
A true copy is attached hereto as Exht'bit C. 
4. After the first six months of my employment I was subject to a probationary period as 
per page nine of the ECPP. Thereafter, I was a regular, full time permanent employee, 
not subject to probation as described in the ECPP. 
5. On April 30, 2012 I was given a Notice of Termination as an employee of Elmore 
County. 
A copy is attached as Exhibit D. 
6. The ECPP provides that prior to discharge I was to be given a 
"Notice of proposed Action" described under the paragraph entitled 
"Pre-Deprivation", page 20. I was not given any Notice of Proposed Action prior to the 
Notice of Termination, Exht'bit D; I was given no list of charges against me. 
7. I requested a hearing before the Elmore Board of County Commissioners, which was 
set for hearing on June 11, 2012. 
See Exhibit E attached hereto. 
8. On May 24, 2012 my attorneys served on the Elmore County attorney a letter 
demanding a Notice of Proposed Action as per the "pre-deprivation" section of the ECPP. 
See Exhibit F attached hereto. 
9. Elmore County sent to Plaintiff a Notice of Hearing. It states in part that: 
~Please be advised that you were an at will employee, and as such are not entitled to a 
hearing regarding the reasons for your termination. The Board wi11 not discuss 
performance -related issues." 
Nix Affidavit Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment 
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See Exhibit G attached hereto. 
10. On June 7, 2012 the Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney sent a letter to my 
attorneys stating that I was on probationary status subject to termination at any time 
and not entitled to the pre-deprivation procedures set out in the ECPP. 
See Exlu'bit H attached hereto. 
11. Elmore County Commissioners held a meeting on June 11, 2012 and issued a written 
decision on June 18. 2012 confirming my termination. I was neither then nor since, ever 
given the pre-deprivation rights and privileges, nor was I ever given a list of the charges 
against me; I was denied any hearing as to the reasons for my termination or an 
opportunity to respond to any charges. 
See Exhibit I attached hereto. 
12. I have not been able to secure employment since the date of my termination on April 
30, 2012. 
13. I was deprived of my vested rights to all the proper procedures prior to my 
termination by a contrived interpretation of what constitutes probation after the initial 
one-year period; disciplinary probation is not new employment probation. 
Dated this J1day of January 2012. 
, laintiff 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) SS 
COUNTY OF ELMORE) 
Cherri Nix, being first duly sworn deposes and states that she is the Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled proceeding; that she has read this affidavit, knows the contents thereof 
and believes the facts as stated herein to be in all respects, true. 
1cforldaho 
esun:~ath'\¼:1 ~.e_.. My Commission expires 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~.,,, 
to the Attorneys for Elmore County, by the following method: 
First Class Mail addressed to: 
Kirtian G. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
yes. X . • 
yes )G .383-9516 
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PERSONAL AND CONFJQENTIAL 
TO: Cherri Nix, Custodial and Maintenance Employee 
Vence Parsons, Supervisor FROM: 
DATE: February _L 2012 
RE: NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION - NOTICE OF LAST CHANCE 
You are hereby notified that I believe you have been Involved In acts or 
omissions for which any employee of Elmore County may be subject to dlsclpllne, up to 
dismissal from employment, pursuant to the Elmore County Personnel Polley. 
This Notice Is provided to make you aware of personnel action that Is being taken 
at this time and to allow you to meet with me or respond to me in writing regarding any 
Information you desire me to consider with regard to these matters. Accordingly, you 
wlll have untll jiJHl o'clock f.M., on Monday, February 8, 2012 (five daya from 
today's date), to meet with me or to submit to me in writing any such response you 
desire me to place In your file. Should you desire to meet with me, you must meet with 
me at 3:00 o'clock P.M., on Monday, February 6, 2012, In my office to discuss this 
matter. 
Pl•- keep In mind, that If you do not meet. with me or submit your 
response within the time allowed, I will base my d$Cislon upon the Information known 
to me at that time and your failure to respond will constitute a waiver of this opportunity 
to provide a response to this proposed personnel action and the Information upon which 
It Is based. 
To assist you In preparing any response you may desire to submit, the following 
Is the Information upon which I have relied to this point In this proceeding: 
1. On January 6, 2011, Dan Collins verbally counseled you regarding errors In your 
performance. He then provided you with a written assessment on May 19, 2011. 
Mr. Collins determined that you had improved in some areas, but still required 
additional improvement. You received a copy of that assessment. Mr. Collins 
requested that you complete a dally log to tum Into him regarding your tasks. On 
December 20, 2011, I started as your supervisor. 
2. On December 27, 2011, I provided you with a task list entitled "Elmore County 
Custodial and Maintenance Duties•, which you signed. The task list was 
Intended so that you and I had the same understanding regarding your daily, 
weekly, and monthly tasks. In th~ pay period from December 24, 2011, through 
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION - NO" 
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January 23. 2012, I personally reviewed each of your buildings to determine if 
you had completed your assigned tasks. I have maintained a dally log/checklist. 
Based on my personal review of your work the next work day, I have found the 
following errors: 
a. December 28, 2011: failed to complete daily tasks: clean urinal In LEB 
building; sweep downstairs and steps at extension office; vacuum carpetaat 
E-9.11 and extension office; clean the sink In the women's bathroom Tn the ·-
basement at the LEB aa there was stlll soda on It. Failed to complete weekly 
tasks: mop floors In Juvenlle probation, E-911, growth and development, and 
extension office; wash windows In LEB, Juvenile probation, OMV, growth and 
development and extension office; or dust In any building. 
b. December 29, 2011: failed to complete dally tasks: sweep floors In extension 
office; vacuum E-911, growth and development and extension office. 
c. December 30, 2011: failed to complete dally tasks: clean toilet In E-911 and 
extension office; sweep floors at LEB, growth and development and extension 
office; and vacuum E-911, growth and development, and extension office. 
d. January 4. 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: clean urinal In LEB and toilet 
in extension office; sweep floors at E-911, growth and development, and 
extension office; and vacuum at E-911, growth and development and 
extension; clean sink at LEB. 
e. January 5, 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: clean urinal In LEB and toilet 
in extension office; sweep floors at E-911, growth and development, and the 
downstairs and steps at extension; vacuum carpets at OMV, E-911, growth 
-- -·· - -.and development and extension office; and clean sink at LEB. 
f. January 8, 2012: failed to completed dally tasks: clean urinal In LEB, sweep 
floors at LEB, growth and development and extension office; vacuum floors at 
growth and development and extension office; and clean sink at LEB and 
growth and development. Failed to clean weekly tasks: mop floors in any 
building, dust In any building and clean the front porch/outside entry way at 
juvenile probation. 
g. January 9, 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: clean urinal at LEB and 
clean toilets at Juvenile probation and growth and development: sweep floors 
at LEB, Juvenile probation, E-911, growth and development and extension 
office; vacuum at juvenile probation, E-911, growth and development, and 
extension office; stock bathroom at extension office; and clean sink at LEB. 
h. January 10, 2012: failed to complete daily tasks: clean toilet at Juvenile 
probation and extension office; sweep floors at Juvenile probation, E-911, and 
extension office; and vacuum at E-911, growth . and development and 
extension office. 
I. January 11, 2012: failed to complete daily tasks: removed trash at extension 
office; clean toilets at Juvenile probation, E-911 and extension office; sweep 
floors In any building; vacuum at juvenile probation, E-911, growth and 
development and extension office; and stock bathroom at extension office. 
j. January 12, 2012: failed to complete daily tasks: clean toilet downstairs at E· 
911 and extension office; sweep floors at LEB, E-911, and extension office; 
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I acknowledge that you completed some weekly tasks that are not accounted 
for herein. I also note that some other tasks were not completed well. My 
reports and the recitation herein focused on the obvious errors. 
I have noticed that you spend short periods of time In each of your assigned 
buildings. It appears that you have repeated entries Into each building. The 
fashion In which you perform your tasks may have led to your poor 
performance. 
3. On January 23, 2012, you submitted a time card that contained more hours 
worked than I had been able to verify. Your original time card reported a total of 
181 hours worked, 24 hours of holiday time, and 8 hours of vacation. According 
to your time card, you reported 3 hours of comp time accrued. I notified you that 
you needed to correct your time caret and submit It to me again by January 24, 
2012.. You aclvtsed m• that you could not or would not change·any of the 
reported time. At that time, I completed a corrected time card and submitted It to 
you. You signed the time card on January 25, 2012. In order to determine your 
hours worked, I reviewed the dally door reports from December 28, 2011, 
through January 23, 2012. Your shift Is Sunday through Thursday from 3:00 p.m. 
until 12:00 midnight. I found the foHowlng erroneous entries: 
a. On December 26, 2011, you took approximately 2 and ~ hours for lunch and 
then left about 46 minutes early. I credited you with 5.5 hours rather than 8. 
b. On December 27, 2011, you left an hour early. I credited you with 7 hours. 
c. On December 28, 2011, you left 2 hours early. I credited you with 6 hours. 
d. On December 29, 2011, you took 1 and ~ hours for lunch and then left at 
appl'C)ximately 10:41 p,m.. l credited you with 8.5 hours. I noted you also 
returned to the office at 12:04 p.m. for some. reason. 
e. On January 4, 2012, you took lunch for approximately 1 and~ hours. You 
then left work at 1 0 p.m. I credited you for 5.5 hours. For some reason, you 
-, used your county-Issued entry key to access the courthouse at approximately 
, 7:53 a.m. on January 5, 2012. As you know, you were not scheduled to work 
at this time. It appears this was personal business as you did not go to the 
office at this time. 
f. On January 5, 2012, you left approximately 1 and~ hours early. I credited 
you with 8.5 hours. 
g. Yo0; requested permission to come in to work on January 6 and January 7, 
2012, in order to shampoo the Department of Motor Vehicles. You reported 
hours on both days and told me you did the work. However, the door report 
shows that you made numerous entries Into other buildings on both days. 
You appear to have been at OMV on January 6 as follows: 8:25 until 8:39, 
8:51 until 8:53, 9:00 untll 10:08 and 10:11 until about 10:25. On January 7, 
you were present in OMV from 1 :29 until 1 :31, 1 :32 until 1 :35, 1 :38 until 2:48, 
and 2:48 until 2:50. You then left about 3:08 p.m. so I credited you with only 
1.5 hours on January 7, instead of the 2 hours you reported. 
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h. On January 8, 2012, you reported 7 hours on your time card. According to 
the time report, you appear to have left for an hour during your shift. You also 
left an hour early. Therefore, I credited you with 6 hours. 
I. On January 9, 2012, you took approximately 1 and ~ hours for lunch and left 
a half-hour early. I credited you with 7 hours. For some reason, you used 
your county-Issued entry key to access the courthouse at approximately 
711:26 a.m. on January 10, 2012. As you know, you were not scheduled to 
\ work at this time. It appears this was personal business as you did not go to 
the office at this time. 
J. On January 11, 2012, you took approximately 2 hours for lunch. You then left 
work by 10:30 p.m. I credited you with 6 hours. 
k. For some reason, you used your county-Issued entry key to access the 
courthouse at approximately 12:00 p.m. on January 14, 2012, and the old law 
enforcement bulldlng twice around midnight on January 15 and 16, 2012. As 
you know, you were not scheduled to work at these times. It appears this 
was personal business as you did not go to the office at any time. 
I. On January 16, 2012, I could only account for 4 hours of work, so I credited 
r- you with that time. 
m. On January 17, 2012, you appear to have left work twice for what appeared to 
----::: be lunch. Therefore, I credited you with 7 hours. 
n. On January 18, 2012, you appear to have been at work for the entire 8 hours, 
so I credited you with the 8 hours. However, In looking at the reports, you 
kept Jumping from building to building for small Increments - 3 to 1 O minutes 
each from 7: 12 until 7:56. I do not believe you could have accompllshed any 
significant maintenance task during those time periods. In addition, you 
appear to have left early, but I was not able to confirm that, so I did not 
decrease your reported time. 
o. On January 19, 2012, you took lunch for approximately one and¾ hours and 
then left early at 9:30 p.m. Therefore, I credited you with 5.75 hours. 
~ On January 22, 2012, you took an extra 16 minutes for lunch. You then left 
work for approximately one hour and 17 minutes. I saw you at your residence 
during this time period. Finally, you left an hour early. I credited you with 5.5 
hours. 
Based on my calculations, you worked only 122. 75 hours and were entitled to 24 
hours of holiday time. I increased your vacation time by 21.5 hours to 29.25 
hours In order to account for the 176 hours of time that should have been worked 
and/or credited to holiday time during this time period. Falsifying a time card Is a 
very serious violation. 
Accordingly, you are hereby notified that, pending receipt of any written 
response by you to the information set forth and/or referred to herein and attached 
hereto, it Is my intention to Impose the following discipline: 
1. You commenced employment with Elmore County on June 1, 2007. 
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION - NOTICE OF LAST CHANCE - 5 
036 
2. You are placed on Probationary Statue for a period of one ( 1) year. Your 
probation wHI run until February 1, 2013. You are, and remain, an at-will 
employee. 
3. I am providing you with a Wamlng that this Is your Last Chance to 
continue employment with Elmore County. · 
4. This Notice wiH be placed In your personnel flle along with your written 
response to this Notice. Any written response must be submitted to me 
within the time and date stated above unless you request addltlonal time 
from me. 
5. A failure to meet the goals set forth herein will subject you to termination 
at the conclusion of your year-long probationary period. A review of 
progress will be made with you throughout this year-long period. If 
progress Is not evident. you may be subject to Immediate termination at 
any time during the probationary period. 
a. You will. at all times hereafter. In the workplace: 
a. Perform your work In a professional and error-free manner; 
b. Report your time accurately on your timecard; and 
c. Demonstrate proficiency In the daily and weekly custodial and 
maintenance duties you are required to complete. 
FURTHER, I WANT YOU TO KNOW I realize you have made significant 
contributions to Elmore County during the time that you have been employed here, and 
I believe that you can·· continue to· make positive contributions during your continued 
employment with Elmore County. However, In view of your actions and omissions 
speciflcally set out herein, and ~use your acts or omissions have delayed the 
accomplishment of duties of our office, further acts, omissions and/or misconduct by 
you will not be tolerated hereafter, without the imposition of more serious discipline 
including but not limited to potential termination from your employment. 
Although I believe it is unfortunate that I feel required to provide you written 
notice of these matters, prior verbal efforts by your then-supervisor; Dan Colllns, to get 
you to Improve your performance have failed, and I do not desire to revisit these Issues 
with you. However, if that becomes necessary, you will not be able to claim that you did 
not have notice of such deficiencies and an opportunity to correct them. 
Please be advised that, since this matter involves proposed personnel action, I 
would recommend that no comment be made regarding this matter until a final decision 
has been made and this matter has been concluded. 
If you do not desire to respond to this Notice, but prefer that your employment 
records with Elmore County show that you terminated your employment by resignation, 
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please submit your written resignation to me on or before the expiration of the above-
noted response deadline. so that your records may be documented In accordance with 
your request and your ffnal paycheck can be prepared and delivered to you. 
Dated this _f_ day of February 2012. 
t.~,I!, " . {k •• 0:1<.i.(___ 
VENCE PARSONS . 
Affirmation of Service 
I, Vence Parsons, Supervisor, affirm that I served the foregoing NOTICE OF 
DISCIPLINARY ACTION-NOTICE OF LAST CHANCE on Cherri Nix this .J_ day of 
February 2012, via hand delivery. 
t.l.aut:L < Bwoz<:9---:. 
VENCE PARSONS 
I, Cherri Nix, hereby acknowledge that I received a copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Dlsclpllnary Action-Notice of Last Chance on the __ day of February 2012. 
Cherri Nix 






PERSONAL AND CQNflDJrf(IAL 
Cherri Nix, Custodial and Maintenance Employee 
Vence Parsons. Supervisor 
February 16, 2012 
Response to Written Submission dated February 7, 2012 
I am in receipt of and have reviewed your February 7, 2012, written response to the Notice of 
Disciplinary Action - Notice of Last Chanco. P-lcase note that I am continuina my initial 
decision and the Notice of Disciplinary Action - Notice of Last Chance stands. 'lbe Notice of 
Disciplinary Action- Notice of Last Chanco, as well as your February 7, 2012, written response 
shall n,main in your persomel file. 
With respect to the request you made to reinstate the time card you submitted for the period 
December 24, 2011, through January 23, 2012, I ~ectfully decline. That time card was 
fraudulent for tho reasons set forth in tho Notice of Disctplinary Action - Notice of Last Chance. 
The amended time card, which you signed on January 25, 2012, stands. . 
Finally, you are not entitled to a hearing before tho Elmore County Board of Commissioners 
pursuant to the Elmore County PersoMel Policy. Therefore, that request is also being denied. 
However, wo did meet on January 24, 2012, to discuss tho timecard issue, and your response at 
that time, your comments at the time you signed the C!)rrected time card on January 25, 2012, as 
well • your written response dated February 7, 2012, did nothing to convince me that the 
County's records regarding your time actually worked was incorrect. 
Ld.,,a_., &«x 4 1 
V cnce Parsons 
Affirmation of Service 
J, Vence Parsons, Supervisor, affirm that I served the foregoing response on Cherri Nix 
this 161 day of February 2012, via hand delivery. 
UtJ.At~fJu 4@ x1 , 
Vence Parsons 
I, Cherri Nix, hereby acknowledge that I received a copy of the foregoing response on the 
16th day of February 2012. 
Cherri Nix 
Nix v. Elmore County 
Affidavit 
Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion 
Exhibit B 
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10. Folow all NIN r9gardln9 aafetylnthe.~~-~formallybythe 
d,,.rtment Qr bY ~·aaenc,a ~plQ~ are encouraged to •uaQNtW8YI to 
maka the wartcpmce orworlc·~-~iWr: . 
11 • . ~ ........ •~ drMll"a·ticel'IM~ ~-fy In the concluct of work for Elmore 
.· Couilty.· .wi. driving 18 • n-.1ily riq_uJ~~ of your Job duties the following 
condltlona apply: · ; 
a. ·each IUCh·efnployee must ·report any 1tate-1mposecl iirlving restrtctlons to 
his/her lmmedfata aupervfw.' 
b.1~.E~ ~ employee la ao obligated to·notity hlllher_so~~r In the event 
that hit/her driving abilltlea are Impaired by anything othertfiin atate raatrlctlana. 
12. ~erfoqn auc;h obllgatlona aa n _r1eteuaiy to:ca.rtY -~·~~~cit. J!fmore County 
. . ~:.:,r.£~~-~~1~ m~~mJl)ll'."~l ~;irt~ witft·"m~ l:isktothe public 
WU J,SIIUW ftrfceta. ·.' . ~ . 1 ··• • • 
. ;.·~ . . 
. 13. .·.l:m·~-~ aha~ be attentive to their work lit all t1:r11~. . ·~ . ·. ' . . . 
c. p~~H·,~rnfo.vvoRKPLACE coNou~T 
. . . 
Wllh~ tt1t1 ~~ •. ~~~ ~·Ei~~ ~o~ntv ~~~~-not:' -~· ;i .~ • 
..... . . . . . '• . 
1. S. preaent In the workplace undttthe Influence of drugs, alqohol, fflegal 1ubltancea 
:::===:.:,~~v::,=1.t1-~i~i-~.,~rt=.: 
~- ~le.~, NuWOlbr·at;oujd1>*·~~:~.-°"Y(t'~O-~f-~ conduct, 
-evtn'-U,~ft auch co~d• ·hffl ~ aonnri~~l~ -~;,.. 
' . .. . . . .. . ...  ~ . . . 
2. ..~~~tlQJt in ,abusJve conduc:t ·to fetloi.e! ~ffllfo . ·ve•• of tcf~, P.~liJ\t· i.';use abusive il.ni~an the p....-ence«··fellow ~~ ~ 'oYtlie .~~~-._·1;mp1~ .. should not 
altimpt to force their Ide• on fetlow em oyiea.-1* the public. · Abua'ive language 
shal Include profanity and loud or haraut~. ·~· . . ... · , 
., . . . :.··. - . . - ·•. . • . . ~ . : . . . . .... 
3. .~ ~nassment i• · illegal ·anct canrir/ ·,.to t ·r. p oticfa ;{ii e.w.~,. County. 




.. !_.. .. • ·" ! . ~ : "' . . . ,, : . ' ;~', ... • .. . .. 
5. Enga~ In political actlvltia while on duty In publlc ~-··11,11 rule shall not apply 
to elected offlclala orchfef deputf• to an~-~ ~ ,,-1 enjoy full 
polfflcal rights when not carrying out their WOif~~ "buf ~111 not use their job 
title or position In _conn~on wffh ~I~~~- :,,. : . . · , , 
• \ w.· . • ""t. \- ....... -., ... '\ .• .. .. ! .. ~: \ ... ~. ,~ . • . • ' ' • • 
~~ ·. _;, · -- · · · ftfotmatJon ~ · inf· . · · · ··· ·' · -.: rtorm .-. --~-*-?"!'~~ . -~~.-~,-J-/~Job pe ance ,...-,u,,t8f"'1Y:v11a-·, ... 11N p1,...,....... or,.,.,..-;~-.-
7. Discriminate In the treatment of~ or meilibin of the public on the ball• of 
race. reflglon, gend•, age, dlubillty or national origin. 
• ~ "\ . • ' • .. . .. . ~ . . • k. ·".. . •. . ' : .-~ ' -:- . •.., ··"'-: , • • ~ 
a. .'Ni> arnqWr,g wltNfl the.public Oft'ldl or othir Jjubllci~ I 
• . . • .,.,, • .. ~ f•~ • 11' ' I • ' ,.. . " . . .. • •• ,,.. .. ' . • . . , . . • 
o.· -«~-... -.. o~ local ruin i.gardlncfNtfn"~·uu, altendlon, 
deatructlon, or removal of any pubBc l'9COrd8 requl,.. by .. to be kept by the entity 
er by other PL4blfc offlclall. · ' . · ., · · ·:: · , · · · 
10 ~==~ bytakl .. ,fustffledal:..a.,ll,i..,Rl..:•, IIW&a ...... vacatl 
• ·• < .. '11 ·" • ··-.·r1n ~mne ng:'=' · · ·· .i,~=-~~"'4'·"!-·-1ncorr:. 
._1pr.-.,· . .............. ·. a. or d.~.,_ ..... _ 
. . ·:, _.. ~~ or,.tq,clafm beneffls~fcl:l are . '.: ~~~~-~-,. ···• --~ With the 
E . ,-qounty polldyi,- ·. . ·· !' : : ,,, ·<·, .• .-.."". ·, ~-., · ·· 
• • • .:-.::·.· • .... :.:.' • .;, : • ~ •• • •• • !. • ., • . • 
· :11. ~~~.-;·; :;.:;1-···t··!··-.:: ·. in abiencefrornN~aa.witho~··' · ; · 'leave andshaff 
. . ' 1''¥.J:i~J~.-.. c;qffl*" ,g. . -::,,::,,IJ,.~~- ·,,~~..:,,, .. . · i-¥.1~1Pn .. .-·reqund.by-N.Elmonh .. uun9"J1V~ r'uii'·ofvacation, sick. 
bnavement, or other types of leave granted ~ ~-I~ ~~!'!n~ p.olfcy • 
. ,.... .• .. 1 .•• .i •• ·, ..... 
12. Engage In any non-work activity including prolonged visits wi1h d,jldren. friend,, or 
~!'Y,1Jn~"1~ .~fch lnterfn with trie ·course"of WOt1(fn ~ ofl'.i~·or department . i,lyjft1~. tf;~, e"plOyf!aff 18":'•· . . · · .. , · ' ' "r.. · . . · ,..,. 
• • • .-~.. • • • • ' • :: '. · .. ! . 
· 13: .. Ui-5 !&l~Ph90.ei .in.the office or w,:,rkplace in a niannerthat c:11.upta·~· work orwortc .. fl~r." .. . , .. , . . ···- •· ..• , .. uw. ··: .··,~·'.': .. ~· \: . ·-~ .... ~ ... . . 
14. Any rule established by the appointing efflclal to rrn11nta1r1 ol'Uei' and productivity in the 
workplace. 
- : •. • \ • • .. • • ' • ; ; • • •• •. • • i • • • : ·,,. --~,. • • J,, • .' ~ • ' 
,.r ]!i6!!t,·,,g~j,---~~9¥•-. ·~ ·Ip behave in·a fawful,mah~. 
' !l\'"1}.q~~nlf llali --~11.ot .. ll-lpclusln. ' . . i:.o\.. ·; . •• 
I '• 
0 
' ' t • JJf"" '~1• 0 •, • ~ • • U• o • • 0 • ' " • 
0 
• ,; • -~' •,, ., \ 0 , •: , • • • 
Potential penafflea for viotatf90 of any such rules may include but shall not be limited to: 
1. Leavewithorwlthoutpay. · ,,.,._., · '· · ,.•. ··· ._.. · 
2. S~alon for a variable or fixed period. 
. '.~L_P._~_~J\:tYt1'foa;, ~~~mP.8f1s.ation an~or•uthorttr.·. 
-;j, --A ~,... -~"'~ii or..-iu~ . . -· , . · · · ~.\, 
5 
,-~· ~ .i..:.a .... ;-~_ .. ·.·.. .. ... ,. . .'. '. ·. 




.• • • • • • • • ~ !'" • • • , •• 
· , frttroductorj: em~~" Wha• PlifofDiin~J•. 119J .1'-11afactory... Tne probationary 
-pe,tod will ~cally be • -~-t~ tq 11'9 ~~ ... - . . . . 
. ' " ' - ; 
C. -COMPEN!3ATIGN POLICIES 
' ; :· .. ·,• .' . ·. . . . ... ,. i , . 
1. · --~Hment Df Ptfi. s~iri: · · ~- . : . 
. . . . .. . ' .... 
Elmora County compenutea employeea In accord with the salary schedule 
eetablllhed.,b:Y. BDPA I~,. Fli,~-~ .ar., mp by the Board of 
eomm.._W. -~ ifeut indtaxlevleanauthorlzed. Pay for any given 
~n 18 1~ to the~ ~ P"'.'1'1..-,d.-• IUCh may be subject to 
-
., ·· ~-~ ~ .. M.,.;.i,-,fl'JCl.for-:irw t11:,1• f*tod. -n,e Board of 
·· ·· ~---- ·. · __ iililfR"liq~~andconaequenlly 
p4'J ~ ~~ atfli ~ YWln orifer10 n\linage Cllh flaw 
. .. to"deal.-" . ofner ·wtilctl,tt,f-. think j11.ulfl"~·ct,angN In entity ~--.Jla.! • . . , ... ·. . . , ~ . _ U~,J ... 111,J ·-- ·~~,.._- . .· . . . : .. . ... ' . 
1' • I • • 
2. Compllanc» with State and Federal Pay Acta 
Elmo,. County ahall comp~ • ~II state and Federal pay acta 1'81pectlng the 
?.~ ~ empl~ fc;,r ~ performed In the publ1e·aerv1ce. 
.. . • • '1 . • .. 
~-. ·c~~ Plan ;_-· .. 
• t , . • , • • f 1 I o • J. • • ~ • .'• ' I 
M. ~~--of ,Elmore c;quo.ty l,haJI be d•alfled ;Jn the •poal11on they hold with 
Ef~ ._ ,~ -~~dt, 1,1the fQI~ .manner:- · ·; . : _ . 
• • • . • • I . . • . • . . . • • • 
• .;. ' , : .. :. ~ , - • • -~.. • ; # • • • 
a. _ offl"IL -· -. - t • • · - · • 
· ~;- . ~- · . · .. •·· . ~~ ~u~_tQ !"~testing or other: selection criteria provided 
· bi .... ; . . ~ .l~~.Qeputlea anp. ORI exempt. unless they strictly supervise • • . . ln• u· J " . - • ,. . I • • ' • 
· c. ~-.. ~ ·: ~ftir.,if:~~- subj~ io:th~ testing and_ pla~ent standards 
Nllll:lfliNlid_·~Jtt~ .. ~ -pok,n,anuat -,· .,- .. .-
d. Part-time or casual employeea exempt from placement standards cited herein. 
4. Right to Change Compensation 
~~" .P9.~. ~-~."~;~.ch.~• gen~~_,, ~~aatlon ~r any -.cm 
s~~--~~.-~-#.1·-~-,i·Ponu.rllalQ~' OOmpenutlon may also be 
iBJ\)ltea billed upon Job ~rform~. and -the -.flablllty ·of funds to maintain a 
solvent entity budget · · 
5. · ·(jyjrtfnie Cbmpei,aatlon·- Compii~ce with FaJr Labor Sta~darda Act 
11me over 40 Hours per Week· 
All employees are cl-ified a exempt or non-exempt for purposes of complying with 
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Ad (FLSA). The FLSA la the Federal wage and 
-10-
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14. Payroll Deduction• u · ' ' · :~ · "z 
. • . .,. ··.'\'.,\• ' • • 1''' ,. •. , \t \:• .. 1 . .... ..,,,. ,. , J 11' 
In accord with ldahot;~:S.~~lfpj.~ 1ucceuor, no payroll deductlona wil be 
made from an ernplo~ P~l.liileM authorized by the employee or required 
bylaw. 
15. Travel Expense Reimbursement 
An -employee on entity bualn- lhall be reimbursed for expenses lnQtf1'9d In 
completing hlllher work~~ent In accord with the pollclel establfehed 
by the Board of Commluioneii.' Each employee 11 reeponalble for providing 
verified recelpta for any ~n- for which reimbursement II requested In accord 
with Idaho Code § 31-1508 or 111 succeaor. 
18. On-the-Job Injuries 
All on-the-job injuries shal be reported to the pe~nnel «?.~~ ~qr Risk ~~~} •• 
soon aa practicable, from the data of the lnjilfY. · If an· ·ett1p1of'ae ia dfaabled 
temporarily by an on-the-job accident he/she ahall be eligible for worker's 
compenutfon benefits. Retum to employmentwll be authorized on a case-by-caae wa. PQ~.~11'\l-~on.~ the~~upe.rvlat119.offlciill,~ th.la ~-_Ins~ Fund. '~ · auoaeid .. Jii. 1nr..-, ~·status 4- ~,.. ..... ~1h• ·c1,1 . ,. :• ... :. .. ..,. ... t~· . . ~,· 11-V¥,. : :· ; ,nay,. ":"~·-... .· ef ei~101'reV1ew.. . . . .... :.··· ~ ...... . . -..:v·.-· ... 'f\.• , ••• _. ...... ,.~4·:·~. ·. . · ·.. · · · ,· 
c. EMPLovee·:eeNi:Firs :'.· · 
'i .. 
1. Vacation Leave 
. ~.. -~-
Accrued vacat1011.r,ave la available to full-time employees who have completed their 
Probationary Period. Vacation accrues from the start of ,mployment (an~ 
date) In the fallowing manner: · 
Length of Service 
1 to 3 years 
4to 7 years 
a to 12 yeara 







25 daya +1 day per year over 21 years 
AJI vacatfon accrued must bet taken In the year following the accrual, except upon 
approval ·by elected offldall, the use of vacation time can be extended for a period 
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, ~~~-~~~;,m~.~-poli~and . . 
... The»-,licy ~ m ~-rv, ~'·s, ~eel PrQ~-.: ···;~ '·T4•P')b~onary 
· pWid4~-fypitfillybo a.'staililatd.90tc>IJ04ys".. :. . ~. .. · · · : 
':.' • ' : .. j • • .... , ; ~-' • ' \ ' ' . ., . ,'· . . • . " •• •: . 
· · '11* AAH ·states ui ·~' . ~.- IV Scdicm. C that '· 10 . 11 certam number of J!V";"t:1 . . . . . ' • ', ·1:.-:: .. ; . emp ~ 89Q'Ue . . 
. vacat11ib ~duil ··« \)aa.,;-buec:I on_.~ o" Rl(Vi~. . . . · . . .· · · ·· . ' ~,l;' ~l~ ,.1'!1'96 ~ ' • . . ,..-. • 'I .. •' . . . ' t •• ., • 
' .... . •\: . ~ ~ . . . . 
n.·i,oJicy ~ tii'Cbapwr' ry, s~~ ·c,.t ... &TPP~ .. \1~:wbere.'Jength (){:service ia-'!21+ 
, ... _.. ~on u:cruea it·~ c:1a~-·+) af1 '··· · ·· · 21 ". . · :,-·, .. . . .,. ·-~11'-~.~~-. )'ea,& . ·,;. ·,. ' . : ,. .. ' . . . . ' . 
The ..,ucy also~~~. \•" "'iv:.v~-~~-,~~,J ."~ .~on leave is 
· availible ~· tegul~ tbU~ and p~~ .. ~f!mpl~.,~ b.Jve ~leffld·.-~ .daya 
empld)lftent.'' incl ,jAll vadition 8CCl'Ued. mtist be 'taken at the end of the 1 ~ tollowiq 
file~- U:P.~ approval by el~ o~c;i~ *'··~-,of',v~~ tnQf ~.be extended for 
a 'period 'of 3 'incmtlij~ ·~on iilJ ·~o -~ ~: ~Oil .wit\m).,th• first1year, 
~ Vidd@' J~e ·1m1e· no~.~ ·;wm· be b6m. ' ate(! fP.i' ·onl . •• Ute tiQle .of s~~- or 
. • >• • • •. I • •,· .••• ~ , • y -,.., . ."fl'.'¥-+' 
'.lil>on tetiniment,·to l1ie mmmum ~ow~~in ~~ahoy,-~~-.", . . : ..... 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT iµtSOt VED 'J,y tJ!F ~-Q~ 9f ~~ of ~iy. <:aunty 
·that the p-olicy'shlllbe alnended b' follows: •?,• • '. •' . . •• . '" . 
'The probatio~ period will typically be a stan~ 90 tc>. 1 ~O days" ff~ be. changed to 
'7heinitialpro"tiattona~fpetiod will be·t year'·~ · · ·1 , •• • ·• • ,, _ . 
Employees shall accrue a certain number of vac-1:i9~ ¥~ -~ Y"81' based on years of 
service. 'Jbe acm,aJ sch~pl,s ~f vacamon_ ~ rates is set-~·1?.'16t.~·:~·.. . 
.;~,: :t•;r~,:.~; •. \" --~ • I " • f' .:·. ,· • .-· '• • # . ... .. . 
Length of semce 
..... . , ... ...... .., 
. ·!·~·-. ' .. ·,..,,.,_ 
... . . t ·. :, • ~ ' 







, . . . 
C ~LOY.BB BBNBPIT$ 
..-.-
• -: • y' 
1. Vauon~ 
. • t; . . . . . \.. . : . 
While vacation hom ·accumulate from the date of anpl~- for ~plar .fiJll;tbpt and part-
time-anployeea. 111 employee is ~ to ·tw ~ i~ ~,he. 91' she 1~ ... ~Ieted 3 
monthl of employm~ Vacation leave: iccttiel &om the start o( :employqic~t.~ fbe ·following 
manner. 
LtnR!h of Seryice 
1.=.3ye,n 4. . -- ·1. . .. yeaq ~3== after 20 yem of service, vacation 
bmn will accmm1ata at the rate 
set forth above for 13 tbmlp 20 
yem of sa"Yice plua additional 
houri for fJVf'KY year of service 



















An employee u;iay accrue vacation leave up to the employee's yearly maximum amount 
Any vacation hours accrued in excess of the maximum amount allowed will be forfeited, without 
right of compmsation, in the month following the pay period in which the excess hours are aca.ued 
if the excess hows are not used or taken. The responsible elected official may grant an employee an 
additional three months to take any excess acaued vacation hours. Said exception must be granted 
by the respon81'ble elected official in writing and acknowledged by the employee in writina, 
Vacation leave is to be scheduled with the consent of the responsible elected official or department 
supervisor~ Efforts will be made to accommodate the preference of the employee in vacation 
scheduliD& but first priority will be the orderly functiomna of affected departments. Upon 
separation ftom employmept, any unused vacation hours up to the maximum allowable acaued 
amount will be compensated by lump-sum payment at the then-current hourly or daily rate. Upon 
separation, any excess unused vacation hours will be forfeited without right of comp~ation. 
'Ibe provision govermng forfeitina vacation time will beam September 30, 2009. 
2. Sick Leave 
Sick leave be.ufits are provided to rep1a:r tbll-time =.ployeea who work 40 hO\ll'I per week at 
the.rate of eiaht.(8) houra per wery month 0£ employm.mt. To replar full-time employees whet 
wmk 35 houri per week, the rate shall be seven (7) baml per every month of employment. To 
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AMEND~G TBB ELMORB COUNTY PDSONNBL POLI~,~~ March 1, 1999, 
u amended January 13, 2003 & Pebru.ary 13, 2006, DD'INJNG "i&TION LEA VB 
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: ·. ·n.Mimi ;,~-~, - ~ ;s '·W SA~ .~ 7boun. ·. ck .. fora35 hour wort -:--·~m1r,:'"J'V.~~, , ··. -.:,·""'~ · -.-.. ~ ,.r . . 
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Certain County employeea work 5 days per week, 8 hours per day for a 40 hour work w*-~ . . . .... ···.·· 
' ' . -· .. .. . . 
! : 
/S/ MARSA GRIMME'IT, Cerk 
Elmore Comity Board of Cornrni11ionen 
1 
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~s. BirUVement Laave • • i ' \ I•. I • 
o I • • ' 
., .. : . I , 
e.· .. tAavN.otAblience 
.,. . . . 
. . . ,: 
Up to thirty dayt unpaid leave can be g,-nt,d tw ~-. . Head for any 
. , juetfflable'pl.llpOl6.·· Paid--1n·any.~outt,i; ·""~ · .~ ~· o1 thirty d• 
lhd requl19'wrfMn apP(aVll_of~-~~ of ~m•, ... ~. ;~···: . . ·. . . .... . ' . . ... ,. ·' . ' 
7. FMLA 
-Employeea-of 'ElmO"N'County may h~. ~~ ·,~ .1~ ~~ of leave under the 
provillona of the Famffy and Medical tMw NA of 1a8' If tt{ey meet the following 
elJgJbllfty requlntmenta, from the ~ of .f ....... ·. ~~ans (CFR) section 
·8251'110; "An ttllQlb16 employeil• 11 an ·employee· of a ·covehlc:f employer who: 
a. H• been tttnployed by ttte·.employer~ at.~ f~. ~. and 
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' ' ; ! !, ·. . ,· ~.: : .. .. , ~ \: 
Th• retlnlment plan of Elmore County comblnea. ~,Pl .il:,A;~bPc ~ployeea 
Retlnlment System of Idaho (PERSI) with soc:W·~·(Fic:A1: P~St charge. a 
percentage of an emp~'•.g~~ ~lary,,!'I:,~ t• n,., _.,tty .~mpt from Ftderal 
-and-~*- .lncometaxN dd ElnfdreC9ii~~,l~-- ··· -,;;hr· ,, . ··,3: . ··.. additional larger 
. -~~,, /.: Cantaditlie' .- ' nll'bfflcl'~ . ' . '? -~ ' • • of ~ · ~~~ · ~ · (" 1 · J' • •• "f • ' •'' • ' • I 4 " '' 
I f •"\ .. • •.• • • I ' • r·, ,'\t • , .. '. • ~t\ I • .. . ,,. • .. ,. 
;;~. -:C~ bf H••H~.~'.fQfR.;1~ ;. ; ~;'' 'if. - Stl lated 
.. _ - .: · :.in -~utJoi,-e248A.~~Not~1~"-~j,i)~~~~te of aZ,uon 
, o1-th1apo11cyt·· ... . { · ·• •. · · · · _._. ., _ :- ·-. . 
. •. . . ... ~ .. -. . . :-,.,J • . •.! .. •,; • . • • ·- : .. ., •. 
I • • • • • • • 4 '•. 
11. Mlacellaneoua Benefits 
In addition to the baneffla Dated on the Pf'.WIOllS .PJ9•,1tb.-f0llowirig miicell•neoua 
benefits are available to full-time regul• employees: 
-17- . 
052 
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A. REDUCTIONS IN FORCE (RIF) 
! I 
<I 
B. REINSTATEMENT PREFERENCE 
Employees who leave Elmore County employment due to a reduction In force ahaH retain 
a flrat rfght to return In th• event of work force rebuildJng for one year from the date of 
their separation. Employees shall retain a preference only for work for which they ara fully 
quallfled and for which available service requirements can be met 
C. FINAL EVALUATION 
When an employee separates from Elmore County service, if an evaluation has not been 
performed within the most recent six month perfod, the supervisor may conduct an 
evaluation of the lndMdual's performance prior to separation from employment. 
< \ 
D. RETIREMENT POLICY 
The retirement policy of Elmore County shall comply In all respects with federal and state 
requirements respecting mandatory retirement and the obligations established by the 
PubUc Employee's Retirement System of Idaho {PERSI). No employee shaft be 
compelled to retire except in compliance with said acts. 
E. COBRA BENEFITS 
Employees of EJmore County who currently receive medical benefits, who separate their 
employment may be ellglble to continue those medtcal benefits at the ei11pl9yees sc;,le cost 
and expense for a limited time In accordance with the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliatfon Act of 1985 (COBRA). If you have any questions regarding your right to 
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. . . . . . f. RESOLUTION NO. ·35·t,05··· . ' .. · = . 
:.e •: • ', \' I:~ ,111 \ l !t I • ,\ • • • .. ... i ' •• \ • • I 
wpmp~~~-~ rnai,mtq>I that the best source of protecQ&f-iqr the. health and 
safely o'f ilie work force-ii the individual employee. Theref'ore, it fa the respoaiibility of all 
emplo,eea to strictly follow all safety and health polici• and proceclurel. 
... 
NOW, TJIBllDORB, BB IT RESOLVED that the followin1 Manapment Safety Policy 
be and the same i1 ha:eby adopted by tho B1more County Board of Commiuion .. and made 
a part of the Blmore County Personnel Policy Manual adopted March 1, 1999 an\f ~
January 13, 2003. · · , . :, ·:.. :· i, .. 
The safety of employees at Elmore County is of primary importance. Blmore Countys 
goal is to provide safe womna conditions and operatina procedurea that will ensme 
a safe wor.k environment for all employees. 
Accidenu represent a needless waste of human resources and economic Jou. A safe 
operation conservea human and material resources and is essential to efficient 
production. 
All level• of manaaement and supervision have a primary responsibility to determine 
safewodc procedurea and ensure safeworkinaconclition1. Suporvilon and employees 
are expected to foJlow the work methods and procedures estabHshcd by the County. 
Theseresponsibiliti• can be met only by working continuously to promote safe work 
practices among all employees and to maintain property and equipment in a safe 





Board of CoJDnitss·loners 
Comale Cnuer 
587-4630 
Date: May 2.3, 200.S 
El.MORI C0llffY C0URTH0US! 
150 Sol6 4'1 EaltSulll II 
Maunlala ..... Idaho &1M7 
Memo from the Board of County Commissioners: 
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El.MORI! COUNTY COUR1H0IJSI 




D:f\TE: . . J'EJl:ttUARY 2, 2Q09 
TO: 
FROM: 
. ·· •. 
.ALL·EL1\;1018lco~~~ 
E~RE C()lJNTY COMMJ'SS~ . 
..... 
\~- . ' 
i.. 
. ... ;;·· 
: '" ' . 
,., . 
! "' • ' .. ~ .. ' .... .· ·•· ', 
,'i•. . . ,, . 
. . ... 
. . '• ,:· 
-
,,. 
:i . ·.• -
·· .::r.1 . 
<, · 
057 
Fa~517~ ' . . . ·. 




Board ~of. ·:·Comlllissloners 
. . . 
_Mi;MO 
ELMOR8 ~~ 
150 South 4th Eut Sule ,s 
! . Mountlln~ ldiho . ., . 
Lan,RoN 
366-2226 
t ' : • " • 
DATE: FEBRUARY 2, 2009 
TO: . ALL ELl\1018lC6~)tffl~ 
FRQ,,.: EJA1:ORE COBN'l'Y COMMISS~ 




Due to gulYtf cins .and-~9.~, chu=tfttat,!O~ is ne\\~ed . . 
regar4W'i>~~C§e,,ot~e Gou..,_Jnjetp¥J~aiid.,fmidl~,,····, ·~ 
Effecj\r;!r.finittltliatel,:; 11rei~n,,f~'8.a e~ifl ~ .,dt~!litiwed 
for aJlt.P-Jtsonal use. . · · · · 
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Elmore County Drug-Free Workplace Policy-.,. · .:· ·.: ·' .. ,. : 
·Diili-Free :Workplace Policy·· 
• , • .: I • . • . • •. • 1 • • 
'·'. 
Elmore County is committed to protecting the safety, health and well being of all employees 
and other individuals in our workplace. We recognize that alcohol abuse and drlif-UM"·fllse ·a 
sjgnjficant threat t~ our goals. We have _established a dfug-free workplace program ~ balances 
our·~'(ot lndi~~s wiffi ilie neea· t,Hiimtlib atfilcoiiol aiad tttu;-tree erivirofunent~ 
. -;· ··: :· ,, , , • . • ., .• , • • : . . r.: .• ' . , • .- ; 
• Elmore County encourages employees to voluntarily seek help with urug' ·ana alcohol 
problem~. 
l\t .,1• ' 
I. 
~l indi~i~tJ&t :':"ho. -~onduc~ b~i~~ss rQr El~o~ County, is .. a~~lyi~~ for a_ i>?s~tion _o~ is 
cpnlfuc;tffia ~an,~ on th~ orpµut16n's property 1s coveted l?Y o~ dni4;.Jree workplace pobcy. 
0& p61,fcj 'iit'cilqa~; but ii ~ot' .{piiied to,. inanagers, ~sors, tuu:.'tinie ·~ loyea, Pai'.t-time 
. ~m,,r9~ 'off'-si,te einpl~ye~s. bo~~c.to~? vol~lee~, f~tems,, appli~t~ an~ ~_lect~ (jffi~ials. 
Apullcablllty 
Our drug-free workplace policy is intended to apply wheneve't ·~yone is 'rei:;Yeieilting or 
coP.4ucting busines.s for Elmore County. Therefore, this policy applies during all working hours, 
·\\thi~er conclucting bttiJiness or representing Elmore Cou#ty, while on call, paid standby, while 
on'E:_lmore County property and aj any Elmore County-jpbfulbted events:· . · :. . · · 
f•, t ',:J• ~ I f f • • •• · • .. • , f• f • 
Prohibited Beh~v.ior 
It is a yiol~oq of our drug-free workplace policy to use, possess, sell, trade, and/or offer for sale 
aicohoJ; tiI~~~~·t 'p ·or intoxicants." · · ·• · · · · · · ·· ·. · · ·· · : · , ..... ' .. ~ .• w..l . *,· • • ·~ • .. 
• • ••• • • 1 • •• 
059 
. , 
Copftdepflallty .• t1 
•• • 'f ... 
Shared Rgponsiblllty 
,c. -*.':. . !1 ~r •• • , t ,, ., • ~ •• ;~ •::·, 
A =fSlife · ·ind: productive drug-free workplace is · achieved t dll'ouib ·CQOpctration and shared 
responsibility. Both employees and management have important roles to play'. ·· . -.: , 
Ali eidj,~oyees -~ :~uit~ to not -~~~rt'!~.~~:~ _.~'. .. $Ubj~~ ·tQ __ i;autt·.'w~i~~ _th~lr _ability _to 
perform Job duties 1s 1mpa1red due to oil.; or off-duty use df alc'bhol br other drugs. · 
In addition, empl~~ are ~ntduta~a~· ·lei: ,! ~.: • ,t ; .. . . . .~ 
... . • B~ concerned about working in a ~• environment. 
• • • • • I ~ 
• Support fellow workers in seeking help. 
• Use the Emp1oyee · Assistance Prograr11· · 
• Report dangerous behavior to their supervisor. 
It is th~ ~~J?~if~~~,~ffpo~ibi,~ty to: ... 
• Infol'D\ ~~ploye~s oft~e ~g-free workplace policy. 
·ob ·e · 10 e r1r · · · • .Kll!~.O.~JLY ~po. 9~· 
• Investig&le:~P.1:il1S of,d.allitrtl\i.$ practices. 
• Counsel employees as to expected perfonnance improvezp~nt. . ·. .,. 
• Refer employees to the Employee Assistance Program. f :. = 
• Cle~ly state c~nsequences of poUcy violations. 
~o~munlcation ' : . ' . ·. 
Co~i;~'i;tr:d,u&-~e·wo~pl~~ policy to both supervisors and employees is critical to 
our succtss: To · ensure all employees are aware of their role in supporting our drug-free 
workplace program: · 
• All employees will receive a written copy of the policy.. -... , 
, '\ 
, . ·""'· , ..... ·· 
...... 
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A. PURPOSE .. . . 




I 't• :. 
. . 1. Th• ·aafe~y~ra~l~.t.~~X>~•· 41i-,•c~t•e..d. pere~ a~e f~r·· the 
purpose of prevenf'ing :Crijury to persons and property • 
. : ; '· 
B. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY 
l. Tb••• saf~ty reg,Aatt~a sl\All. ·pe e·ff~c;:.,tive as of the 
date oJ; --i1uiu¢,ce ~~ ~~:m,~iAc• k~;;. '4t•ry ~l~y-,. of the County 
under· e"y_!f.rY -~~~cum~~~ce "shall b, r~~r~.d- whe7t.e. •P-t>lic;a~le. 
. . ,,,. ~ . . . . . .. .. . .. 
2. Emplq,:ee~ acting 1~ ~ .-ui>-.¢,,ory_ .c~}!,a~ltY, either 
reaw.Jarly- ·or -temporarily, shall requite ,11 eq,1-p,:eea woxking 
unaer the~r sup•rvision to comp~y ~t.~ all ap_pl~~able safety 
instructiob:i a.net safe piactices. · · . ·: ·; . ,. . · 
·3. If a differ,ehce o·f opinion· arises in the application or 
interpretation of these regulations, ~he d:e,c~s.i~n of the employee 
in chart• of th~ job ah~ll'. 'b~ followflc;l~ Su\,s~·q'.'-'leit;t_ :_appeal -~Y be 
made through eatablished procedures. · , 
' . . ' . . 
4. Departments and Divisions may promulgate additional°· 
safety regulations to be followed by_ t:hQae •. p~rsona WQr-k~n_g. Qr 
operating under the jurisdiction of those aepartments. A copy of 
Depar~t S~fety Regu~ations •hall be providtd, t~ the ~ounty 
Safety to~tt'•e ~hlt.i~. imployeea,' ~~~t~f~ tp work "ite 
outside their-'normaLwork station or department will follow the 
safety procedures applica~!~.to that 1work stt~, 
.. ..t ' . . 
C. BNFORCtbmtQ' 
. . 
: • , · ; · ' 1 ,r 
1. ~-In· c~9forinq~e wit~ ~b,, ~~RSO~~ -~~- · -~l.s~ipiinary 
action trl:,,11 r~,ul~ for_vi9l4~io~.of,th••, a~t•~Y;~eguJ•tions. . :'; : : . , . . .,. .- . . . . . . ,, . .·. . 
2. 'Whilnever there 1.-~. a:Lf-fer;~~~ ot. ~pin~on ~e~e41n -tne 
employee and the supervisor aa to whattier or not a particular 
assign.men~ is••~~. ~~e j~4gment of ~4~.~\W~~~ot will prevail. 
The em.plot~• may'_fi~e a ,8!'i:eva~~e r;ga.t4,!:P.g ;the, 1:1i~'Qatiqn-d:n. 
accordance with· Cotin~y' g:r;ev~c~. _proi;.~du:re!)S •. · · 
.- : . t . · r ~· ·· · · ;'. .. " · 
D. MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
SECTION I lttl'R0DUCT10tf 
ns t 
.. 
• with the employ• d as soo~ as possi~le,. _ -~- ~.~t. ;h~. ~~peryi~or' s 
acQidettt. it1Ye1~4.g~tibn· and ~epol!'t fol!'ID~ ;No b'li.f11c.l wttt···t~ :'>~ left 
. empty on th~ report form, if the particular question does 'tiot 
apply, indicate that with the symbol N/A i~ t~~ ~pprQpriate 
blank. . 
3. Supervisor'•· additional resporia1bilias include: 
. . ':: . ·-
a~ ., t~~t~cting new workers" ~·Jsafett· prQcedu~es apd 
safety rules. · · · · · · · · · · · : '· 
· . . b. Training · all ·workers for-'-•a:11 ta41l<a · asaip,ed ~o 
them; checking their progress~ · : . · · _- ., · ' · . . : .. · · 
c. Ens\Lring-:~t an•·.employee is ·adequately trained 
prior to authorizing that employee to operate ~ch~e~ and 
equipment. . .. , · \ · · 1 
d. Ensuring that equipment and facilitiea ~re properly 
maintained. . ·. · · · · · 
e. Enforcing saf~t·1' resuJ.-atiorla. · · · ·!' 
. . . f. Cctrrecting unsafe· :·acts.; 
g. IdEUitJ;f,y,ing trouJ;,led employees and ,follow-up··with 
interview :~d -re!a.xr•l, when -ne6easary. · ·. · 
h. Inspectinf and correcting hazards in t~e Supervisor's 
own area of· res.ponsibil ty.· · • . . 
· ... i. Pt"oviding each employae witli an Elmore Co~~Y 
Safety Handbook; answering any~questt~na·corlcernink safety and 
loss cQn~rol •. before ·they sign,· t·o signify tha"t-.:·they have rfad 
and understand ·--it-. · · ; · ··'-i: .: -y·· ·· • ' 
F •.. s~n: cOMMITTEE/SAFETY onrGBR 
1. The safety committee meets monthly (or moi.-e often; if 
necessary). The Committee meeting will be conducted by the 
Safet-Y· P~fic..er. · Meeting minutes will· be kept Hy a rec;:o·;-d:t.,t}g 
secretiary:. The -S:afety Officer will then ·r,eview· the m-•tin.i 
minutes of the last meet"ing and 'report what. h•s =tieen doiie ·.:to 
accomplish any tasks that were assiped during the rcae9.ting. If 
th.a S_pety :PX.Oblem that resulteq- · in· ·the 1iW..,ki\menc ~i'.,.been 
reaolve.d,. ~t- wi:11· "b'e 1:epo'rted. .11;· th•-"p~~l,nt ... c;,imio*. 0e· re~~lved, 
the reason will be.reported~ 1f. the problem c"an it11l be resolved 
and aiJ!iply has not yet been. imple~t;ed, tJ;t~t,. ~l-~111!.n,tation 
sch_ed~k wi,11 be repo·rt•d and/or a ·n'e1' ~ltaol:ut;i9n to .. 1:tt~; problem 
will be fo~late.d by the Commf:.ttee. · •. · ·,· .. · · , ·!· · 
~ i : .. t •• • • .. .. • ' ·~ ' : • • • • • • • 
The Conmiit-tee· ·will then tnove ort to an'y -ne1r business, · 
including suggestions from any member, a review of Elmore County's 
accident· x-ecpi;-~e s4,nce th, pr!!vious m.~e;~ng~ ·~d .~Y ~,i,ignme-q~s 
that axe n~ssary· to permit newly forii\w.ated· -'changes· to·· t·ake. 
place •. -The .Qf·f·t~er ·will make certain that each aa11i~~ "includes 
a specific completion date so that proper reporting-!·,tcf .ttiie Codmissionei: 
can take place. .. 
. . . . . . . 
~- ~~~-ty Officer. w1ii' stat the. tblt:e· .Qf t;~a ri~~i!':Sifety 
CQ•e~e,~ ~~.~-~g -~4·· advise. all who are ~6 · attihd~·,., T.!l1'· sa.t~~Y 
Offtc·er w,111,.Jla.~rtl_le ·meeting ~U!i~• tJ:ped, a·~1··Di ~~ff ~j.-f ~ 
a~ggestto~.fa:..fs>t :~ha:oge Qr ·:t~r~vement ~n~~ ... tt. ·, . ~lr"e.,: Jhe ,, 
list of p,;.•PP.•~.·•••igne4 -to dui:f tas~. · ·Thtr. ~e J:-t\w1:ii fflel,._.J?..~ 
fon-.rdec:I to .the ·Director .for-revitt. · · · 1 -~ .. " ..., : .. · '· ,. '. 
• . . • ... . !" . • : 
SECTIO!.f i INTRODUCTION 
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. , 
A%Cer che employee has been treat•~inedically, he/she will 
report such treatment t6 1:tie Stip6rrisor·~· . Supervisors a'&'e to 
be informed by injured employees regarding any change in their 
medical etatua. . . . ... · . 
. . • ! . ' . . ~ 
. I.f '1Jll't.lro11•• ~ve qu•stiona -~Qp.qerniri1 .J:.he disposition 
of the~r _Wo,;kers· ..,C'PJi'Pt111sat~on c~-~. th'.ey ,sh(?;u~_d ask If~r.~onnel 
or call th~. I~ ~St4te lns~ance Fund directly. . . · . . 
• I , • ' • • 
2. A:4d1~io~~l. ~loy•~ i;,apoq.aibil;Lt.i!• ,~nc~lud~: .. 
. a. . ~owiv-1· ;&l\d co1Di>~Yi~g, with the ··~•t:Y r•iula~:i.otis 
applicable· to 1thijir jobs • 
. . . _b • .1~·0:llp~g •~fe work p_~._ctices and •ncouraae their 
CO-WOTkers to do tlie·aame. . 
c. Rlt~~~ting ~y unsa~, c9nditi0ns. . .. 
d. 'Ce>rrecting unsafe condi~~dll,4, whe~ nece~••.~Y. 
a. Promptly reporting an injury to a Supervisor. 
f,._ Promptly r~porting all accid•nts and.near accidents 
to a Supervi@~~. ., · . , 
g. Making suggestions for improved safety conditions. 
H. Iffl~RETATION OF REOtJµTIONS. . . . 
Th••• regulations shall be liberally interpreted and 
shall be the controlling policy over any conflictin1 instructions 
elsewh_er~ give~. Jt?wever, ~f l•wful and ,.pplicabia .goyernmental 
regulat,.on~· a:re cont~ary to. the•• :i-eful~t-i9(1s, then such 
governmental 'regulations will contr'o . . : 
I. AMENDMENTS 
.. -· . 
Alterations or amendments to these safety refulations may 
be made only in the manner in which these regulat' ens were 
orig~~~y i_ssued and ~Y .. su~h, c~ge~ flhall ~e ~~i;ective on 
the data of 'their issuan~e ~. Copies of all al, terflt-f,~ns or 
amendments will be distrlbut·ed to employees and ·posted on 
District bulletin boards .. 
J. GOVERNMENTAL SAFETY STANDARDS 
In' aaddi~~oi:r to thiise 11afe~y· inilt~~c1:'ion~. atid practices, 
the County and its employees·shall comply with all other 
applicaple safety stan4ards and law~ ~n the pe~formance of 
their work. -· · · 




1. • , .. 
l. STOP -- turn off the ignition -- do not move the 
vehicle. Advise the other driver not to move his/her vehicle. 
I • • 
2. Assist the injured; call ambulance, if needed; do not 
move any :l.nj~ed pe;r.aqn unl~ss abaolu~ely, n.ec".s~a'I\J··· 
3. Protect,. th~ acciden:t scepe ancl h;ve so.i;eone .d4:rac~ 
traffic. : . 1 •.. 
4. .-: ~1. mo_to,r,, veq_iclct acc:icl•pta involri,:ig Co,unt:,; · O.lfP.•d or 
other vehicles. :us_e~ :t» .Oouney b11Sinea a. ,hell be · .H.poi:~•.G · : .. · 
immediately to the Pol!ce Department ·and, if 1approprtat•, tne 
County's Sheriff Department. 
\ •• ' • •• • ••• • ••,1 
s. .. \~~l •• -~.~cprci ;._ get n_.. -ad.str••s, l.lceilae. number, 
and insuran~~ -c_pmp.any of the othe, v~1'~qle(..e)·,~~lved~ · Qei · 
name• .,-nd flAdl:'.•••·~• -of .~tneaa,s;: 111Ak~ aiagrPl&; .i.f ,.po.••:iblt!!, 
take pictures. Make sure the police make an accident ~eport, 
regardless of the amo,mt of damage. 
6. ~·:~Qt;. S~P.. ·,-nything:•but the ·tr~tftc til~k~.t, ~i-the 
police ~s~. Do ~-o~; -JU.ke or. ·stgn any stateinent· ;aQIP:ttil\l · 
fault. You &1:'.~ r-.q~_ired to tell onJ.y. ypur n~e "and addrei,s 
and show your driver's license, vehicle 1'•gis-tt:ratd:on and proof 
of insurance. 
' ; \ .. ,: . 
7. · F"i~e, an :accident report with-yQur Superv,isor. 
8. County Sheriff Department accident investigator shall 
take pictures, and get a copy of accident report. · · · 
F. FIRE EMERGENqy 
1. No ;~:u~~_!L:ng, ~quipment or material· of any kind.is 
worth a human life. Don't take chances. 
2. Steps f~r. a gener•l fire: 
a. Remove injured, if any, from fire area; wam 
people in th~ .~J.'!~~: pf ph~ :f.~~e; c;9t1t-~9l. c~o-,rd.s.. . .. 
; .l>:~ . . ConJ~n~- 1th~ .fir~; if tnd~.ors, close doori .of 
adjacent ro.om.s .• .,. •.·. . . . .. . . . . ~ 
1.c ...... Call firp ·d~partment :~- emergf:ln.cy ·-911 ;· '8ive the 
exact location(s) of the fire and.answer all questions calmly. 
d. Assign someone to go to the nearest street 
interst:U:~~9~. ~\! df.~e~-t .f.ir-, ·eq~pment.; · · . . . . . . . 
. . :e .• :· .. if: ~.t 1• .a s~ll fire, .BJl,cl,~t:/is feasible., ~t-ght 
the fire . UJing lire ie~tinguisllers SlP,-·tlib}e for . ~he type o.f. · .. 
fire bei.n.g fo'3,ght. i . · 
SECTION II ACCIDEN'J;~ & INJURIES II-2 
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7. Materials 11 not be stacked withi 8-inches of 
ceilit).g j,1.-i:-~ .,prinld.,tf b.••91l',. ~ter-1,.1,s·l snall not bJ! ,~_tac~ed in 
such a manner as to proj41·,;t;-.iil~O. a.1:,1,,. ' · · 
8. Combustible waste and flammable materials.-.. ,ubj'eot ·to· 
spontaneous combustion, shall only be deposited in noncombustible 
metal cQ~JltJ~ir.-. (~tb. 11tlf~cl<>•lr.,.g lidi.-4.n ct:>11fd.:ned ar~aa) . 
C. PRQ~cttvt :~quu•m.< . : .. , ·~, · ~ ·. . . · . · ' ·' 
• • I .. .., "f •• • "f ~ • , • • : • .,. ' •, 
l. Prtacrlbed protective equipment shall be used at all 
times.~ 1'0fk ........ ••~ .: · . , . · ·:·;. · 
• ;• • • I{\ • ~ : ' • ' • 
2. Approved hard hats shall be worn when th~ employee is 
exposed tQ,fl}4f•t-d•t ~from· flying 4l'J.6! fait11:tg ;Object~. 1 ~·When· a . · 
County ._lVPi!lY.f~·--4-•, req\1l~ecJj1:0 :~be· -~D •~:work' are• tontrolied 'by ·; 
others, iie/ihe aha11 obey a11 ·e•fety,,rutes .established. fot" the 
area, including those pertaining to hard hats. 
' • lt .. • I •*9 . r• ,•, I'' • .,. • ?:.,. • :. • I • • • 
3~ Gog1les, face shields, and other suitable protection 
devic,a. slµ&J..,J .. 'f.?., .~orn _:wh ... ll $Dip'loy,es · .are e:q,osed to posiible 
flying pairtl9,lia -O+ q)l~cal ·Splashef. · · . ··. · ··, , ., .. 
. . 4, . A.PP~V~d resptr.~o~y -~tat ~ &1lt4li .be u,ed. :when employ~ea 
are exposed to concentrations of· dust; : fUJD.$s , v..apQrs or gasses. · · 
5. ~4Ri~9~~4 h~a~iAJ p~o~ectors_must·be wo.m-when wor~ing 
in areas·:.9t .. ,l).~gl1 .t\~.tse. lev.el. · · ,' · ... 
f. .. • ' • 
. 6. Equipme~t safety devices and g~rding shail be used at 
all times and shall not be removed or blocked by Operating 
persqnnel. .. , · ·. · . · · 
; 
7. Protective equipment shall be kept clean and free f~om 
damagt. 1~E!41.l~~"t;';:C-p.tfp_e~-ian~ shall betp:erform.ed and· asaufe t~t 
prote9,t·i~9: ·14~p~~ c,ffe~a maxlmUlll ·pl;'o~ttl9tio.n. l)amag~ut or·· 1:.. '.: 
defective :Jl.t.~~eq~~ •qu:LpDl&tJC o:r clothing· shall be ··r~placed ,or • · · 
repaired priof to use. . ' . 
D. HANDLING OF MATERIALS 
: .. • 1--"t•l""J~io t ... ·. , ' , {,'. , , . • 
l. : _:(~~~~·· sbll~l .not try -to .,J.~i.ft o.r ,'lllQVe loads ~tit; ·•~• · 
too.b.f:!l!V1.··01; c:;·t1*•.7 ro~. 9ne-,person-tQ ·han.dle.·i· d~. .:_ ...... : 
.· .f~.-· ',:-.· .. ·; .. \:~- -·~ ...... _; i:, ~- .. ·" ., .... j \ •. "· . ., : ..... . 
2. ;.vij'lll,re ·P~.1111:Lql,:e, Jl\ecb,anic4l. equipment. •sh_ould··be used to 
lift or move heavier materi•ls. If mechanical assistance is not 
availabl.ft:, _aqditiop.-1 QJanp_o,;,r ~i.1·1~ '. ~ .~eq~~4.• ·. · · 
• ' f ..... : t •. ~ f ' ; ·'-t .. -· . ' ' . ,.,. 
3. All employees shall b~ ~esponsible to ~~wand practice 
proper \#-~~in&i1.t~~lmigµ41s-.., · . · ~ ~;, ;.. . · 5; ·. , · 
..._. ~ :~ I • • '.° • .# ,. • • ' ; : : • .. f ':_ ' • ;• • • : " ,r' • • ' ."' 
4. "Before' an object is lifted, it shall be inspected :for 
slippery •~bstances to insure that the object.will not slip from 
a p;ie ... ·'.lil.._i spqµid, ·also· ,be· i-nsp~c:t.ed ,for· .. shar.p~. edgeli'f" s!Li~~~s · 
and ·~7=:e:_~5iisi&- n,~~lil .r, t~ _. ..:·-< · ·.. , . • , • ; · t, (;- ; . ·, · · • ~ '~ ; · 
• ,- ~, t • • • • t* •,. ,·o • • ., I ~ -;.• : :.,: ~ = ~ : .,. 
. ·.· .. , .. 
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5. Flammable 11qu~4.• stJ,.it µ~~ be stored in aisles or 
walkways and shall be so located that there will be no interference 
with evacuation of the area in case of fire. . 
'. ... ' 
6. Cigarette but~s, matches or other similar materials 
shall not:' bl di~cardi~ ·<wit:hoti~ fully ext:i.n-ui~hJll--*.. ~&~'··s~stal_l~e. 
• : ~ • .. , . • :\ ; I .,., • • , • • • • ~ 1? :-!' , t ~ . • 
·, 7-_ Ash·tt:a:Ys~ ... ciga1:~~~e·b~~~· ~~ ~t~hea·~h~il on~y be_.;.·. 
disposed of tu approved noncombuitible containers. 
8. Smoking, striking of matche.~, .ftr othtt:. ~O~.c;f• ,qf .. 
ignition shall not be permitted within· ;No ·smoking" -~reas. · 
·. 9 ~ ··No g,i~oline, ··~laiilmabt-• sol:veti(:~ o~· !i~uia+:· ,hall.~, , . 
stored·tnsi4e buildings in other tHan·approved' flammable itorage 
containers. 
SEC'.I'IO.N II I ... "GENERAL · SAF!!i'Y· 
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' • t • • ._. ~ ·,,: ' ' 
3. Electrical cords shali be heavily insulated and not 
subjected to excessive b•nding, stretching, or kinking. All 
cords and wires shall be frequently inspected for signs of 
defects. Damaged or frayed electric wires, cords, and plugs 
shall be immediately replaced by a qualified electrician, or 
other properly trained maintenance personnel. . 
D. CHEMICAL SPRAYING 
1. Chemical spraying programs, where applicable, will be 
formulated individually by each Department under the guidelines 
set by the Department Manager, and in accordance with Federal, 
State and local regulations. 
2. All employees of each particular department will 
follow their Department's chemical spraying safety program. 






PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
CHERRI NIX 
VENCE PARSONS, SUPERVISOR 
APRIL 30, 2012 
NOTICE OF TERMINATION 
On February 1, 2012, you were served with a Notice of Last Chance based upon 
a disciplinary action being taken against you. You were placed on probationary 
status for a period of one (1) year, during which tlme·you were Informed that you 
would be an at-will employee subje'ct to termination with or without cause at any 
time during your probationary period. You were, also, warned that this was your 
last chance to continue employment with Elmore County, and any further 
performance problems could result In your termination of employment. 
Based upon the fact that your I performance In your position has not met our 
expectations and you have not fulfilled the performance requirements as set out 
in the Notice of Last Chance, you are hereby notified that your employment as a 
Custodial and Maintenance Employee with Elmore County is hereby terminated 
effective this 30th day of April 2012. 
. 
I have been continuously reviewing your work and progress with respect to the 
Notice of Last Chan~. I have documented continuing problems with your 
performance of your assigned job duties. Then, while I was on vacation three 
weeks ago, it was reported to me that your cleaning duties were substandard and 
you took longer lunches than allowed. These are the same performance issues 
that resulted in the Notice of Last Chance being served upon you. 
You are directed to immediately surrender to the person serving this Notice upon 
you any and alt equipment and property (however characterized) Issued to you 
by Elmore County. You are also directed to Immediately surrender to the person 
servln~ this f\Jotice upon you any and all identification cards, business cards or 
any items that identify you as an employee of the Elmore County, along with any 
and all keys which you have to any and an Elmore County automobiles, buildings 
or facilities of any nature. Finally, you are directed not to access or utilize any 
County computer, computer system, network resource or application (however 
characterized) or remove, erase or alter any documents or other County property 
(excluding only your personal effects unconnected with County operations) from 
any County facility. 
Should you believe that this termination is based upon an unlawful discrifl)inatory 
purpose, you have" seven (7) days from termination to notify me that you wish to 
meet with the Elmore County Board of Commissioners to discuss this issue. NQ 
NOTICE OF TERMINATION 
Nix v. 8more Councy,------
Affidavit 
Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Motion 
1168 Exhibit D 
• other issues pertaining to your termination will be considered at that time. If you 
believe this personnel action is the consequence of unlawful discrimination, 
neglecting to raise such allegations In a timely manner shall constitute a failure to 
exhaust your administrative remedies. 
Your paycheck for all services rendered and all leave accrued through this date 
will be transmitted to you on the next regularly scheduled pay date. 
Dated this 30th day of April 2012. 
td.w~ Pawaztw1 
Vence Parsons, Supervisor 
AFFIRMATION OF SERVICE 
I, ttAJC( fh &:50A21 , afflnn that I served the foregoing Notice of 
Termination on Cherri Nix this 30th day of April 2012, via: 
_ ..... X_ Hand Delivery 
__ Certified Mail 
__ Regular Mall 
__ Other: ____________ _ 
,L~A < RW01t.l(,L 
SignaFure 
Attachments: Notice of Last Chance 
NOTICE OF TERMINATION 2 
1169 
May 4, 2012 
TO: ELMORE COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
150 S. 4TH E. STE. 3 
MTN. HOME, ID. 83847 
FROM: CHERRI NIX 
435S. 2ND E. 
MTN. HOME, ID. 83647 
RE: FORMAL REQUEST TO MEET WITH THE ELMORE COUNTY BOARD 
OF COMMISSIONERS 
Elmore County Board of Commissioners, 
I, Cherri Nix, am requesting to meet with the Elmore County Board of 
Commissioners. I wish to be put on the agenda for an Executive Session as 
soon as possible. 
Thank you, 
Cherri Nix 
CC: Vence Parsons, Maintenance Supervisor 
l 
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lVIAUK & BlJRGO\"l"~E 
Telephone: (208) 345-1654 
Faal111Ho1 (108) J45-JJJ9 
E-mail: 1lb@maukburaoyae.com 
Webllto: www.maukburao,ao.com 
Altomeys at Law 
May 24, 2012 
515 So11tll 6th Street 
Post Office Box 1743 
Bolso, Idaho 83701-1743 
VIA FIRST CLASS MAIL AND EMAIL (kschindele@elmorecounty.org) 
Kristina M. Schindele 
Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney 
190 South 4th East 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
RE: Cherri Nix 
M&B File No. 12-6751-B 
Dear Ms. Schindele, 
This will confirm an earlier communication from your staff that the Elmore County 
Commissioners will hold their hearing on the termination of Cherri Nix's employm~nt at 1 :30 
p.m. on June 11, 2012 in the Commissioners' Room at the Elmore County Courthouse. If I have 
misunderstood this communication in any degree, please notify me immediately. Will Ms. Nix 
and I be issued a formal notice of the hearing? 
Thank you for having your staff send me a copy of the Elmore County Personnel Policy. 
It is the same as that which my client has, and it confirms 'my view that the policy was not 
followed. I will explain. 
Section 4 on pages 20 and 21 of the personnel policies is titled "Appeal Hearing (Pre-
Deprivation)." This policy provides that full-time regular and part-time employees have a right 
"to a hearing prior to any final decision on discharge .... " Subsection (a) of the policy further 
provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he employee will be provided notice of the charges," and a 
"Notice of Proposed Action" containing "an explanation of the employer's evidence [and] the 
proposed personnel action .... " 
Ms. Nix's supervisor issued her a "Notice of Termination" on April 30, 2012, stating that 
she "is hereby terminated effective this 30th day of April 2012" (emphasis in original). Indeed, 
Ms. Nix's employment, pay and benefits did terminate on that day. Yet, the Appeal Hearing 
policy states it is "Pres-Deprivation," that the employee is entitled to a hearing before "any final 
decision on discharge," and that the employee is to be provided a ''Notice of Proposed Action" 
stating "the proposed personnel action" ( emphasis added). Consequently, the Notice of 
Termination, and the actual termination of Ms. Nix's employment effective April 30, 2012, were 
premature and in violation of the County's policy. Ms. Nix should have been issued a Notice of 
Proposed Action informing her of a proposal to terminate 
"71 
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• • Kristina M. Schindele 
May 24, 2012 
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Furthermore, although the Notice of Termination noted Ms. Nix's alleged failure to fulfill 
"~rforrnance requirements" and "problems with [her] performance," it did not include any 
specification of "charges" or any "explanation of the employer's evidence" as required by the 
Appeal Hearing policy. This is no mere technical or minor defect. These failures deprive Ms. 
Nix of a meaningful opportunity to adequately prepare for the hearing. She is left to guess about 
the precise alleged performance problems for which she was fired and the evidence with which 
she will be confronted at the hearing. She must prepare for the hearing in a vacuum guessing 
about the charges and the employer's evidence. This will hamper her ability to be meaningfully 
heard and cause her increased expense because of the need to over prepare. Due process requires 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. The defects in the Notice of Termination have denied her 
both of these rights. Furthermore, a very practical consideration is that the defective notice wilJ 
require Ms, Nix and I to present evidence on every possible charge, prolonging the hearing 
beyond that which would otherwise be required. 
It seems to me that Ms. Nix and Elmore County would both be well served by correcting 
the notice problems in this case before the appeal hearing. This would allow the parties to focus 
on substantive rather than procedural issues at the hearing. If the notice is not corrected, I will be 
asking the Commissioners to overturn the discharge because of the defective and premature 
notice. The County would presumably then correct the notice and propose to discharge Ms. Nix, 
leading to a second hearing on the substantive matters in this case. 
Finally, as due process and the Appeal Hearing policy require that the notice and hearing 
be "pre-deprivation," Ms. Nix is entitled to back pay and benefits until such time as a decision on 
the merits of discharge is rendered by the Elmore County Commissioners. I therefore demand 
that Ms. Nix be reinstated effective April 30, 2012 and until such time as a final termination 
decision might be rendered by the Commissioners. 
Please notify me as soon as possible of Elmore County's position on the issues I have 
raised in this letter. Although Ms. Nix and I want to proceed as expeditiously and cooperatively 
as possible on the procedural issues, if these matters are not to be promptly corrected in advance 
of the hearing, I will need to seek appropriate expedited relief in the courts. 
Very truly yours, 
/1~/7~. 
Grant T. Burgoyne 
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NOTICE OF HEARING IN FRONT OF THE ELMORE COUNTY BOARD OF COUN1Y COMMISSIONERS 
JUNE 11, 2012, 1:30 PM 
COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S ROOM - ELMORE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
Pursuant to your request, the Elmore County Board of Commissioners have scheduled a meeting 
to discuss any discrimination clalms you may have asalnst Elmore County, Its agents or employees. 
Please be advised that you were an at wlll employee, and as such are not entitled to a hearing regarding 
the reasons for your termination. The Board wlll not discuss performance-related Issues. 
; The meeting wm be held In executive session and will be at 1:30 pm on Monday, June 11, 2012 
In the Commissioner's Room of the Elmore County Courthouse. 
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS 
ELMORE COUNTY, IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF CHERRI NIX l Decl8lon ~ Hearing June 11, 2012 
Cherri Nix was placed on probation by Elmore County on February 1, 2012, due 
to job pelfonnance Issues as further set forth In the Notice of Dlscfpllnary Action -
Notte& of Last Chance of the same date, which notice confirmed her statua •• an "at-
wtlr employee. Ms. Nix was tennlnated from her employment • a Custodial and 
Maintenance Employee with Elmore County on April 30, 2012, pursuant to a Notice of 
Termination of the tame date. FaffGwtng tennfnatlon, the count, sdtedulect a hearing 
ort·Ma,,14, 2012, to hear from Ms. Nix If she had any clalrna.8flli!t:O.~. iti 
employees or agenU. for .. a,da:rid dlscrimtft1.li11.s whld\. the. cou,ii,···•ual:P·--,. 
inveatlgate. Ms. Nix retained Mr. Grant Burgoyne .of the firm Mauk & Burgoyne to 
represent her in this matter. and Mr. Burgoyne requested that.the hearing be vacated 
and rescheduled to allow him time to review the matter. 
The county rescheduled the hearing for June 11, 2012, (the -Hearing1 pursuant 
to a Notice of Hearing in Front of the Elmore County Board of County Commiasloners 
and the hearing was restricted 10 hearing "discrimination claims that [Ma. Nix) may have. 
against Elmore County, its agents or employees.· The notice also advised Ms. Nb<, 
"You were an •at-wllr employee, and aa such [would] not be entitled to a hearing 
regarding the reasons for your termination. The Board [of County Commissioners) will 
not dlecun performance-related issues.• Mr. Burgoyne requested a hearing in front of 
the Board of County C6mml88ioners (the ·eoarc1; regarding the merit9 of Ma. Nix's 
termination. Attorneys for the county advi8ect M,. BUIVOYf* that he could make an 
argument to the Board why he believed Ma. Nix was entitled to a hearing regarding the 
performance-related raau. resulting in her termination. 
1. Unlawful Discrimination. 
Mr. Burgoyne confirmed at the Hearing that. at this time, Ms. Nix did not have 
any claims of unlawful dllcrimination against the-county, but raaerved the right to raise 
such claims if such matters became apparent or went discovered at a later data. 
Since no claims or allegation• were made, the Board seea no need in conducting 
any lnvestfgatlon a, to whether there were any unlawful acts of dlscrfmlnatton by the 
county, ita emoloyees or agents against Ma. Nix. 
Nix v. Elmore County 
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2. Hearing on the Merits. 
Mr. Burgoyne presented materials at the Hearing and pied to the Board for it to 
consider conducting a hearing for Ma. Nix to contest performance-related matters and 
present her case aa to why she should not be tannlnated. Hie argument la essentially 
that under the Elmore County Personnel Polley effective March 1. 1999, as amended 
(·ECPp-), Ma. Nix la entitled to a Pre-Deprivation appeal hearing In front of the Board, 
• more thoroughly set folth In Exhibits 1-11 and oral argument presented to the Board 
at the Hearing and, without such hearing, Ml. Nix ia being deprived of her due proceu 
rights. 
The ECPP providel that a permanent employee le entitled to •a hearing prior to 
any final decision on discharge, demollorfwith attendant change In pay, or suspension 
without pay.,. ECPP at rt.19. Therefore, an employee ia only entitled to a hearing prior 
to a flnal decision when he or she le being terminated or demoted with an attendant 
change fn pay or suspended without pay. On February 1, 2012. when Ms. Nix was 
placed on probation for: one year, there was no termination, demotion with attendant 
change in pay or suspension without pay. Therefore she was not entitled to a hearing 
under the ECPP in connection with being placed on probation. 
On April 30, 2012, Elmore County terminated Ms. Nlx's employment with the 
county as a Custodial and Maintenance EmployM. At the time of Ms. Nlx's termination, 
she waa, ~~ empto,- with the county. A probationary employee of the 
county is expressly an ·at-wtn• employee. The ECPP states that the probationary period . 
•shall be utilized for closely oblerYfng the employee'• work .•. and for n,Jecting an 
introductory employee whose pedonnance ii not sat19faetcMy:• ECPP at p. 9. To 
construe that the ECPP ~· anything. other than ·at-wilt• status for a probationary 
employee, or that the probationary employee Is entitled to. a hearln9 upon tenninatlon, 
would render the probationary- employee concept meaningless under the ECPP. 
Probationary empteyeee are not entitled to a hearing under the ECPP. The county Is 
aware of one matter in which this issue has been reviewed by an Idaho Court. In 
Romet0 y, Plummer. CV-2010-113, Idaho Fourth Judlclal District (April 8, 2011), Judge 
Richard Greenwood found that the ECPP makes It clear that alt a-,e· County 
employeea ar. •at-will'! employeee ancl thet ,S,]robatlonary and .. c•ual emptoy.- are 
not entitled to any hearing.• Romero, at p. e. The county recognizes that Romero was 
not dlractly on polnl. as the. employee therein .. was a fu&-time permanent employee and 
the decision from a trial court has limited precedential value, but continues to assert that 
probationary employees are at-will employees and as such are not entitled to a pre-
deprivatfon hearing. 
3. Oeciaion. 
Based on the record before the Board, and taking notice of those facts which are 
in common knowledge or of which there Is general public awarenesa, the Board finds as 
follows after considering oral and written testimony and argument received at the 
Hearing: 
O?R 
a. No claim or evidence of any unlawful discrimination against Ms. Nix by 
Elmore County, its employees or agents was presented to the Board at the 
Hearing or otherwise. Since no claims or allegations were made, the Board 
sees no need to conduct any investigation as to whether there were any 
unlawful acts of discrimination by the county, its employees or agents against 
Ms. Nix. Elmore County, its employees and it agents did not violate any 
rights of Ms. Nix, and Ms. Nix was not terminated due to any unlawful 
discrimination. 
b. Ms. Nix shall not be entitled to a hearing to consider the merits of her 
termination as she was & probatienary ,em,,leyee and, as such. she is not 
entitled to a hearing upon termination. 
c. It is hereby confirmed that Ms. Cherri Nix's employment with Elmore County 
was terminated as of April 30, 2012. 
Dated thisfi-/1,day of June 2012 
ELMORE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
By:t:24~ ~ 
Arlen 0. Shaw, Chairman 
By: ____________ _ 
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Certificate of Service 
The undersigned hereby certlflea that a copy of the Decision following 
Hearing June 11, 2012, to which this Certlflcat. of Service Js attached was mailed to the 
following, in envelopes addreased to the name and add1'811 listed below, by deposit In 
the U.S. Mal with the correct ftrst-clall pqatage and by certlfted mail return receipt 
requested to addreaeee below, on June .tJjt 2012: 
Attorney for Cherri Nix: 
Grant T. Bu,voyne 
Mauk & Burgoyne 
P. 0. Box 1743 
Boise, ID 83701-1743 
~ Clerk for Elmore County 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO 
Defendant. 
Case No. _2012-1213 
BRIEF SUPPORTING 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Facts Undisputed 
A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment cannot be successful if there are genuine issues of 
material fact. The First Cause of Action in the Complaint requests judgment that pre-
termination procedures were not done. Stated simply, Nix contends that she was entitled to 
pre-termination due process and she was fired by Elmore County without it. Whether she 
was a permanent contract employee or an employee at will is immaterial; either status was 
protected. She was entitled to notices and hearings. Elmore County claims she was a 
"probationary employee•. They agree that permanent employees had vested pre-termination 
rights not_afforded to employees on probation. Accordingly, the only issue oflaw is whether 
Nix had probationary status. If she was not " on probation• as defined in the Employee 


















Manual, judgment on Count One can be granted. This is a question of legal interpretation 
uniquely suited for summary judgment. 
FOUNDATIONAL FACTS AND EXHIBITS 
1. That the Exhibits to the Affidavit of Plaintiff Nix are copies of original documents. 
2. That the facts stated in the Exhibits are statements admissible as per Rule of 
Evidence 803; not that the actual recitation of facts are true; only that the 
documents speak for themselves as to content. 
3. Cherri Nix was employed from 2007 to 2012 by Elmore County as a janitorial 
employee. She had an initial period of probation as a new employee of six months in 
2007. Her probation ended in 2008. 
4. The Elmore County Personnel Policy Manual was published and adopted by the 
county in 1999, Amended thru 2/13/2009. 
5. Nix was terminated on April 30, 2012. 
6. Elmore County decided the pre-deprivation procedures prior to termination as 
contained in the Personnel Policy Manual did not apply to Ms. Nix. 
(June 7, 2012 letter from Elmore Prosecutor to Grant Burgoyne, attorney for Nix. 
Exhibit H to Nix Affidavit. ) 
7. The pre-deprivation procedures include the right to a hearing before "any final 
decision on discharge"; a Notice of Proposed Action as well as a Notice of charges. 
The Notice of Proposed Action described in the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
(ECPP) is meant to give the employee "an explanation of the employer's evidence 
and the proposed personnel action." That is stated in the ECPP. 
8. No pre-termination hearing was held. 




9. No "Notice of Proposed Action" was given to Nix. 
10. No hearing was given Nix on the basis for her termination. She was given no 
opportunity to contest her termination. 
11. Attorney Kristina M. Schindele, Elmore County Prosecutor and counsel for the 
county advised the Elmore County Commissioners that none of the pre-termination 
steps or procedures provided for in the Employee Manual applied to Nix. The 
Commissioners accordingly stated in the Termination Decision of June 18, 2012: 
"The ECPP provides that a permanent emplQYee is entitled to "a hearing prior 
to any final decision on discharge, demotion with attendant change in pay or 
suspension without pay ... On February 1, 2012 when Ms. Nix was placed on 
probation for one year, there was no termination, demotion with attendant 
change in pay or suspension without pay .. .At the time of Ms. Nix's 
termination, she was expressly an "at will" employee with the county. A 
probationary employee of the county is expressly an "at-will" employee. The 
ECPP (employment manual) states that the probationary period "shall be 
utilized for closely observing the employee's work... and for rejecting an 
introductory employee whose performance is not satisfactory ... To construe 
that the ECPP creates anything other than "at-will" status for a probationary 
employee, or that the probationary employee is entitled to a hearing upon 
termination would render the probationary employee concept meaningless 
under the ECPP." (Emphasis added) 
See,_Decision on Termination dated Jun 18. 2012; Exhibit I; Nix Affidavit . 
12. A proper Notice of Claim was served on Elmore County or September 27, 2012. A 
copy is attached to the complaint filed. 
13. On December 27 2012 a Notice of Appearance was filed by attorneys for 
Elmore County. 
ARGUMENT 
There are two reasons stated in the June 11.2012 Decision why Nix was not entitled 
to pre-termination procedures. They can be summarized: 
1. Cherri Nix was an "at will" employee and accordingly was not entitled to a pre-
termination hearing. 
2. Ms. Nix was a probationary employee and could be terminated without cause. 
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... .. , 
She was not entitled to the processes or procedures given to employees who have 
gained permanent status. 
THE STATUS OF MS. NIX AS AN" AT WILL" OR PERMANENT EMPLOYEE DOES NOT 
CONTROL THIS PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
For purposes of this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment it is unnecessary to decide if the 
Employment Manual provides Elmore County employees a status other than being "at will". 
( Note: The Manual provides safeguards and procedures for salaried, permanent 
employees once they are employed past the initial probationary hire period. It limits 
and details the reasons employees once past the 180 new-hire probationary period 
can be terminated. An employment manual can if relied upon by the parties, limit the 
reasons for which an employee can be terminated. Watson v. Idaho Falls 
Consolidated Hospitals, Inc. 111 Idaho 44,720 P.2d 632 (1986). However, her status 
as permanent or at-will is the subject of the Second Cause of Action, not the First. ) 
Idaho law recognizes a cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Metcalf, 116 Idaho at 626, 778 P.2d at 248. Such a covenant is found in all 
employment agreements, including employment-at will relationships. Mitchell v. Zilog, 125 
Idaho at 709, 71.5, 874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994); Sorensen, 118 Idaho at 669, 799 P.2d at 75. An 
action by one party that violates, qualifies or significantly impairs any benefit or right of the 
other party under an employment contract, whether express or implied, violates the 
covenant. Metcalf, 116 Idaho at 621. 778 P.2d at 749, However, the covenant "does not 
create a duty for the employer to terminate the at-will employee only for good cause." Id. 
The covenant requires that the parties perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their 
agreement. This implied covenant places a good faith obligation on each party to a contract 
to take reasonable measures to ensure that the other party obtains the benefits of the 
Nix Brief Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment 
082 
4 
agreement. George v. University of Idaho, 121 Idaho 30. 37, 822 P.2d 549, 556 
Idaho recognizes that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in the 
employment at-will contract, whether the employee can be terminated without cause or not. 
Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co, Supra. 
Nix was a public employee of Elmore County. A county employee is a public employee and 
enjoys procedural due process protections in addition to those provided by Idaho "at-will" 
employment law. 
Harkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 715 P .2d 1283 (1986) explains the Federal law: 
"In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2101, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 {1972). 
the United States Supreme Court established the parameters of a legitimate 
property interest in public employment subject to due process protections: To 
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an 
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of 
it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of 
the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely 
in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a 
purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a 
perso11 to vindicate those claims. Property interests, of course, are not created by 
the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by 
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as 
state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support 
claims of entitlement to those benefits. Id. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709.f the public 
employee has a property interest in employment, then due process requires that 
he or she be afforded notice and a hearing before termination of 
employment. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698, 33 
L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). In addition to procedural protections, the employer may not 
deprive the employee of the property interest "for an improper motive and by 
means that were pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and, because unrelated to 
the proper reasons for layoff, without any rational basis. Nebbia v. New York. 291 
U.S. 502, 525. 54 S.Ct. 505. 510. 78 L.Ed. 940 (1933) ... [additional citations 
omitted].• Hearn v. City of Gainesville, 688 F.2d 1.128, 1332-33 (11th Cir.1983). 
The Supreme Court later specified the potential sources for a property interest in 
employment with a state: "A property interest in employment can, of course, be 
created by ordinance, or by an implied contract. In either case, however, the 
sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state 
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law." Bishop v. Wood. 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2071. 48 L.Ed.2d 684 
(1976) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we now examine what constitutes a 
property interest in employment under Idaho law. To have a property interest in 
employment in Idaho, the employee must have more than a mere hope of 
continued employment. Loebeck v. Idaho State Board of Education, 96 Idaho 
459, 461, 530 P.2d 1149, 11.1';1 {1975). Certainly a permanent employee, whose 
employment is not terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer, 
holds a property interest in his or her position. Allen v. Lewis-Clark State 
College. 105 Idaho 441. 460 n. 6. 67o P.2d 854, 867 n. 6 {1983) ("A term of 
employment set by contract is a property interest safeguarded by due 
process."); Bowler v. Board qf Trustees, 101 Idaho 531, 541, 617 P.2d 841, 845 
(1980} (Teacher's interest in renewable contract rights to continued employment 
was a property interest.); Ferguson v. Board qf Trustees. 98 Jdah9 359, 364, 564 
P.2d 971, 976 (1977}, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 431, 54 L.Ed.2d 
229 (Teacher's right to automatic annual renewal of contract and right not to be 
discharged except for cause gave property interest in employment.) .... 
As Chief Justice Donaldson wrote for a unanimous Court, an employee "hired 
pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment, or limits 
the reasons for which the employee may be discharged" is not an employee "at 
will." f&MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hoa,ital, 108 Idaho 588, 5891 101 P.2d 
208, 209 {1985) (emphasis added). The contract can be express or 
implied Clements v. Jungert. 90 Idaho 143, 153. 408 P.2d 8101 815 
{1965): see Bishop, supra, 426 U.S. at 344, 96 S.Ct. at 2071. An employee's 
handbook can constitute an element of the contract. Johnson v. Allied Stores 
Com .. 106 Idaho 363. 368. 619 P.2d 640. 645 (1984) (The trier of fact must 
determine whether "a contract existed between the parties by virtue of the 1962 
policy manual"); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation District, 98 Idaho 330. 334, 563 
P .2d 54, 58 (1977} (This Court enforces the right to a pre-termination hearing 
since "A hearing is provided as a matter of contract (the handbook)."). Harkness 
alleged that the resolution and the manual together was a contract, which limited 
the reasons for which he could be discharged " 
Harkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353,715 P.2d 1283 (1986). 
The United States Supreme Court in Cleveland Board o(Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 
105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed2d 494 {1985), held that when public employees have a protected 
property interest in their employment, the due process clause requires that prior to 
termination, the employee be given: a) oral or written notice of the reason(s) for the 
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termination, b) an explanation of the employer's evidence, and c) an opportunity to present 
their side of the story. 
The case was addressed in Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority, Worrell, 124 
Idaho 450, 860 P.2d 653 (1993) and in Catwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 191 P3d 205 
(2008); 
"When a state has conferred a property interest in employment, the Due Process 
Clause prevents the deprivation of such an interest without appropriate procedural 
safeguards, including notice and an opportunity to be heard. Anderson v. 
Spalding, L'37 Idaho 509, 516, 50 P.3d 1004, 1011 (2002) (citing Cleveland Bd. of 
Educ. u, Loudermill. 470 U.S. s.12, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, 503-
04 {1985)) ..... Due process requires that, prior to termination, an employee must be 
given (a) oral or written notice of the reason(s) for the termination, (b) an 
explanation of the employer's evidence, and (c) an opportunity to present his or her 
side of the story. Anderson, 137 Idaho at 516, 50 P.3d at 1011. • (Emphasis added). 
ELMORE COUNTY PROVIDES PROTECTED EMPLOYMENT 
INTERESTS FOR NON-PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES 
The plain language contained in the Elmore County Personnel Policy states: 
" The personnel policy of Elmore County establishes the right for full time and 
part-time employees to a hearing prior to, any final decision on discharge, 
demotion with attendant change in pay, or suspension without pay. (Practicing 
Attorneys are not subject to the personnel hearing procedure, being subject 
instead to the rules of professional conduct for their profession.) The following 
elements of procedure are for any such hearing to be held before the Supervising 
Elected Official, unless waived by the employee: 
a. The employee shall be provided notice of the charges. (Notice of 
Proposed Action) against the employee, an explanation of the employer's 
evidence, the proposed personnel action, and the procedure for requesting 
a hearing. 
b. If requested, the employee shall be heard before the Supervising Elected 
Official with the oral hearing to last no longer than two hours, unless 
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other wise approved by the Supervising Elected Official. 
c. There shall be a record maintained, including a tape recording of the 
hearing. 
d. The employee shall have an opportunity to be represented by legal 
counsel at his own expense. 
e. The purpose of the hearing shall be to provide the employee an 
opportunity to present evidence and to rebut the information upon which 
the proposed personnel action is based." 
Elmore Counzy Personnel Policy. P. 20. 
Attached is an Order denying motion dismiss in the recent Idaho Federal District Court Case 
Misty Sommer v. Elmore County 2012 WL 4523449 . Sommer was an employee of 
Elmore County who brought an action against the county alleging wrongful termination. A 
key difference with this case was her status; she was a newly hired person terminated during 
the initial probationary period. She claimed however that even though she was probationary 
and therefore an at -will employee, she had a protected property interest in continued 
employment. Hon. Ronald Bush Magistrate denied Elmore County's Motion to Dismiss 
holding the ECPP was ambiguous; it does not say that a pre-termination hearing is provided 
only to non-probationary employees. Sommer argued that she was full time at-will 
employee still in the probationary period ; the County countered that as a probationary new 
hire there were no limits on her termination. The court relied upon Potlatch Education Assn 
v. Potlatch School District No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010); holding that the 
ECPP was ambiguous and subject to two different interpretations. 
The court most importantly, discounted an argument by Elmore County that regardless of 
whether Sommer was a regular full-time employee, as an at-will employee she had no 
property right in continued employment. The court noted that Elmore County does in fact, 
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guarantee pre-termination rights to full-time employees and argued exactly that in it's 
briefing which the court quoted verbatim: 
" Defendant's briefing , and the record of Sommer's employment, suggests 
otherwise. Defendants repeatedly refer to the hearing provided to regular 
employees and even refer to it as a "right' or "guarantee ,. for those 
employees. See, e.g., Defs.' Mem., p. 2 (Dkt.19-1) ("Sommer was a 
probationary at-will employee at the time of her termination, and the 
County's Personnel Policy only extends the opportunity for a pre termination 
appeal to full-time and part-time regular employees.•) (internal citations 
omitted; emphasis added); Defs.' Mem., p. 4 ("In the ... Policy, the only 
limitation on the at-will employment relationship is that full-time 
regular and part-time regular employees may request a pre-deprivation 
appeal hearing before termination. This hearing is available to regular 
employees 'prior to any final decision on discharge, demotion with attendant 
change in pay, or suspension without pay.' ") (internal citations omitted; 
emphases added); Id ., pp. 4-5 ("Sommer's termination was proper because 
she was a probationary employee, and was not a Full-Time Regular 
employee, otherwise provided a pre-termination hearing.") (emphasis 
added); Defs.' Reply, p. 2 (Dkt.21) ("In Elmore County, full-time regular 
employees through the Personnel Policy are afforded a pre-deprivation 
hearing upon notice of termination (if the employee requests it). Sommer, 
while a full-time employee, was a probationary, and not a 'regular' employee, 
and had no such hearing right.") (internal citations omitted); Id., p. 5 (the 
Policy "only guarantees hearings to full time regular employees"). Thus, 
Defendants' briefing indicates that there may be some limitation on the at-
will employment relationship, at least with respect to "regular" employees, 
who have rights to a pre-termination appeal hearing. See Reply, pp. 4-5 
(Dkt.21); Defs.' Memo. p. 4 (Dkt.19-1) ("In the ... Policy, the only limitation 
on the at-will employment relationship is that full-time regular and part-time 
regular employees may request a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before 
termination. This hearing is available to regular employees ... ). 
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Elmore County made the same statements with regard to Nix. The County Commissioner 
Decision of June 18, 2012 states: 
" The ECPP provides that a permanent employee is entitled to "a hearing prior to 
any final decision on discharge, demotion with attendant change in pay, or 
suspension without pay, ECPP at Page 19. • 
(Emphasis Added.) 
Here there is no ambiguity as to the establishment of the pre-deprivation right, and no 
ambiguity to which employees have been granted the right. The Court need not construe the 
Elmore County Personnel Policy as it relates to the pre-deprivation process, the Court only 
needs to follow and apply the policy as written. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 (ldaho,2011) citing and quoting State 
v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) "If the statute is not ambiguous, 
this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." See also U.S. ex rel. 
Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 2001) citing United States 
v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544. 
MOVING THE GOAL POSTS WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS 
Counsel for Nix obtained a recent brief filed by Elmore County in the Sommer case, 
requesting summary judgment following denial of the motion to dismiss. The new 
argument made which will undoubtedly be repeated here, is that the disclaimer language in 
the ECPP controls; no employee whether permanent or probationary, can escape the trap of 
being at-will, citing Mitchell v Zilog, 125 Idaho 709, 874P.2d 520 (1994); a disclaimer can 
negate any intention that the employer's handbook or manual becomes part of the 
employment contract. 
The argument of mmore County in Sommers with reliance on Zilog is in a vacuum that 
does not exist with respect to Nix. First, in Zilog the employer did not argue as Elmore 
County does in Sommers , that permanent employees do in fact, have certain vested rights 
including pre-termination notices, hearings and appeals. Nix was not a new hire on 
probation as in Sommers. Elmore County arguing a disclaimer exists but also admitting 
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that employees have vested rights, created in Sommers an ambiguity requiring a jury to 
resolve. See Also, Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 560 S.E. 2d 606 (2002); Bums v. 
Universal Health Services, Inc. 603 S.E. 2d 605 (2004). 
Haselrig v. Public Storage, Inc. 585 A.2d 294 (1991) addressed this issue; when a manual 
contains express disclaimers of a contract and also guarantee language as to certain rights 
given to some classifications of employees. The employer demanded that the court simply 
ignore the notice and hearing rights enumerated and rely on the disclaimer. The court 
disagreed stating that, " In other words it is appellee's position that the only critical inquiry 
in this case is the existence, vel non of an express disclaimer. " It concluded that such a 
position was untenable. Mealand v. Eastern New Mexico Medical Center, 33 P.3d 285 
(2001) is in agreement and reviews the pertinent cases, calling a manual such as that of 
Elmore County "an example of a give with one hand, take back with the other approach to 
employee handbook drafting", citing multiple jurisdictions. One of those cited is Swanson v. 
Liquid Air Corp, 118 Wash.2d 512, 826 P.2d 664 (1992) rejecting the premise that a 
disclaimer "can, as a matter of law, effectively serve as an etemal escape hatch for an 
employer who may then make whatever unenforceable promises of working conditions it is 
to it's benefit to make". The New Mexico court concluded that language in the manual 
providing a review by Human Resources was sufficient to uphold a finding that the 
employee was not at-will : 
" To summarize, ENMMC promulgated an employee handbook containing detailed 
statements that could reasonably be understood as imposing substantive and procedural 
limitations on its common-law right to discharge employees at will. Although the 
handbook also contains qualifying language, the overall effect of the handbook is to 
create genuine issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff could be terminated only after 
meaningful prior review by ENMMC's human resources department and only if that 
review established reasonable grounds to believe that Plaintiff had engaged in the 
alleged misconduct. " 
Cases cited include: Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y. 417 
N.W.2d 797, 801 (N.D.1987} (Meschke, J., dissenting); cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stone. 116 
N.M. 464. 466. 863 P.2d 1085, 1087 (1993) ("Thus, the policy on one hand giveth, but 
on the other hand it taketh away."). A handbook utilizing this approach relies on 
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disclain'J.ers and/ or qualifying words or phrases to neutralize affirmative representations 
describing procedural safeguards and substantive standards. The goal of this approach 
is "to obtain the benefits of a handbook policy, while avoiding liability that might 
otherwise arise from promissory language contained in the handbook." Befort, supra, at 
348. Reliance on disclaimers and qualifying words and phrases to negate expectations 
generated by other statements can be risky; courts have declined to give dispositive 
effect to disclaimers, reasoning that a combination of disclaimers and promissory 
statements on the same subject results in a question of fact for the jury. McGinnis v. 
Hone~ell, Inc., 110 N.M. 1, 791 P.2d 452 (1990} (declining to treat disclaimers as 
dispositive; upholding jury verdict in favor of employee );Kiedrowski. 119 N .M. at 5751 
893 P.2d at 471 (holding that disclaimer did not necessarily override other employer 
representations giving rise to reasonable expectation of termination only for good cause; 
reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of employer); accord Strass v. Kaiser 
Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic, 744 A2d 10001 1013 
(D.C.Ct.App.2000) (characterizing statement in disclaimer in handbook is not contract 
as "rationally at odds with other language in the document"; reversing trial court's order 
setting aside jury verdict in favor of employee ); Trombley v. Southwestern Vt. Med. 
Ctr., 169 Vt. 3861 738 A2d 103, 108 (1999} (noting that handbook provisions 
committing employer to progressive discipline system are sufficient to support jury 
finding that employer may terminate employee only for cause); Fleming v. Borden, 
Inc., 316 S.C. 452, 450 S.E.2d 589, 596 (1994) (observing that "[i]n most instances, 
summary judgment is inappropriate when the handbook contains both a disclaimer and 
promises"). 
To summarize: in the cases where there is a disclaimer plus stated rights in the same 
employee handbook and nothing else, ambiguity exist. This case is starkly different. 
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Herein, personally and directly to Nix, Elmore County has added to the equation it's 
explicit interpretation of it's own manual ; that she individually, in the context of her 
specific case, is entitled to notice and hearings prior to discharge if she is not a 
probationary hire. Elmore County mecifically in her case resolved any question of 
ambiguity. gffirmatively stating in writing that she would have her hearing rights as a 
permanent employee. 
The employer's intent to be bound by particular provisions in an employee manual or 
handbook can be ascertained from all of the documents and writings pertaining to the 
employment. Vargo v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc. 115 S.W. 3d 487; all ambiguities in 
personnel manuals are resolved against the source of the handbook, the employer. Amfac v. 
Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 839 P.2d 839; Douglass v. Pllueger Hawaii, Inc. 
135 P.3d 129 (2006). As there is no ambiguity as to the establishment of the pre-deprivation 
right, and no ambiguity to which employee was granted the right, the Court need not 
construe the Elmore County Personnel Policy as it relates to the pre-deprivation process, the 
Court only needs to follow and apply the policy as written. See Verska v. Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (Idaho,2011) citing and 
quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) "If the statute is not 
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." See also 
U.S. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft: Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (C.A.9 (Cal.), 2001) citing 
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52. 
CHERRI NIX WAS NOT A NEW PROBATION EMPLOYEE WHEN 
HER EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED 
In various notices and writings the Defendant states Nix was not entitled to a hearing or the 
other pre-termination procedures because she was on probation and not a regular employee. 
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"Finally, you are not entitled to a hearing before the Elmore County Board of 
Commissioners pursuant to the Elmore County Personnel Policy. Therefore, 
that request is also being denied. " 
February 16, 2012 Notice from Vence Parsons County Supervisor to Nix:. 
Nix Affidavit Exhibit B. 
"You will also note that she was placed on probationary status as an at will employee 
subject to immediate termination at any time. Therefore, based upon prior notice to 
your client of her at-will status, the pre-deprivation procedures set out in the 
Personnel Policy do not apply to her." 
Prosecuting Attorney Schindele letter to Attorney Burgoyne, June 7, 2012. 
Nix Affidavit Exhibit H. 
" Please be advised that you were an at will employee, and as such are not entitled to 
a hearing regarding the reasons for your termination. The Board will not discuss 
performance related issues " 
Commissioners Notice of Hearing June 11, 2012. 
Nix Affidavit Exhibit G. 
"The ECPP provides that a permanent employee is entitled to "a hearing 
prior to any final decision on discharge, demotion with attendant change in 
pay, or suspension without pay." ECPP at p.19. .. ..... On April 30. 2012 
Elmore County terminated Ms. Nix's employment with the county as a 
Custodial and Maintenance Employee. At the time of Ms. Nix's termination 
she was a probationary employee with the county. A probationary employee 
of the county is expressly an "at-will" employee. The ECPP states that the 
probationary period "shall be utilized for closely observing the employees 
work. .. and for rejecting an introductory employee whose performance is not 
satisfactory. " ECPP at p.9. To construe that the ECPP creates anything other 
than "at-will" status for a probationary employee, or that the probationary 
employee is entitled to a hearing on termination would render the 
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probationary employee concept meaningless under the ECPP." (Emphasis 
Added). 
Elmore County Decision following Hearing June 18, 2012. 
Nix Affidavit Exhibit I 
The references to "probation• refer to the Notice of Disciplinary Action-Notice of Last 
Chance dated February 1, 2012, which states: 
"You are placed on Probationary Status for a period of one year. Your probation will 
run until February 1, 2012. You are and remain, an at-will employee." 
Notice of Disciplinary Action-Notice of Last Chance dated February 1, 2012. 
Nix Affidavit Exhibit A. 
Probation is addressed in two places in the ECPP manual. The section entitled "Employee 
Classification, Compensation and Benefits" page 9 states: 
"B. PROBATIONARY PERIOD 
The probationary period shall be regarded as an integral part of the selection process 
and shall be utilized for closely observing the employee's work, for securing the most 
effective adjustment of a new employee to his or her position and for rejecting an 
introductory employee who performance is not satisfactory. The probationary period 
will typically be a standard 90 to 180 days. " 
Elmore County Personnel Policy, Page 9. 
Nix Affidavit Exhibit C. 
In the section entitled " Employee Discipline Procedures and Principles" 
pages 19 and 20 is found the following: 
3. Levels of Disciplinary Actions Available. 
The Following actions include some but not all of the disciplinary steps which may 
be taken by the supervisor in response to personnel policy violations: 
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a. Oral Warning. 
b. Written warning or reprimand. 




By a plain reading of the ECPP Nix was not an "introductory employee". She had 
been employed by Elmore County since 2007 and had been a full-time regular 
employee for five years. Accordingly she was not on probation as a new employee for the 
"standard 90 to 180 days". Her status as being on probation was stated in the Notice of 
Disciplinary Action-Notice of Last Chance. It was one of the "disciplinary steps" taken by 
her supervisor Vence Parsons on February 1, 2012. 
The county provides, that regular full-time employees are entitled to the pre-termination 
hearings and procedures as per the ECPP. Obviously this would mean Cherri Nix was so 
entitled unless they could provide an interpretation of disciplinary probation equating 
disciplinary probation to the "introductory probation" of a new employee. In that case all 
employees including Nix regardless of new or permanent status could be denied due process 
by the simple use of a disciplinary step; probation. 
Such an interpretation is a contrivance. The ECPP states that introductory probation is for a 
period of 90 to 180 days. Ms. Nix was placed on disciplinary probation for a period of one 
year. No language is found in the section of the ECPP entitled "Levels of Disciplinary 
Actions Available" which states that an employee placed on disciplinary status of probation 
is thereby converted into an employee at-will or for that matter, is a new or "introductory" 
employee. There are clearly two distinct probations; the new employee probationary period 
during which as Elmore County states the employee is "at-will" and a disciplinary probation 
during which no automatic conversion of the employee to being new, or "at-will" occurs. 
A case in point is McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach 882 F2d 384 C.A.9 (Cal.) 1989. 
McGraw passed her probationary period a year after her first hire and thus attained the 
status of a permanent employee of the City as a Police Clerk. When she transferred to a 
different department she was advised that she had to serve another probationary period. 
Afterword, she was terminated. The attorney for the City of Huntington Beach cited the 
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personnel manual for the proposition that a "probationary employee" could be rejected at 
any time without cause, with no right to appeal. The Court first observed that, 
" ... It is very difficult to accept an argument that the City Council intended "permanent 
employee" status, once earned, to terminate sub silentio upon promotion, once again 
subjecting the promoted employee to the risks of what is essentially the "at-will" 
employment status of newly-hired probationary employees.• 
The court concluded: 
• The question then arises whether appellant could have been both a "permanent" 
and a "probationary employee when she was terminated. We believe that it is 
consistent with the Rules taken as a whole, and with the policies upon which the 
City's personnel system is based, to conclude that appellant was a "permanent 
employee" who was serving out a "promotional probationary period" in a position to 
which she had received a promotional appointment ... McGraw was not a mere 
probationary employee. She had successfully passed one period of probation in the 
HBPD, and attained "permanent employee" status in the City's competitive service. A 
permanent City employee who was subject, as was McGraw, to a promotional 
probationary period, moreover, could legitimately claim on the basis of the Personnel 
Rules promulgated by the City of Huntington Beach to have developed and retained 
reasonable expectations of continued employment, at least to continued employment 
in the position from which they had been promoted. We conclude that McGraw had a 
constitutionally protected property interest, and that absent an adequate defense or 
immunity, appellees deprived her of that property interest without due process of 
law." 
Although the factual context here is different, the reasoning in McGraw is applicable. Nix 
was a full-time permanent employee of Elmore County in 2012. She was placed on 
disciplinary probation for one year. That action did not as the court in McGraw noted, 
silently terminate her full-time permanent status thus subjecting her to the risk of being 
terminated without cause the same as if she was a new hire. The reasoning of Elmore 
County was characterized in McGraw: 
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"Appellees' argument also flies in the face of the well-established principle of 
statutory construction that every word, phrase, sentence, and part of a statutory 
enactment must be accorded significance and harmonized with every other part. DE 
Young, 147 Cal.App.3d at 11-18. 194 Cal.Rptr. at 725. Appellees' argument would 
read the "release• provision right out of the Personnel Rules. • 
That is precisely what would occur to every Elmore County employee if such an 
interpretation is allowed. Full-time permanent employees who serve their probationary 
period could have their due process rights •read right out' of the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy if for a disciplinary reason they are placed on probation. 
Attorney's Fees 
The prevailing party in an action brought for breach of an employment contract is entitled to 
an award of fees under § 12-120(3), on the basis that an employment contract constitutes a 
contract for the purchase or sale of services under that statute. See Clark v. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare, 1.'34 Idaho 521. 5 P.3d 988 (2000}; Atwood v. Western Const. Inc., 129 
Idaho 234, 237, 923 P.2d 479, 482 (Ct.App.1996} : Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp. 141 Idaho 
233,108 P.3d 380 (2005). 
Conclusion 
Defendant Elmore county has interpreted the Personnel Policy Manual. In written opinion 
the county states that full-time permanent employees are granted protected employment 
rights that include the right to a hearing prior to termination. They are entitled to certain 
notices and a list of their shortcomings. Plaintiff Nix was a permanent employee. Being 
placed on probation as a disciplinary measure did not deprive her of that status. She was not 
by definition a newly hired employee who can be terminated at will without the right to due 
process guaranteed by Elmore County. No facts are in controversy; as a matter oflaw she is 
entitled to a partial summary judgment Order that her termination was wrongful; it was in 
contravention to the Personnel Policy Manual. She is entitled to re-instatement and an 
award of all accrued salary and benefits. She is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and 
costs. 
Dated this ___ day of January 2012. 
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Only the Wesdaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
Misty SOMMER, Plaintiff, 
v. 
ELMORE COUNTY, Marsa Plummer, and John/Jane Does I through X, whose true identities are presently unknown, Defendants. 
No. l:ll-cv-00291-REB. 
Sept. 30, 2012. 
Background: Former county employee brought action against county alleging wrongful termination in violation of her due process 
rights and negligent infliction of emotional distress. County moved to dismiss. 
Holdings: The District Court, Ronald E, Bush, United States Magistrate Judge, held that: 
ill issue of whether employee had property right in continued employment could not be resol~ed at motion to dismiss phase; 
£21 employee had no private cause of action under Idaho Constitution for employer's alleged violation of her due process rights; and 
Ql county did not owe employee duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Motion granted in part and denied in part. 
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A court may consider documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of 
judicial notice without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Fed.Rules Ciy,Proc,Rule l2(b). 28 
u,s,c,A. 
W Constitutional Law 92 C=:>3869 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVIllB} Protections Provided and Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3868 Rights, Interests, Benefits, or Privileges Involved in General 
92k3869 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
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92 Constitutional Law 
92,XXVII Due Process 
92XXVIl{8) Protections Provided and Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3892 Substantive Due Process in General 
92k3894 k. Rights and Interests Protected; Fundamental Rights. Most Cited Cases 
A threshold requirement to either a substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiffs showing of a liberty or property 
interest protected by the Constitution. U.S.C.A, Const.Amend, 14. 
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92XXYII Due Process 
92XXVll(B) Protections Provided and Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3868 Rights, Interests, Benefits, or Privileges Involved in General 
92k3874 Property Rights and Interests 
92k3874{1} k. In General. Most Cjted Cases 
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92XXYII Due Process 
92XXVJl(B} Protections Provided and Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3878 Notice and Hearing 
92k3879 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
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To state a claim under the Due Process aause, a plaintiff must first establish she possessed a property interest, deserving of 
constitutional protection; if a property interest exists, the essential requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to 
respond. U,S,C,A, Const.Amend, 14. 
HI Constitutional Law 92 €=>3867 
2l Constitutional Law 
2lXXVII Due Process 
92XXVmB} Protections Provided and Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3867 k. Procedural Due Process in General. Most Cited Cases 
A Section 1983 claim based upon procedural due process contains two elements: (I) a deprivation of liberty or property interest 
protected by the Constitution~ and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. U,S,C,A, Const.Amend, 14: 42 U,S,C,A, § 1983. 
I.5} Labor and Employment 231H C;::::>40(2) 
llW Labor and Employment 
llil:11 In General 
231 Hk37 Term, Duration, and Termination 
231Hk40 Definite or Indefinite Term; Employment At-Will 
231Hk4Q(2} k. Termination; Cause or Reason in General. Most Cited Cases 
In Idaho, employment is at-will unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract that specifies the duration of employment or 
limits the reasons for which an employee may be discharged; thus, in the absence of an agreement limiting a party's right to terminate 
the employment relationship, they may terminate it at any time or for any reason. 
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Under Idaho law, if a public employee serves at-will, he or she has no reasonable expectation of continued employment, and thus 
no property right protected by the Due Process aause. U.S.C,A. Const.Amend, 14. 
W Federal Civil Procedure 170A C=:>1831 
.l10A Federal Civil Procedure 
17QAXI Dismissal 
170AXl{B) Involuntary Dismissal 
17QAXl{B}5 Proceedings 
l 70Akl827 Determination 
170Akl831 k. Fact Issues. Most Cited Cases 
Issue of whether county employee had property right in continued employment could not be resolved at motion to dismiss phase 
of claim for violation of due process against county because of factual dispute as to how to interpret language of county's personnel 
policy. U.S.C,A. Const.Amend, 14. 
W Civil Rights 78 e=:>1720 
78. Civil Rights 
78Y, State and Local Remedies 
78k1718 Right of Action; Nature and Grounds 
78k1720 k. Employment Practices. Most Cited Cases 
An action for monetary damages to remedy asserted violation of a due process rights was not available to county employee under 
Idaho Constitution for county's failure to provide her a hearing prior to termination. West's I.C,A. Const. Art. 1. § 13. 
W Damages 115 e=:>57.14 
filDamages 
lUlll Grounds and Subjects of Compensatory Damages 
J 151Il(A) Direct or Remote, Contingent, or Prospective Consequences or Losses 
115IIHA}2 Mental Suffering and Emotional Distres~ 
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• l l 5k57, 13 Negfo1ent Im'liction of En1otional Distress • 0 
t t 5k57.14 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
There are five elements to a claim for negligent, infliction of emotional distress in Idaho: ( I) the existence of a duty; (2) a 
of that duty; (3) proximate cause; (4) damages; and (5) physical manifestation of the injury. 
WU Labor and Employment 231H e=:::,79 
lllH Labor and Employment 
231 WII Rights and Duties of Employers and Employees in General 
231 Hk79 k. Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Most Cjted Cases 
Under Idaho la:w, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a judicially created exception to the employment at-will doctrine 
based on a contractual duty of good faith; it requires the parties to perfonn in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement, 
and implies obligations into every employment contract. 
[ill Labor and Employment 231H e=:::,79 
lllH Labor and Employment 
231 WII Rights and Duties of Employers and Employees in General 
231Hk79 k. Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Most Cjted Cases 
Under Idaho law, any action which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit or right which either party has in the 
employment contract, whether express or implied, is a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
lUJ. Counties 104 e=:::,67 
l!liCounties 
~ Officers and Agents 
I Q4k67 k. Removal. Most Cjted Cases 
Under Idaho law, county employer did not owe employee duty of good faith and fair dealing, as required to support claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, inasmuch as she was an at-will employee with no reasonable expectation of continued 
employment. 
Ronaldo Arthur Coulter. Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC, F.agle, ID, for Plaintiff. 
Kirtlan G. Naylor. Jacob H. Naylor. Naylor & Hales, Boise, ID, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
RONALD E. BUSH. United States Magistrate Judge. 
•t Pending before the Court is Defendants Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.19). Having considered the briefing and counsels' oral 
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arguments, and otherwise being fully advised, this motion is denied, in part, and granted, in part, for the reasons explained below. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Elmore County terminated the employment of Plaintiff Misty Sommer ("Sommer") on October 4, 2010. Compl., 1 32 
(Dkt. l ). Sommer asserts that Elmore County was required to provide her an opportunity to appeal her termination pursuant to the 
process provided in its personnel policy. Sommer argues that her status with Elmore County was as a full-time regular employee in a 
probationary period; Elmore County responds that, because of her probationary status, Sommer was not a "regular" employee entitled 
to an appeal. 
Sommer filed a Complaint on June 22, 2011, bringing claims against Defendant Elmore County and Marsa Plummer, the Elmore 
County Clerk, (collectively "Defendants") for (1) wrongful termination in violation of Sommer's due process rights and (2) negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Defendants responded with the Motion to Dismiss at issue now. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12lbX6) ffil tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim for relief. The relevant inquiry is whether 
the plaintiff's allegations are sufficient under Federal Rule of Qyil Procedure 8{a}, which sets forth the minimum pleading 
requirement, i.e., that the plaintiff provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entided to relief," and 
"give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp, v, Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544. 555, 121 s,ct, 1955, 167 L.Ed,2d 929 <2007}. 
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all non-conclusory, factual (not legal) allegations made in the 
complaint, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 565 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Erickson Y, Pardus, 551 U,S, 89, 127 S,a, 2197, 167 L,Ed,2d 1081 
£2.001)., and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, Mohamed v, Je,i,pesen Datqplan, Inc., 519 F.3d 943, 949 
(9th Cir.2009}. "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b}(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a 
plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entidement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Iqbal, 565 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U,S, at 555}, A complaint must 
contain sufficient factual allegations to provide plausible grounds for entitlement to relief. 'Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555--56. "A claim has 
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 565 U.S. at 678. 
W The Court may not consider any evidence contained outside the pleadings without converting the motion to one for summary 
judgment. See Fed.R.Civ,P, 12lb): United States y. Ritchie. 342 F.3d 903, 907-908 (9th Cir.2003). "A court may, however, consider 
certain materials-documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial 
notice-without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 908 (citing Van Buskirk v, CNN, 2&4 
F.3d '171, 980 <9th Cir,2002); Barron Y, Reich, 13 F.3d 1370. 13V <9th Qr.1994}: 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal 
Practice§ 12.34{2] (3d ed.1999)). 
*2 Sommer attached five documents to her Complaint: (I) the written Notice of Termination, (2) the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy, (3) Sommer's Request for an Appeal Hearing, (4) a Notice of Action finding Sommer ineligible for food stamps, and (5) a 
Notice and Application for Emergency Unemployment Compensation. Compl., Eu. A-E (Dkts.l-4-1-8). The Court has considered 
only the written Notice of Termination and the Personnel Policy in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. Defendants have not objected to 
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the authenticity of these documents and, mdeed, have cited to them in their briefing. Accordingly, these two documents are the type 
that"may be·considered without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See Branch v, Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449. 453 (9m 
Cir.1994} ("[DJocuments whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not 
physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b}(6l motion to dismiss."). 
DISCUSSION 
A. Due Process Claim 
(2](31(41 "A threshold requirement to a [either] substantive or procedural due process claim is the plaintiffs showing of a liberty 
or property interest protected by the Constitution." Wedzes/Ledges qf Cal., Inc, v, City qf Phoenix, 24 F,3d 56. 62 £9th Cir,1994); 
Marhews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 318, 332 (1976). To state a claim under the Due Process Clause, Sommer must first establish she 
possessed a property interest, deserving of constitutional protection . .l:?::a /d.: see also Gilbert v, Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29, 1 17 
S,Ct, 1807, 138 L,Ed,2d 120 (1997). If a property interest exists, the essential requirements of due process are notice and an 
opportunity to respond. See Cleveland Bd, of Educ, y. Loudermill et al,. 470 U.S. 532. 546. 105 S.Ct. 1487. 84 L.Ed,2d 494 t 1985}. 
Ul[fil In Idaho, employment is at-will unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract that specifies the duration of 
employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may be discharged. See Jenkins v, Boise Cascade CQCR,, 141 Idaho 233, J 08 
P.3d 380. 387 (Idaho 2005). Thus, in the absence of an agreement limiting a party's right to terminate the employment relationship, 
they may terminate it at any time or for any reason. See Mitchell y, Ziloe, Inc,, 125 Idaho 709, 874 P.2d 520. 523 <Idaho 1994}: see 
also MetcaVv, Inteanounta;n Gas Co,. 116 Idaho 622. m P,2d 744. 746 (Idaho 1989) ("Unless an employee is hired pursuant to a 
contract which specifies the duration of the employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may be discharged, the 
employment is at the will of either party and the employer may terminate the relationship at any time for any reason without incurring 
liability."). This rule applies to state/county employers as well: if an employee serves at-will, "he or she has no reasonable expectation 
of continued employment, and thus no property right." Dyack v. Commgnwealth qf N. Mariana Islands. 317 F.3d 1030, 1033 <9th 
Cir,2003): Cameron y, Owyhee County, No, CV--09--423-REB, 2011 WL 2945820 *9 <D.ldaho July 20,201 l}. 
*3 Sommer agrees that she was an at-will employee, but both parties submit varying arguments as to how Sommer should be 
classified according to the Elmore County Personnel Policy (the "Policy") . .EW. See Comp!., Ex. B (Dkt.1-5). The reason the parties 
disagree about Sommers classification is that the Policy explains the "Significance of Employee Classification", providing: 'VJ'he 
procedures for hiring, promotion, and transfer of full-time employees shall be subject to the provisions of this policy." Policy, p. 9 
(Dkt.1-5). The Policy also "establishes the right for full-time regular and part-time employees to a hearing prior to, any final decision 
on discharge." Policy, p. 20 (Dkt.1-5). The termination process provides for notice of the charges, a hearing to last no longer than two 
hours with a record maintained, at which the employee may be represented by legal counsel and present evidence and rebut 
information upon which the proposed personnel action is based. Id. 
Defendants' counsel argued at the hearing that, regardless of whether Sommer is considered a "regular" full-time employee, as an 
at-will employee she has no property right in continued employment and, thus, no basis for a due process challenge. Defendants' 
briefing, and the record of Sommer's employment, suggests otherwise.e.t4 Defendants repeatedly refer to the hearing provided to 
regular employees and even refer to it as a "right" or "guarantee [ }" for those employees. See, e.g., Defs.' Mem., p. 2 (Dkt.19-1) 
("Sommer was a probationary at-will employee at the time of her termination, and the County's Personnel Policy only extends the 
opportunity for a pretermination appeal to full-time and part-time regular employees." ) (internal citations omitted; emphasis added); 
Defs.' Mem., p. 4 ( .. In the ... Policy, the only limitation on the at-will employment relationship is that full-time regular and part-time 
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regutar employees may request a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before termination. This hearing is available to regular employees 
'prior to any final decision on discharge, demotion with attendant change in pay, or suspension without pay.' ") (internal citations 
omitted; emphases added); Id., pp. 4-5 ("Sommers termination was proper because she was a probationary employee, and was not a 
Full-Time Regular employee, otherwise provided a pre-termination hearing.'' ) (emphasis added); Defs.' Reply, p. 2 (Dkt.21) ( .. In 
Elmore County, full-time regular employees through the Personnel Policy are afforded a pre-deprivation hearing upon notice of 
termination (if the employee requests it). Sommer, while a full-time employee, was a probationary, and not a 'regular' employee, and 
had no such hearing right.'j (internal citations omitted); Id., p. S (the Policy "only guarantees hearings to full time regular 
employees'j. Thus, Defendants' briefing indicates that there may be some limitation on the at-will employment relationship, at least 
with respect to "regular" employees, who have rights to a pre-termination appeal hearing. See Reply, pp. 4-5 (Dkt.21); Defs.' Mem., p. 
4 (Dkt.19-1) ("In the ... Policy, the only limitation on the at-will employment relationship is that full-time regular and part-time 
regular employees may request a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before termination. This hearing is available to regular employees."). 
•4 Hence, Sommer's claim, if any, based upon the alleged deprivation of a hearing depends on whether she is considered a 
"regular" employee. Although being careful not to characterize the Policy as a contract in and of itself, determining its scope turns on 
principles of contract interpretation and will be examined accordingJy in this limited instance. See, e.g .. Metcalf. m P.2d at 747 
("This Court has recognized that "[a]n employee's handbook can constitute an element of the contract. Unless an employee handbook 
specifically negates any intention on the part of the employer to have it become a part of the employment contract, a court may 
conclude from a review of the employee handbook that a question of fact is created regarding whether the handbook was intended by 
the parties to impliedly express a tenn of the employment agreement.'') (internal citations omitted).~ 
121 As noted above, the parties disagree about how to "interpret" the language of Elmore County's Policy. Defendants suggest that 
the personnel policy "indicates that probationary employees enjoy no procedural limits to their termination" and because "Sommer 
was a probationary employee and not a full-time "regular'' employee," Defendants had no limits when terminating her employment 
relationship; Defs.' Reply, p. 3 (Dkt.21). Sommer counters that she was a "full-time regular at-will employee still in a probationary 
status." Resp., p. 4 (Dkt.20). Both interpretations are "reasonable" and thus the Policy is ambiguous. Potlatch Education Ass'n v. 
Potlatch School District No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 1m, 1280 <Idaho 2Q10l (internal citations and quotations omitted) 
( explaining that a contract term is ambiguous "when there are two different reasonable interpretations''). Sommer was on probationary 
status and the Policy described that status "as an integral part of the selection process ... utilized for closely observing the employee's 
work:, for securing the most effective adjustment of a new employee to his or her position and for rejecting an introductory employee 
whose performance is not satisfactory," (Dkt.1-5, Ex. B, p. 9). However, nothing in the Policy says that a hearing is provided only for 
employees not in a probationary period. Therefore, because "interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue of fact," dismissal is precluded 
at this time. Potlatch. 226 P,3d at 1280. 
B. Violations of State Constitutional Civil Liberties as a Basis for Monetary Damages 
!fil Defendants argue that Sommer cannot obtain monetary damages under Article l, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution ~ for 
deprivation of her due process rights, Comp!., fl 55-58 (Dkt.1), because there is no such private cause of action under the Idaho 
Constitution. Other courts in this District have ruled that the "Idaho Constitution does not provide for a private cause of action for 
monetary damages based on an alleged violation of person's civil liberties.'' Boren v, City o(Nqmpa. No. qy 04--084:S::MHW, 20Qfi 
WL 2413840, •10--11 CD.Idaho Au&.18, 2006} (citing Katzbere v. Beeents of the Univ, o(Caltfornia, 29 Cal,4th 300, 127 Cal,Rptr,2d 
482. 58 P,3d 339 (2002}: Spurrell v. Block, 40 Wash,A12p, 854,701 P,2d 529,535 <Wash.A1212,1985)). While acknowledging that the 
Supreme Court of Idaho .. has never specifically addressed this issue," the federal district court in Boren was "confident that [the Idaho 
Supreme Court} would not find a private cause of action." Id. Accord, Mott v, City qf McCall, CV;:-06--063::S::MHW, 2007 WL 
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l:J:30764. *6 <D.ldaho Ma,v !4, 2007) ("there is no private cause of action for an Idaho constitutional law violation"). 
•s Both of these cases were cited by Defendants in support of their request to dismiss the monetary damages claim for the alleged 
state civil rights violation. There is a third case taking the same view, Young v. Young, CV-06--324-S-EJL, 2009 WL 909241. *9-1.Q 
<p,Idaho Mar.31. 2009}. See Young (explaining that "[t]o the extent Counts 3 and 4 set forth a claim for a violation of Idaho's 
Constitution, a civil cause of action for damages of a state constitutional right does not exist," and because "State constitutional claims 
are not cognizable under Idaho law ... this claim must be dismissed as to all defendants") (citing State y. Charpentier, 131 Idaho 642.. 
962 P,2d 1033. 1037 <Idaho 1998) (rights of individuals under the Idaho Constitution not greater than those provided under the federal 
constitution)). 
This Court finds these cases, and the primary case upon which they rely ( Kat;Jzere y, Beeents al University ofCaJi(Qrnia. 29 
Cal.4th 300, 127 Cal,Rgtr.2d 482, 58 P.3d 339 (2002)) persuasive and adopts their reasoning and decision. The Katzberg court address 
the question of "whether, assuming the complaint states a violation of plaintiff's due process liberty interest, plaintiff may maintain an 
action for monetary damages to remedy the asserted violation of his due process liberty interests under article I. section ](a)" of the 
California Constitution.fm Id, at 486-87. 127 Cal.Rptr,2d 482. 58 P,3d 339. The court considered cases from multiple jurisdictions 
when concluding that a plaintiff may not maintain such an action in California. See, e.g ., lpw,:ll v, Hayes, 117 P,3d 745. 7S3 <Alaska 
2Q0.1l ("We have never recognized a Bivens-type private right of action for constitutional torts under the Alaska Constitution. We have 
stated that we will not allow a constitutional claim for damages, "except in cases of flagrant constitutional violations where little or no 
alternative remedies are available."); Hunter v. City o(Euaene, 309 Or. 298. 787 P,2d 881. 883 <Or,1990} ("We hold that plaintiffs 
may not bring an action for damages against defendants directly under Article I, section 8. of the Oreaon Constitution."). In short, the 
reasoning and the conclusions of Kat:berg, the cases the California court cites, and the analogous cases from the District of Idaho are 
compelling authority and are followed here. 
Sommer offers no cases finding otherwise, but instead relies on Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v, County of Kootenai, 151 Idaho 405, 258 
P,3d 340 (Idaho 201 n. Sommer argues that A/lied's significance "is that, as recently as July of 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to hold that in Idaho there is no private cause of action for monetary damages based on an alleged violation of a person's 
civil liberties," but did not do so. However, that issue was not before the Allied Bail Bonds court, and the negative inference by 
implication argument will not carry the day here, in the face of the multiple decisions identified above. 
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
*6121 There are five elements to a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Idaho: (1) the existence of a duty; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause; (4) damages; and (5) physical manifestation of the injury. C;aplicki v. Goodine Joint School . 
Dist. No, 231, 116 Idaho 326. V5 P.2d 640 0989}. Sommer aJleges that she suffers from severe emotional distress, suffering from 
depression, anxiety, fear, frustration, and irritability. Compl., p. 13 (Dkt.1). At the oral argument Defendants counsel conceded that 
these are sufficient to allege injury for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, but argue that Sommer has not plead a duty 
owed to her by Defendants sufficient to support a negligent infliction of emotional distress ("emotional distress") claim. See also, e.g .. 
Cl4J)licki, I 16 Idaho 326. 775 P,2d 640 <holding that a plaintiffs claim for emotional distress damages will survive summary judgment 
as long as they allege physical manifestations of the emotional distress); Cook v, Skyline CQCll,. 135 Idaho 26, 13 P,3d 857, 865-6§ 
<Idaho 2000) (allowing emotional distress claims to proceed because plaintiffs had testified "that the situation was 'very stressful,' " 
that the problems put distance between them, that one felt ill just being in the house and she suffered from frustration, headaches and 
irritability and that the other suffered from ulcers and anxiety, and that he was "shaky" and .. shaky-voiced"). 
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r toll 11) Thus, the only remaining issue for present purposes is whether Sommer has adequately pied that Defendants owed her a 
duty. Sommer asserts that the duty Defendants breached is the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which she asserts is applied to all 
employment agreements. Pl.'s Resp., p. 8 (Dkt.20). Sommer did not allege this as claim in her Complaint, but offers it now to satisfy 
the duty element of her emotional distress claim. "The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a judicially created exception to the 
employment at-will doctrine based on a contractual duty of good faith." Crea v, FMC Corporation, 135 Idaho 175, 16 P.3d 272,276 
lldaho 2000). It requires the parties to "perform in good faith the obligations imposed by their agreement," Jenkins y, Boise Cascade 
Corp,, 141 Idaho 233. 108 P.3d 380. 389-390 {Idaho 2005}. and implies obligations into every employment contract. Sorensen v,. 
Saint Alphonsus Beiional Medical Center, Inc,, 141 Idaho 754, 118 P,3d 86 <2005}: Metcalf. 116 Idaho 622, m P,2d 744 0989}. 
Any action which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit or right which either party has in the employment contract, 
whether express or implied, is a violation of the covenant. Metcaft 116 Idaho at 627, TI8 P,2d at 749. 
ll2l Defendants argued that the duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts is limited to actions such as taking 
away sick leave or other rights already earned. See Reply Br., p . .S. In a recent decision from the District of Idaho, the court 
determined: "[A)lthough the issue has not been squarely decided by Idaho courts, this Court is confident that Idaho courts would not 
recognize a claim for [emotional distress) in [the employment) context. The Plaintiffs claim for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is therefore subject to dismissal." Feltmann y. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc,, No, 2;11-cy-414-Eil,cMHW. 2012 WL 1189913. 
*6 CD.Idaho Mar,20, 2012). The court in Feltmann considered that "other courts considering this issue have generally held that a claim 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot lie in the employment context." ld.WB. This Court finds the reasoning and 
conclusion in Feltmann persuasive, and determines that the emotional distress claim, as pied in the Complaint, does not state a claim 
for relief and must be dismissed. Sommer was an at-will employee with no reasonable expectation of continued employment. As the 
Feltmann court noted "the Idaho Supreme Court held (over a strong dissent), that a plaintiff could not pursue such a claim, reasoning 
that employment at-will cannot be converted into a guarantee of employment by bringing an emotional distress claim." Id. (citing 
Sorensen Y, SaintAlphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc,, 141 Idaho 754, I 18 P,3d 86 lldaho 2005}. 
CONCLUSION 
*7 At this stage in the proceedings the Court finds that Sommer is entitled to proceed, but only on her Sectjon 1983 cause of 
action. The allegations in the Complaint for that cause of action satisfy the Rule J2(b}(6). Because the Court has denied, in part, 
Defendants' Motion, the issue of attorneys' fees is moot at this time. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.19) is DENIED, in part, and GRANTED, in part, as set 
forth above. 
Elil.. Although Defendants' Motion to Dismiss refers to "IRCP l2(b) (6)", see Mot., p. 1 (Dkt.19), their memorandum cites 
to the rules applicable to this case, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
~ A Section 1983 claim based upon procedural due process contains two elements: (I) a deprivation of liberty or property 
interest protected by the Constitution; and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. See Brewster v. Bd, of Educ, QJ 
the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist .. 149 F.3d 971. 982 {9th Cir.1998). 
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.E& The Policy classifies employees, in relevant part, as provided below, see Policy, p. 9 (Dkt.1-5): 
I . Employee Classification 
The classification of the position you hold with Elmore County may affect the status of obligations or benefits associated 
with your employment. The primary classes of employees and their respective status is outlined as follows: 
a. Full-Time Regular Employees 
Employees whose typical work schedule calls for at least 20 hours of scheduled work during each weekly payroll period. 
Full-time regular employees shall receive all employee benefits provided by Elmore County as such benefits now exist or 
may be subsequently changed. 
b. Part-Time Regular Employees 
c. Casual/Seasonal Employees 
Employees who provide services for Elmore County on an irregular or temporary basis, less than 5 months per year or 19 
hours a week or less, [and] receive no benefits provided to regular employees, except those required by law or those 
provided by express written authorization of the Board of Commissioners . 
.EtM,. The briefing does not contain a full discussion of the points and authorities supporting this position, nor did Sommer's 
response provide a detailed response to such an argument. The Court's own research found some persuasive authority 
indicating that even if Sommer is classified as a regular employee for which a hearing is provided under the Policy, that 
might not be enough to confer a "property" right sufficient to warrant Constitutional due process protections. For example, 
an Oregon federal district court recently considered whether a plaintiff's claim that a company's Standard Operating 
Procedures ("Procedures"), outlining termination procedures, conferred a protected property interest such that the employee 
was entitled to a hearing before he was terminated. Franklin y, Clarke, Ciy. No, 10--00382::;CL, 2011 WL 4024638, *3-5 
{D,Or, Sept,9, 2011 }. Significant to that court's consideration of the plaintiff's claim was the following: 
Individuals who have a property interest created by an "independent source, such as state law" are entitled to procedural 
due process protections In Oregon, a property right can be created by a statute or regulation, ... or by city personnel 
policies or handbooks .... "At-will" employees are not entitled to constitutional due process protection 
Plaintiffs retain their "at-will" status even when the employee handbook or other policy provides that the employees should 
only be terminated for certain reasons or after certain procedures ... or when the city had a "standard practice of affording 
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kearings." 
Id. at *4 (emphases added and internal citations omitted). The Oregon court detennined that the Procedures "merely 
provide a non-binding framework for disciplining at-will employees and do not create a protected property interest." Id. at 
*S. See also Lawson v, Umatilla County, 139 FJd 690. 693-94 {9th Cir.1998) (applying Oregon state law and detennining 
that because the county defendant's policy contained a disclaimer preserving the employee's at-will status, the county's 
rules about termination of pennanent employees "merely provide a framework for disciplining at-will employees which is 
not binding on the County''). 
However, the Court is reluctant to issue a ruling on this issue in the absence of a clear, developed argument, citing to legal 
authorities, along with an opportunity for response briefing. Although the Idaho Supreme Court has addressed whether a 
statute establishing that "city clerks are at-will employees, subject to removal from the appointive office without notice or 
a hearing," may be modified by an employment manual outlining procedures for dismissal, including notice and a bearing, 
this does not present the exact same circumstances as the present case. See Boudreau v, City q/ Wendell, 147 Idaho 609, 
213 P,3d 394. 395 <Idaho 2009}. The policy/manual in Boudreau contained a disclaimer similar to the one in FJmore 
County's Policy, i.e., that the policy is not a contract, but the court found the city clerk was not entitled to the hearing 
provided for in the policy because "once the legislature determined that a municipal appointive officer is at-will and 
provided for the removal of such an officer without notice or a hearing.'' the city "could not alter that status by adopting a 
[policy/manual]." Id. Here, it does not appear that there is a legislative statement about county employees that the FJmore 
County Policy was attempting to override. In short, because there is not a clear answer provided by Idaho case law and the 
arguments related to this issue were not fully developed by the parties in the proceedings on the motion to dismiss, the case 
will proceed at this time, without prejudice to Defendants raising this argument and fully developing it in future motions. 
See D. Idaho Loe, Civ. R. 7(b) (explaining that non-routine motions must be accompanied by a separate brief "containing 
all of the reasons and points and authorities, relied upon by the moving party"). 
~ The Policy provides that: "THIS PERSONNEL POLICY IS NOf A CONTRACT. NO CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT WITH ELMORE COUNTY WILL BE VALID UNLF.SS IT IS SIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
PROPER PROCEDURES BY A SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED REPRESENf A TIVE OF THE GOVERNING BOARD 
AND UNLESS IT IS SIGNED BY AND CONf AINS THE NAME OF THE EMPLOYEE WHO WOUID BE 
BE?'IIEFI 11 ED BY THE CONTRACT." Policy, p. 2, Compl., Ex.. B (Dkt.1-5) (emphasis in original). 
Ilffi,. This section provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law." Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13. 
ENZ.a This provision is similar to Idaho's equivalent Constitutional guarantee, providing: "A person may not be deprived of 
life, liberty. or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws." Cal, Const,, Art, I.§ ](a). 
FNS. See. e.g. Herman y. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 60 F.3d 1375. 1386 {9th Cir.1995} (holding that Nevada 
law precludes emotional distress claims in the employment context); Dodge y. U,S,, 162 F,Supp.2d m <S.D,Ohio 20Qll 
(holding that Ohio law does not recognize a separate tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the employment 
context); Snyder v. Medical Service Corp,, 145 Wash.2d 233, 35 P.3d 1158, I J64 (2001) ("absent a statutory or public policy 
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• ,. mandate, employers do not owe employees a duty to use reasonable care to avoid the inadvertent infliction of emotional 
distress when responding to workplace disputes."). See also Berry v, World Wide Language Resources. Inc .. 716 F,Supp,25! 
34, 52 <D.Me,2002) (applying Maine law and declining to recognize a "special relationship" in the employment context 
sufficient to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress). See also. Perodeau v, City of Hartford, 259 Conn.. 
729, 792 A,2d 752 <2002) (disallowing emotional distress claims against individual employees who were involved in 
plaintifrs tennination). Cf., i\Uller v, Fairchild Industries, Inc., 797 F,2d 727, 738 <9th Cir,1986} (allowing an [emotional 
distress] claim to proceed under California law where the conduct giving rise to that claim was separate from that underlying 
the main claim of retaliatory discharge). 
D .ldaho,2012. 
Sommer v. Elmore County 
--- F.Supp2d ----, 2012 WL 4523449 (Dldaho) 
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ELMORE COUNTY, A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO 
Defendant 
Case No. _2012-1213 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RE: 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff advises the Court as per the Pre-Trial Conference Order dated January 22, 
2013 of the following statement of material facts: 
1. Plaintiff Cherri Nix is a citizen and resident of Elmore County, State of Idaho 
residing at Mountain Home, Idaho. Elmore County is a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho. At all relevant times the Plaintiff was an employee of 
Elmore County until her discharge and termination on April 30, 2012. 
2. Elmore County adopted and implemented the Elmore County Personnel, 
referenced by the county as the "ECPP·. A true copy is attached to the Nix 
Affidavit as Exhibit C. It was effective March 1, 1999. 




Ms. Cherri Nix was terminated on or about April 30, 2012 by Elmore 
County. 
4. A true copy of the Notice of Termination is attached hereto as Exhibit A to 
the complaint and Exhibit D to Nix Affidavit. 
5. Cherri Nix was employed by Elmore County as a salaried, regular employee 
for approximately five years prior to termination and discharge 
by the county which occurred on April 30, 2012. 
6. On February 16 2012 Plaintiff was placed on probation and given a notice of 
discipline-last chance on "probationary status" for a year, or until February 
1. 2013. The Notice is Exhibit A to Nix Affidavit. 
7, After the first six months of employment Plaintiff was subject to a 
probationary period as per page nine of the ECPP. Thereafter she was a 
regular, full time permanent employee, not subject to new hire probation as 
described in the ECPP. Probation for disciplinary purposes for full-time 
employees is provided for on page 20 of the ECPP. 
8. On February 16, 2012 Plaintiff's supervisor gave her a note stating that she 
was not entitled to a disciplinary hearing; a copy is attached as Exhibit B to 
the Nix Affidavit. 
9. "Notice of proposed Action" described under the paragraph entitled "Pre-
Deprivation", page 20 of the ECPP was not given prior to the Notice of 
Termination . 
10. Plaintiff requested a hearing before the Elmore Board of County 
Commissioners, which was held on June 11, 2012. 
11. Elmore County sent to Plaintiff a Notice of Hearing. It states in part that: 
~Please be advised that you were an at will employee, and as such are not 
entitled to a hearing regarding the reasons for your termination. The Board 
will not discuss performance -related issues." 
A copy is attached as exhibit G to the Nix Affidavit. 
12. • On June 7, 2012 the Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney sent a letter to 
Plaintiffs attorneys stating that she was on probationary status subject to 
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termination at any time and not entitled to the pre-deprivation procedures set 
out in the ECPP. 
See Exhibit H attached to Nix Affidavit. 
13 •• Elmore County Commissioners held a meeting on June 11, 2012 and issued 
a written decision on June 18. 2012 confirming Plaintiffs termination. She 
was never given any pre-deprivation procedure, nor any a list of the 
charges • Plaintiff was denied any hearing as to the reasons for her 
termination or an opportunity to respond to any charges against her. 
See Exhibit I attached to the Nix Affidavit. 
14. Plaintiff served a Notice of Tort Claim upon Elmore County on or about 
September 27, 2012 in accordance with I.C. 6-906. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon th-;)<. day of:;..-,w-,,,~'-"--¥--' , the 
undersigned attorney, sent/delive~ an c t copy: the foregoing 
document, to wit: to the Attorneys for Elmore ounty, by following method: 
First Class Mail addressed to: 
Kirtian G. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
FAX: )( . 
yes. __ _ 
yes~.383-9516 
A copy to the Court in Ada County by mail ____ or electronic copy by email 
at Inorton@adaweb.net r· 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDMSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF 
DISPUTED FACTS IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
hereby submit its Statement of Disputed Facts in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
l. Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts RE: Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (hereinafter, "Plaintiff's Statement of Facts") is undisputed. 
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2. Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is disputed. The copy of the Elmore 
County Personnel Policy ("ECPP") as attached to the Affidavit of Cherri Nix is incomplete and 
missing material pages. A true and accurate copy of the entire ECPP is attached to the affidavit of 
Barbara Steele, tiled concurrently. (Aff. of Barbara Steele, Ex. A) 
3. Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is undisputed. 
4. Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is undisputed. 
5. Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is disputed. Plaintiff was employed as 
a full-time regular employee for approximately five years prior to her termination, subject to two 
periods of probation: an initial period of probation upon beginning her employment and a period of 
probation beginning February 1, 2012 which continued until her termination. (See Aff ofBarbara 
Steele, Ex. A, p. 14-15; Ex. B, p. 6) 
6. Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is disputed. Plaintiff was placed on 
probationary status on February 1, 2012. A true and accurate copy of the Notice of Disciplinary 
Action - Notice of Last Chance that was served upon Plaintiff on February 1, 2012, is attached to 
the affidavit of Barbara Steele, filed concurrently. (Aff. of Barbara Steele, Ex. B) 
7. Paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is disputed. Plaintiff was subject to an 
introductory period of probation, but upon completion of that period she was classified as a "full-
time regular'' employee and not a "full time permanent" employee. Defendant denies Plaintiff's 
characterization of probation as referenced in the ECPP as the document speaks for itself. 
8. Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is undisputed. 
9. Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is undisputed. 
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10. Paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is undisputed. 
11. Paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is undisputed. 
12. Paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is undisputed. 
13. Paragraph 13 of?taintiff's Statement of Facts is undisputed. 
14. Paragraph 14 of Plaintiff's Statement of Facts is undisputed. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2013. 
NA YI.OR & HALES, P.C. 
By{h; 
Jacoii Ni;, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE or SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of March, 2013, I caused to be served, by 
the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDMSION OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, 
P.C., hereby submit its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Cherri Nix filed a complaint against Elmore County, alleging wrongful 
discharge in violation of the Elmore County Personnel Policy ("ECPP"), wrongful discharge in 
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violation of her "for cause" employment status, and wrongful discharge in violation of the Idaho 
Protection of Public Employees Act (Complaint, p. 2-6) Plaintiff specifically alleges that she was 
not afforded a pre-deprivation hearing, that she was not an at-will employee and was therefore 
wrongfully terminated without cause, and that she was forced to improperly alter her time cards and 
terminated because she refused to do so. (Id.) Currently, the only issue Plaintiff raises in her partial 
summary judgment motion is that she was not afforded a pre-deprivation bearing allegedly provided 
by the ECPP. (Brief Supporting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Supporting 
Brief'), p.1) She alleges this hearing is contractually provided through the ECPP and was denied 
by decision of the Board of County Commissioners. (Id. at 2) However, contrary to the assertions 
of Plaintiff in her briefing, whether or not she was an at-will employee at the time of her termination 
is material to the appropriate legal analysis, and thus will be discussed herein. 
Primarily, Plaintiff is precluded from bringing her claims in the current action because 
she has failed to address her claims through the statutorily required judicial review procedure as 
required in I.C. § 31-1506. Thus, her entire cause of action for wrongful termination is 
inappropriately raised before this court. However, even if her claims were proper in the current 
action, because the disclaimer language in the ECPP leaves no question of material fact that there 
was no intent by the county commissioners to include the ECPP as part of her employment 
agreement, Plaintiff had no contractual rights to any provisions found in the ECPP. This would 
include any pre-termination appeal offered in the ECPP. In addition, as an at-will employee at the 
time of her termination, there were no limitations on the termination of the employment relationship 
between Plaintiff and Elmore County, and, as such, she was not offered any hearing under state law. 
Finally, as a probationary employee at the time of her termination, she was not entitled to any pre-
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tennination hearing as the conditions of her probation allowed for immediate termination at any time 
during the probation period and that any "for cause" probationary status is not contemplated by the 
ECPP (which has been upheld by this court previously). Consequently, Plaintiff cannot legally 
prevail on her claim and partial summary judgment should be denied. 
n. 
ANALYSIS 
A. IRCP 56(c) Legal Standard 
Summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When 
considering a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in 
favor of the nonmoving party. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360,364 (1991). 
Moreover, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in favor of the party 
resisting the motion. Id. 
The party moving for summary judgment initially bears the burden of establishing 
both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820 P.2d at 364. This burden may be met by establishing 
the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. 
Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such an absence of 
evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence 
or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that proof of a particular 
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element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. 
App. 2000). 
Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of fact, the burden 
shifts to the nonmoving party to produce admissible evidence, which sets forth specific facts 
showing the existence of a genuine issue of fact on the elements challenged by the moving party. 
I.R.C.P. 56( e ); Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 21, 791 P .2d 1285, 1299 1300 ( 1990); 
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530 31,887 P.2d 1034, 1037 38 (1994). An 
opposing party may not merely rest on allegations contained in his pleadings nor may the opposing 
party's case rest on speculation or conclusory assertions. Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 
13(> Idaho 835, 839, 41 P.3d 263,267 (2002); McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769, 820 P.2d at 364. The party 
opposing the motion must produce evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to show that there is indeed 
a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Olsen, 117 Idaho at 720, 791 P.2d at 1299. 
B. Plaintiff Failed to File a Petition for Judicial Review of the Board of County 
Commissioners' Decision Within 28 Days as Required by I.e. § 31-1506. 
Idaho Code Section 31-1506(1) establishes: "Uniess otherwise provided by law, judicial 
review of any act, order or proceeding of the board shall be initiated by any person aggrieved thereby 
within the same time and in the same manner as provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for 
judicial review of actions." This code makes clear that any review of a decision made by a board 
of county commissioners must be effectuated through the process of judicial review, not a civil suit 
for damages as has been brought by the Plaintiff. The plain language of the statute sets forth that 
"judicial review of any act, order or proceeding of the board shall be initiated" through the judicial 
review process ( emphasis added). Thus, the statute is mandatory. 
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This Court has recently considered the question of whether I.C. § 31-1506 applies to 
employment decisions made by a board of county commissioners in Ravenscroft v. Boise County, 
et al., Case No. CV-2011-113 (J. Owen) and has determined that it does. See Memorandum 
Decision and Order dated September 14, 2011.1 In that case the Boise County Board of County 
Commissioners terminated the employment of Plaintiff Ravenscroft. Ravenscroft then brought a 
timely Petition for Judicial Review as required by I.C. § 31-1506 and pursuant to the filing 
requirements ofIDAPA (Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code). Boise County moved to dismiss the 
proceeding, arguing that I.C. § 31-1506 did not apply to employment decisions made by the Board. 
The District Court disagreed, finding the clear language of the statute, combined with precedent of 
the Idaho Supreme Court, indicated employment decisions must also be reviewed by a court through 
the judicial review process. 
In Plaintiff's complaint and in her currently pending motion for summary judgment, the focus 
of her claims is the written decision from the Board of County Commissioners of June 18, 2012, 
where the Board found that: 1) Plaintiff was not terminated due to any unlawful discrimination; 2) 
Plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing to consider the merits of her termination; and 3) Plaintiff's 
termination as of April 30, 2012 was confirmed. (Aff. of Cherri Nix, Ex. I) Any appeal of these 
employment decisions, made by the Board of County Commissioners, required a timely Petition for 
Judicial Review. LC.§ 31-1506. In fact, throughout Plaintiff's Supporting Brief, she repeatedly 
invokes this written decision of the Board of County Commissioners to support her claim for partial 
summary judgment. (See Plaintiff's Supporting Brief, p. 3, 10, 13-15, 18) 
1 A copy of this decision is attached hereto as Addendum 1. This decision was approved for 
permissive appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court (Dkt. No. 39323-2011 ). Oral argument was held on 
February 11, 2013, and a decision is now pending. 
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In the present case, Plaintiff did not file a petition for judicial review with respect to this June 
18, 2012, written employment decision by the Board of County Commissioners. Rather, Plaintiff 
has filed a civil complaint seeking monetary damages under claims of wrongful termination and the 
Idaho Whistleblower Act And, as more than 28 days have passed since the Board's decision 
confirming her termination, any future petition for judicial review she may file would be untimely 
under the time restrictions ofl.C. § 67-5273. 
Thus, partial summary judgment as a matter of law for Plaintiff's allegations regarding the 
is improper, as she is procedurally prohibited from bringing her current civil complaint seeking 
monetary damages and injunctive relief pursuant to I.C. § 31-1506. She has failed to pursue the 
required process for judicial review of the Elmore County Board of County Commissioners' 
employment decision. 
C. Plaintiff's Partial Summary Judgment Must Be Denied as a Matter of Law 
Because as an At-Will Employee, She Had No Contractual Right to Any Pre-
Deprivation Hearin1. 
Even assuming for this motion only that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff's claims and that all Plaintiff's allegations in her complaint are true, there is insufficient 
legal basis for the Court to reasonably infer that Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for not providing her, 
as an at-will employee, an appeal hearing prior to her termination. The ECPP is not a contract. (Aff. 
of Barbara Steele, Ex. A, p. 7) Due to the lack of any employment contract to the contrary, Plaintiff 
was undeniably an at-will employee at the time of her termination, and as such had no contractually 
created property interest in continuing employment. This would preclude any property interest in 
any pre-termination hearing. Idaho law establishes that where there is a clear contractual disclaimer 
in a personnel policy, there is no question of material fact in the lack of intent by the employer for 
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that personnel policy to be considered as part of the employment agreement. Mitchell v. Zilog, 125 
Idaho 709, 712-13, 874 P.2d S20, S23-24 (1994). Thus, due to the clear contractual disclaimer in 
the ECPP at issue here, there can be no issue of material fact that there was no intent by Elmore 
County to include the policy and its provisions as a part of Plaintiff's employment agreement The 
disclaimer found in the ECPP effectively negates intent of the county from including the policy or 
any part therein as a part of Plaintiff's employment agreement. Without any contractual provision 
to rely upon, there no entitlement to any termination procedure sufficient to maintain a wrongful 
termination action. 
"Under the federal constitution, at-will employees possess no protected property rights and 
therefore are not entitled to due process before being terminated." Lawson v. Umatilla County, 139 
F .3d 690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1998) ( citing Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 99S F .2d 898, 904 (9th 
Cir.1993)). In Idaho, employment is at-will unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract that 
specifies the duration of employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may be terminated. 
See Jenldns v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 387 (Idaho 200S). Without a contractual 
agreement limiting a party's right to terminate the employment relationship, "either party may 
terminate it at any time or for any reason without incurring liability." Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., liS 
Idaho 709, 713, 874 P.2d 520, 523 (1994) (emphasis added). This presumption of at-will 
employment may be rebutted if the parties intend that an employee handbook or manual will 
constitute an element of an employment contract, but at-will status is retained when the employee 
manual contains a superceding disclaimer that "specifically negates any intention on the part of the 
employer to have [the handbook or manual] become a part of the employment contract." Zilog, 125 
Idaho at 712-13, 874 P.2d at 523-24 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court specifically stated: 
It is settled law in Idaho that, unless an employee is hired pursuant to 
a contract which specifies the duration of the employment or limits 
the reasons for which an employee may be discharged, the 
employment is at the will of either party. Either party may terminate 
the relationship at any time for any reason without incurring liability. 
Thus, in the absence of an agreement which limits either party's right 
to terminate the employment relationship, either party may terminate 
it at any time or for any reason. This rule reflects the judiciary's 
reluctance to bind employers and employees to an unsatisfactory and 
potentially costly situation, although we recognize that either party is 
likely to be damaged by an unforewamed termination of the 
employment relationship. 
A limitation on the at-will relationship may be express or implied A 
limitation will be implied when, from all the circumstances 
surrounding the relationship, a reasonable person could conclude that 
both parties intended that either party's right to terminate the 
relationship was limited by the implied in fact agreement 
In particular, the presumption of an at-will employment relationship 
can be rebutted when the parties intend that an employee handbook 
or manual will constitute an element of an employment contract. 
Whether a particular handbook does so may be a question of 
fact, unless the handbook "specUlcally ngates any intention on 
the part of the employer to have it become a part of the 
employment contract." 
Zilog, 125 Idaho at 712-13, 874 P.2d at 523-24 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see 
also Metca/f v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 624-25, 778 P.2d 744, 746-47 (1989) 
( discussing presumption of at-will employment). The valid disclaimer in Zilog read, in part, as 
follows: 
This guide is not to be construed as a contract between Zilog and its 
employees and does not in any way imply or create any rights, contractual or 
otherwise, on behalf of Zilog's employees. Zilog may, at its sole discretion, 
alter or amend this guide or portions thereof at any time. 
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Zilog, 125 Idaho at 713, 874 P.2d at 524. Thus, pursuant to well-established Idaho law, when an 
employment manual or personnel policy specifically negates any intention to become part of the 
employment contract, there is no question of fact that the presumption of at-will employment 
relationship remains regardless of the language within that personnel policy. When an employee is 
at-will, there are no limitations on the termination of the employment relationship, and there cannot 
be any inferred contractual protections creating "for-cause" status from any document, as the very 
nature of being "at-will" indicates that there is no express or implied contractual limitation on the 
termination of the employment relationship. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has very recently again addressed this issue and made clear that 
where, as here, the alleged source of a limitation on the at-will employment relationship is the 
employer's policies, the "policies must manifest an intent that they become part of the employment 
agreement." Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632,639,272 P.3d 1263, 
1269 (2012) (citing Metcalf, 116 Idaho at 624). The Supreme Court bad previously explained its 
applicable reasoning for this established law in a separate case: 
[A]n employer may provide guidelines, which are necessary 
conditions for continued employment, and avoid having them read as 
a guarantee for a specific term of employment or placing limits on the 
reasons for discharge. 
An employer's custom of only terminating employees for good cause 
is likewise not sufticient to support a claim of an implied contract 
term eliminating the employer's right to terminate at will. As the 
Court of Appeals in Atwood [v. Western Const., Inc., 129 Idaho 234, 
239,923 P.2d 479,484 (Ct App. 1996)] reasoned: 
As a matter of policy, this Court will not consider evidence 
that a company does not usually fire employees without a 
good reason as by itself establishing that the company does 
not maintain an at-will employment policy. To do otherwise 
would encourage employers to occasionally fire employees 
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for no other reason than to show that they maintain the 
freedom to do so. 
If we were to accept the . . . contention that an employer who 
normally only fires employees for good cause should be held to have 
forfeited the ability to claim an at-will relationship with employees. 
the rule would necessarily swallow up the at-will presumption. 
Employers would be forced to arbitrarily fire an employee 
periodically just to reaffirm their right to discharge for no reason. 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,242, 108 P.3d 380,389 (2005) (internal citations 
omitted) (bracketed language added) ( emphasis added). Here, due to the contractual disclaimer 
found in the ECPP, any provisions found in the ECPP itself are simply guidelines, but do not place 
limits on the reasons or procedure for discharge, regardless of the language used. 
In Lawson v. Umatilla County, 139 F.3d 690, 691 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit 
considered a similar factual situation as applied to Oregon case law that mirrors applicable Idaho 
law. There, a county employee alleged that his permanent classification status and the county 
personnel policy afforded him protections such that he was no longer an at-will employee, and 
created a protected property interest in his continuing employment. Id. at 691. However, the 
Personnel Policies there also included a disclaimer that the personnel policies were not an 
employment contract with the employee. Lawson v. Umatilla County, 139 F.3d 690,691 (9th Cir. 
1998). Consequently, the court there held that the disclaimer would, "retain the employee's at-will 
status even when the policies also provide specific reasons for termination and for an appeals 
process." Id. at 693 ( emphasis added). 
The personnel policy at issue in this case is not a contract. (Aff. of Barbara Steele, Ex. A, 
p. 7) Thus, it cannot rebut the presumption of at-will employment. The disclaimer language found 
in the ECPP is similar to the language upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court as a valid disclaimer of 
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any limitation on the at-will employment relationship in Zilog, supra, and Parker v. Boise Telco 
Federal Credit Union, 129 Idaho 248, 250-51 (Ct App. 1996).2 It reads: 
THIS PERSONNEL POLICY IS NOT A CONTRACT. NO 
CONTRACTOFEMPLOYMENTWITHELMORECOUNTY 
WILL BEV ALID UNLESS IT IS SIGNED IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH PROPER PROCEDURES BY A SPECIFICALLY 
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNING 
BOARD AND UNLESS IT IS SIGNED AND CONTAINS THE 
NAME OF THE EMPLOYEE WHO WOULD BE 
BENicFfl"I'ED BY THE CONTRACT. 
(Aff. of Barbara Steele, Ex. A, p. 7) (emphasis in original) This language validly disclaims any 
possible intent by Elmore County to have the policy become part of the employment contract with 
Plaintiff, and thus pursuant to Zilog, supra, there is no question of fact that the ECPP does not negate 
the existing presumption from Idaho law that Plaintiff was an at-will employee. This superceding 
disclaimer precludes any language in the ECPP that could seem to create any contractual limitation 
on Plaintiff's employment relationship. See Lawson, 139 F.3d at 693; Zilog, supra. 
2The disclaimer in Parker reads as follows: 
The contents contained in this handbook are presented as a matter of 
information only and are not to be construed as a contract between the 
employer and its employees. The [Boise Telco Federal Credit Union] 
reserves the right to unilaterally and without notice add to, change or 
delete, supplement, or rescind all or any part of the practices, 
procedures, or benefits described in the handbook as it deems 
circumstances require. I agree to conform to the rules and regulations 
of the Credit Union. I also understand that my employment and 
compensation can be terminated, with or without cause, and with or 
without notice at any time, at the option of either the Credit Union or 
myself 
Parker v. Boise Telco Federal Credit Union, 129 Idaho 248, 250-51 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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Additionally, the broad scope of the disclaimer language in the ECPP is supported by the 
language of the disclaimer itself. That langauge states that the only way for an employee to avoid 
the contractual disclaimer is through a separate contract which requires the name of the employee 
and the signature of both a specifically authorized representative of Elmore County and the 
employee herself. (Aff. of Barbara Steele, Ex. A, p. 7) A solitary statement within the ECPP, 
regardless of the language used, does not meet this requirement to elevate its status to a contractual 
provision to avoid the superceding disclaimer. Therefore, the only way the presumption of 
Plaintiff's at-will employment status can be rebutted is if she can show an actual contract of 
employment with Elmore County, signed in accordance with proper procedures by a specifically 
authorized representative of the governing board, and signed by Plaintiff herself, which indicates an 
intent of the parties to include the ECPP as part of that employment contract. Similarly, without 
such a contract indicating an intent to contractually provide an appeals hearing specifically to 
Plaintiff, she has no valid claim of a violation of a contractual right that does not exist. It is 
undisputed that such a contract does not exist, and thus the presumption of at-will employment 
remains with no limitations on the employment relationship, and there also is no contractually 
provided right in continued employment. 
Similarly, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which exists in both for-cause 
and at-will employment relationships, only applies to benefits or rights found under an employment 
contract. However, as an "at-will" employee, Plaintiff has failed to show how the Defendants 
terminated her in the desire to avoid payment of benefits she already earned, which is the only 
implied covenant that exists for "at-will" employees. Idaho does require that both parties in an 
employment agreement perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their agreement. Jenkins 
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v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,242, 108 P.3d 380,389 (2005). While there is an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing with at-will employees, this does not create a duty for the 
employer to demonstrate cause for a termination. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 
627, 778 P.2d 744, 749 (1989). "The covenant does not protect the employee from a 'no cause' 
termination because tenure was never a benefit inherent in the at-will agreement" Id. ( citation 
omitted). However, there is protection against an employer who simply terminates an employee in 
order to avoid payment to that employee of benefits already earned, such as sales commissions. Id 
As established here, the ECPP is not part of Plaintiff's employment agreement because it is 
specifically disclaimed as not part of any employment contract. Thus, there cannot be any violation 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on a failure to comply with the language of the 
policy, because it was never a contractual part of the Plaintiff's employment agreement, and does 
not fall under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Plaintiff argues that whether she was a permanent contract employee or an employee at will 
is immaterial, but this simply ignores the definition of being an employee "at-will." There are no 
limitations on the termination of the at-will employment relationship. There is no Idaho case law 
that supports any limitation on termination for an at-will employee. Thus, by simple logic, if 
Plaintiff was, in fact, an at-will employee, there were no limitations on either Defendant's or 
Plaintiff's right to terminate the employment relationship, which would negate any implied 
opportunity to receive a pre-termination hearing. 
Plaintiff also misapplies Harkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353 ( 1986), in that the holding 
of that case does not provide automatic procedural due process protections to public at-will 
employees, but rather establishes that there are inherent procedural due process protections when 
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there is an already existing protected property interest in continued employment based on contract 
or statute. Under the federal constitution, this creates a constitutionally protected property interest 
in continued employment in that a permanent employee's "employment is not terminable at the will 
of either the employee or the employer."3 In other words, when an employee is "for cause." There 
is no such basis in Idaho law that creates a "for-cause" presumption of employment for the majority 
of public employees, such as Plaintiff. Again, the court in Harkness states that an employee's 
handbook could constitute an element of the contract if the parties intend it to be so, but well-
established Idaho law indicates clarifies that there is no question of fact as to the lack of intent when 
the employment handbook contains an express disclaimer of contractual intent. 
While there are examples of public employees who are statutorily "for-cause," Plaintiff here 
does not enjoy such a status. For example, in Boudreau v. City of Wendell, 147 Idaho 609, 612 
(2009), the issue addressed by the court was whether a statutorily "appointed officer" of a city could 
use the provisions of a personnel policy to preempt his at-will employment status as established for 
his "appointed officer'' position in I.C. § 50-204. The court there held that local governments could 
not override statutes as enacted by the legislature. Id. Thus, Plaintiff Boudreau was actually a "for-
cause" employee based on his statutory "appointed officer'' position. Plaintiff here was not an 
"appointed officer'' under Idaho statute, nor does her claim involve any applicable state statute, and 
thus any public employee "for cause" analysis as applied in Boudreau is not applicable here. In fact, 
3In the context of Plaintiff's filed Complaint and her current briefing in this Partial Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Defendant only understands Plaintiff's claims to be contractual and 
based in Idaho state law. Plaintiff's reliance on federal law is without some connection to similar 
state law is misplaced in that it is largely applicable only where there is a constitutionally protected 
property interest in continued employment. As Plaintiff has raised no constitutional claims at this 
point, such reliance on this federal law is unpersuasive . 
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previously cited Idaho case law indicates that Plaintiff is presumed to be an at-will employee unless 
she can provide an employment contract that states otherwise. As the personnel policy at issue here 
is specifically disclaimed as a contract, it cannot be considered as such for purposes of Plaintifrs 
employment 
Plaintiff cites to a wide range of disparate jurisdictions to support her argument that when 
there are "ambiguities" found from a contractual disclaimer in a personnel policy and the language 
of the policy themselves, that the court may disregard the disclaimer and look to the policy as 
written. (Plaintiff's Supporting Brief, p. 10-13) However, these arguments ignore the supporting 
individual state case law of those distinct jurisdictions, and the differences found in their application 
of at-will employment law to controlling Idaho at-will employment law. For example, one of the 
various cases that Plaintiff cites to is Swanson v. Liquid Air Corp., 118 Wash.2d 512,826 P.2d 664 
(1992). Plaintiff uses Swanson to support her assertion that even when there is a valid disclaimer 
of contractual intent, the Court may ignore the controlling nature of that disclaimer and look to the 
language of the policy itself. Were Washington precedent analogous to Idaho precedent, then 
Swanson might be persuasive, however, the following analysis of applicable Washington law 
indicates that Washington has interpreted its at-will employment law differently than Idaho. Thus, 
Plaintiff's reliance on Swanson and its accompanying analysis is misplaced. 
Washington at-will employment law parallels Idaho at-will employment law in most respects. 
Both states have a presumption of at-will employment that can be rebutted through the contractual 
or implied intent of the parties involved. Compare Zilog, 125 Idaho at 712-13, 874 P.2d at 523-24; 
Carlson v. Lake Chelan Community Hosp., 116 Wash.App. 718, 729-730, 75 P.3d 533, 539-540 
(Wash. App. Div. 3, 2003 ). Both also allow an employer to disclaim any contractual intent from the 
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language of an employment manual and to avoid that manual:from being considered as part of the 
employment agreement through that disclaimer. Id. However, a crucial and material distinction 
between Washington and Idaho at-will employment analysis arises at this point in the analysis. 
Where Idaho bas conclusively and consistently established that there is no issue of material fact 
when an employment manual disclaims its contractual intent and thus ends the analysis at that point, 
Zilog, supra, Washington specifically allows further analysis with respect to the employment manual, 
in that it "must be read in reference to the parties' 'norms of conduct and expectations founded upon 
them."' Jd.;Paynev. SunnysideCmty. Hosp., 78 Wash. App. 34,42, 894 P.2d 1379, 1384 (1995). 
In other words, Washington at-will employment analysis allows further inference beyond the 
contractual disclaimer when, "the employee has a reasonable expectation the employer will follow 
the discipline procedure, based upon the language used in stating the procedure and the pattern of 
practice in the workplace." Payne, 78 Wash. App. at 42,894 P.2d at 1384. No parallel analysis is 
found in Idaho precedent. 
In fact, comparing the applicable case law from both states serves to clarify the distinction 
between Washington and Idaho at-will employment analysis: 
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Washington At-Will Analysis 
"A contractual disclaimer does not 
automatically negate a document's contractual 
status and must be read by reference to the 
parties' 'norms of conduct and expectations 
founded upon them' " 
Idaho At-Will Analysis 
"In particular, the presumption of an at-will 
employment relationship can be rebutted when 
the parties intend that an employee handbook or 
manual will constitute an element of an 
employment contract Whether a particular 
handbook does so may be a question of fact, 
unless the handbook 'specifically negates any 
intention on the part of the employer to have it 
become a part of the employment contract. m 
Payne v. Sunnyside Cmty. Hosp., 78 Wash. Mitchell v. Zilog, 12S Idaho 709, 712-13, 874 
App. 34, 42,894 P.2d 1379, 1384 (1995) P.2d 520, 523-24 (1994) (emphasis added) 
While the various jurisdictions cited by Plaintiff might not foreclose the possibility that there 
may exist ambiguities when a personnel policy, "must be read in reference to the parties' 'norms of 
conduct and expectations founded upon them'," there is no applicable and controlling case law in 
Idaho that states the same. Thus, application of Washington case law ( or any other state jurisdiction 
that allows such inferences) in the current case is inappropriate. As clearly established in 
Defendants' prior argument, there is ample controlling Idaho case law setting forth that there is no 
issue of material fact as to the intent of the parties when there is a clear disclaimer of contractual 
intent, as exists here. 
Plaintiff also attempts to use the decision in Sommer v. Elmore County, 2012 WL 4523449 
(D. Idaho), to somehow establish that the court conclusively "discounted an argument by Elmore 
County that regardless of whether Sommer was a regular full-time employee, as an at-will employee 
she had no property right in continued employment." (Plaintiff's Supporting Brief, p. 8) However, 
this miscbaracterizes the decision of the court, attached to Plaintiff's Supporting Brief. The court 
there held that whether the employee had a property right in continued employment could not be 
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resolved at the motion to dismiss stage based on insufficient briefing by the parties, and invited 
further briefing as to whether Plaintiff Sommer even had a constitutionally protected property 
interest in continued employment as an at-will employee. In fact, the court specifically noted that 
although this issue was not fully briefed by the parties, its "own research found some persuasive 
authority indicating that even if Sommer is classified as a regular employee for which a hearing is 
provided under the Policy, that might not be enough to confer a 'property' right sufficient to warrant 
Constitutional due process protections." 2012 WL 4523449, •J, n. 4 (D. Idaho 2012).4 Thus, even 
the court in Sommer recognized the importance of an employee's at-will status, in that it would limit 
Constitutional due process protections. While Plaintiff's current claim hinges more upon the attempt 
to tum the ECPP into an employment contract and that she was not on "introductory probation" like 
Plaintiff Sommer, her at-will status at the time of her termination, like that of Plaintiff Sommer, is 
essential to the analysis as to the lack of any limitation on the right of either party to terminate the 
employment relationship. 
Plaintiff also attempts to use state contract law to interpret the ECPP, but such consideration 
of the ECPP as a contract would only be appropriate if the policy failed to include a disclaimer of 
intent to be considered part of the employee's contract. See Zilog, 125 Idaho at 712-13. Pursuant 
to Zilog, if the personnel policy contains a valid disclaimer of contractual intent, then there is no 
question of fact that the personnel policy should not be considered as part of the employment 
contract. Thus, contractual interpretation is inappropriate. 
4These issues have been recently briefed in parties cross motions for summary judgment, with 
no hearing yet scheduled. 
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D. As a Probationary Employee at the Time of Her Termination, Plaintiff was Not 
Entitled to Any Pre:: Termination Hearing. 
In addition to previous arguments, Plaintiff had no entitlement to a pre-termination hearing. 
It is undisputed that Plaintiff was a probationary employee at the time of her termination. She had 
been placed on a one-year probation on February 1, 2012, for poor work performance, and informed 
at that time in her "Notice of Discipline-Last Chance" that she ''was, and remain, an at-will 
employee," and that she could be terminated immediately at any time during the one-year 
probationary period. (Aff. of Barbara Steele, Ex. B, p. 6) Plaintiff was terminated on April 30, 
2012, during the one-year probationary period, for failure to meet the working requirements 
established with respect to the Notice of Last Chance. (Aff. of Cherri Nix, Ex. D, p. 1) In their June 
18, 2012, 'Written decision on termination, the Board of County Commissioners established: 
A probationary employee of the county is expressly an "at-will" 
employee. The ECPP (employment manual) states that the 
probationary period "shall be utilized for closely observing the 
employee's work ... and for rejecting an introductory employee 
whose performance is not satisfactory." To construe that the ECPP 
creates anything other than "at-will" status for a probationary 
employee, or that the probationary employee is entitled to a hearing 
upon termination, would render the probationary employee concept 
meaningless under the ECPP. Probationary employees are not 
entitled to a hearing under the ECPP. 
(Aff. of Cherri Nix, Ex. I, p. 2) The Board continued to explain that in Romero v. Plummer, CV-
2010-113, Idaho Fourth Judicial District (April 8, 2011 ),5 the court there stated that the ECPP makes 
it clear that all Elmore County employees are at-will, and probationary employees specifically are 
not entitled to any hearing. The court made no distinction in introductory probation or disciplinary 
'A copy of this decision is attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
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probation. Thus, the decision of the Board at that time was to deny Plaintiff any pre-termination 
hearing because, as a probationary employee, she had no such opportunity. 
Ultimately, Plaintiff attempts to argue a distinction between a "new probation employee" and 
a "disciplinary probation employee," and to then attach "at-will" employment status to the ''new 
probation employee" and to create a "for cause" status to the "disciplinary probation employee." 
(Plaintiffs Supporting Brief, p. 13-18) While probationary employees are discussed in two different 
sections of the Personnel Manual, there is no language that would support Plaintiffs inference that 
there is such a difference in "at-will" status between the two. In fact, in the section of the ECPP 
entitled, "Levels of Disciplinary Actions Available," probation is simply listed as one of five 
disciplinary steps which may be taken in response to personnel policy violations, with no further 
explanation provided. (Aff. of Barbara Steele, Ex. A, p. 33) Plaintiff argues that "no language is 
found in the section of the ECPP entitled 'Levels of Disciplinary Actions Available' which states 
that an employee placed on disciplinary status of probation is thereby converted into an employee 
at-will or for that matter, is a new or 'introductory' employee." (Plaintiffs Supporting Brief, p. 16) 
This is because there is no language explaining the levels of disciplinary actions available at all. 
Thus, by Plaintiffs own admission, the language in the ECPP is, at best, inconclusive as to what the 
intent of "disciplinary probation" might be. 
However, Plaintifrs attempt at distinguishing these two types of probation is irrelevant 
because Plaintiffs notice of her one-year disciplinary probation clearly states that part of the 
conditions of her probation were that Plaintiff was, and would remain, an at-will employee, and 
could be immediately terminated at any time during the one-year probationary period. (Aff. of 
Barbara Steele, Ex. B, p. 6) Therefore, it was clarified in her Notice of Last Chance and probation 
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that she wu an at-will employee subject to immediate termination at any time. Thus, any argument 
that Plaintiff was under the impression that sho was a ''for-cause" employee while she wu on her 
probationary one-year period ignores tho existing presumption of at-will status and tho clear 
language of her probationary conditions, which were provided to her more than two months before 
her termination. As her probation clearly classified Plaintiff' as an at-will employee who could bo 
immediately terminated at any time, it is clear that she would not bo offered any pre-termination 
appeal hearing. As such, partial summary judgment is inappropriate for Plaintiff. 
ID. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiff has failed to bring this claim as a matter of judicial review as required by 
Idaho statute, this court does not have proper jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims in their current civil 
action state, and partial summary judgment is improper. Further, as she was an at-will employee of 
Elmore County, and also because she was a probationary employee with specific conditions of being 
an at-will employee who could bo terminated immediately at any time, she would not be given the 
opportunity for a pre-termination hearing and thus partial summary judgment is improper. 
Defendant respectfully requests that this court deny Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
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CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of March, 2013, I caused to be served, 
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
B. Leo Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
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DISTRICT COIJfU BOISE OOUH1Y, I 
Reootdtdn&ook---•'--+-
Flfed SEP 1 ~ 2011 
ev~~~-::::fr---;u~ 
lN nm DISTRICT COURT OF nm FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
nm STATB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUNTY OF BOISB 
GORDON RA VBNSCROFT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOISB COUNTY, IDAHO, a county 
Organized under the laws of the Stato of 
Idaho; BOARD OP COUNTY 
COMMISSIONBRS FOR BOISB 
COUNTY; JAMIB A. ANDERSON, 
TERRY C. DAY, ROBERT B. FRY, 
Commissioners, CHBRISB D. MCLAIN, 






Boforo tho Court is tho respondents' motion to dismiss. As explained below, tho Court will 
deny tho motion. 
Background and Prior Proceedings 
The petitioner Gordon Ravenscroft (0 Ravenscrotl.'') was employed by Boise County. On 
April 12, 2011, tho Boise County Board of County Commissioners (tho "Board") conducted an 
administrative hearing regarding Ravenaoro.ft'a employment. At the close of tho hoadng, tho Board 
terminated his employment, momorlaUzed in a document entitled 0 Notice of Decision Regarding 
Ponding PersoMcl Action -Tennination of Employment," dated April 25, 2011. 
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On May l 1. 2011. Ravenscroft filed a Petition tor Judicial Review against Boise County, tho 
Board. tho three county commiasionors, and a dopuly county prosecutor ( collectively "Boise 
County'). The potitlon seeka to set aside the Board's termination ordor and have Ravol18Croft 
reinstated. n also seeks all compensation and benefits from the time of his tcnnlnation through 





On May 21. 201 I, Bolse Cotmty filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P, J2(b)(I), 
along with a momorandum in support arguing that the Court does not have subject maUor 
Jurisdiction. Ravenscroft flied an opposition 011 July 11, 2011, to whlch Boise County flied a reply 
















The Court conducted a bearing into tlte matter al the Ada County courthouse on July 26, 
2011. Michael J, Kane. Michael Kano & Assooiatcs, PLLC, appeared and argued on behalf of Boise 
County. John T. Bujak appeared and argued on behalf of Ravenscroft. The Court took the matter 
under advisement. 
Legal Standard 
Judicial review of an administrative decision L1 wholly statutory. E.g., Cobbley v. Cha/Ila, 
143 Idaho 130, 133, 139 P.3d 732, 73S (2006), In order for the district court to review an action ofa 
local government, its officers or its units, there must be express authorization by statute. 
I.R.C.P.84(1)(11). While the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (''IAPA''), Idaho Code§ 67-5201 
et seq,. authorizes judicial review of agency actions, a county board of commissioners is not an 
"agency' for purposes of judJclal review under IAP A. Idaho Codo § 67-5201 (1 ); Taylor v. Canyon 
County Bd. O/Com'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 430, 210 P.3d 532, 538 (2009) (citing Petersen v. Franklin 
County, 130 Idaho 176, 182,938 P.2d 1214, 1220 (1997)), "Absent a statute invoking the IAPA's 
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Glb.ron v. AdaCountySh,rlff'1 D,pt., 139-ldaho S, 7-8, 72 P.3d 845, 847-48 (2003)). 
Dlseu,afon 





(1) Unless otherwise _provJded by Jaw, Judicial review of any act, order or proceedhig 
of tho board shall be initiated by any person aggrieved thereby within the same time 
and in tho same manner as provided ln chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, tot judicial 
review of actions. 






arguing that Idaho Code § 31-1506 does 11ot expressly authorize the Court to revlow personnel 
decisions of tho Board. Boise County argues Idaho Code § 31-1506 is within a grouping of statutes 
that deals with county fmances and claims, and that the statute only sets forth the procedure for 
denying a claim or a wruTant, (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at pp. 2-3.) Jn 
15 opposition, Ravenscroft argues that Idaho Code § 31-J 506 plainly and unambiguously authorizes 









action in this case. 
Recently, tho Idaho Supremo Court bas clarified that It has "given an expansive 1·eadi11g to 
I.C. § 31-15061 notwithstanding the fact that the provision is included in a chapter that addresses 
county finances.,, Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Je1·ome County, 150 Idaho 5591 ___, 249 P.3d 358, 360 
(2011) (citing Inn Bennion, 97 Idaho 7641 554 P,2d 942 (1976) (decision [under prior statute] 
approving property development); Rural High Sch. D/11. No. J v. Sch. D/11. No. 31. 32 Idaho 3251 
182 P. 859 (1919) (order fw1der prior statute) changina school district boundaries); YI/lap of /lo v. 
2s Ram.y, 18 Idaho 6421 112 P. 126 (1910) (order [under prior statuto]lncorporat.lng a village); and 
'-6 MEMORA.ND'UM DECISION AND ORDER- PAGE 3 
143 
ADDENDUM 1 • Page 3 
. . 
~9/14/ZOll 01:40 FAX 
Latah Cnl)t "· H<UfurtlMr. 12 Idaho 79?, 88 P. 433 (1907) (order [under prior statute]opening a 
1 
2 private road)). In fact, and contrary to Boise County•a position, the Supremo Court reftmed to Idaho 
3 Code f 31-1506 u a "broadjuriadiotlonal grant' for jucffcfal review. ld. at 35~. 
4 While tho Court is not aware of an Idaho Court of Appeals or Supremo Court case 
5 specificall)' applying the statute to review a board of commissioners' decisJon to tlro an employee. 




county employee and the subsequent denial of review by a county board. In Gibson v. Ada County 
Sh1rljf'1 Dept., 139 Idaho S, 12 P.3d 845 (2003) r'Glb.ron l'), Gibson, an Ada County Sheriffs 
Department employee, wu fired for misconduct. Gibson appealed that decision adminlstratlvely and 
10 
11 an Ada County personnel hearing officer affirmed. Gibson did not thereafter seek appeal to the Ada 
12 County Board of Commissioners but instead sought judicial review ftom the distlict court. The 






there is no statute authorizing Judicial review of a decision by a county personnel hearing officer. 
Gibson I, 139 Idaho at 8. However, the Court stated In dicta that: 
Notably, had Gibson appealed the county personnel hearing officers deoisfon to the 
Ada County Board of Commlsslonera (board), the board's decision would be an 
appropriate subject for judicial review and tho IAP A standard of review would 
apply. l.C, § 3 t -1 506( I). 




Gibson thereafter appealed the hearing offlcer•s decision to the Ada County Board of 
Commissioners, which refused 10 reviow the hearing officer's decision. Gibson then petitioned the 
district court to review the board's ret\Jsal to act. The district court denied the petition and Gibson 
23 
2, appealed, arguing that Idaho Code § 31-1506(1) conferred jurisdiction. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 
2s Idaho 746,133 P.3d 1211 (2006) ("Gibson JP'). The Supreme Court in Gibson II stated thatfdaho 
26 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND Om>ER- PAGE 4 
144 
ADDENDUM 1 • Page 4 
,· 







Code§ 31-1S06 did not apply because the af~to expressly.apfliee to boam "action", not inaction. 
GIIMon v. Ada Co11111y, 142 Idaho 746. 151, 133 P.3d 1211, 1222 (2006) f'Glbson O"). The Court 
wont on to state that: 
Thia Court•, language [in Glbaon 1] was not a mandato for tho dlatrict court to review 
the sheriff's decision. Tho Court ruled that LR.C.P. 84 required a atatuto exlat that 
provided authority for judicial review. 'fhJa Court In no way Indicated it could 
provide an altomate means for the district court to roviow tho oftlcor's decision in 
this situation. Furthonnoro, evon if thle Court attempted to provide such 
authorJzation, it would not satisfy I.R.C.P. 84. 
a Id. Tho court found that the statute dfd not speoiflcally authorize judicial review of the porsonnol 
















In this case, however, tho pctltfon seeks judicial review of tho Board's own decision to 
terminate Ravenscroft. The petition dooa not seek.judioial review of tho Board's review, or refusal 
ofreviow, of personnel decisions of other elected county officers. As such, th* Is a board of 
county commissioners "action". Gib.son I and Gibso11 II indicate that Idaho Code § 31-1506(1) 
would thus confer jurisdiction. Consequently, Boise County's motion to dismiss will be denied, 
Conclusion 
As explained above. tho Court wUl deny Boiso County's motion to dismiss. 
IT IS SO ORDBRBD. 
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I, Mary T. Prisco, the undontgned autborJt)', do hereby certify that I have malled, by United 
3 States Mall, a true and correct copy of the within lnatrument aa notice pursuant to Rulo 77(d} 
4 J.R.C.P. to each of tho attomoya of record In this cauao in envelopes addressed aa follows: 
5 
MICHABLJ. KANB 
6 MICHAEL KANB AND ASSOCIATBS, PLLC 
7 :~:,"n;s;;s70l-286S (Y\~--~~ 
8 
SUSAN LYNN MlMURA 
9 ATTORNBY ATLAW 
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Clerk of tho District Court 
Boise County, Idaho 
By~-
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IN nm DISTRICT CO~T OF nm FOUR.TH JUDICIAL BISrRif!. flt/I! J., ,· 
THE STATB OF' IDAHO, IN AND FOR TUB COUNTY OF ELMORB 












MARSA PLUMMBR, ELMORE COUNTY, 
and JOHN/JANE DOES I through X. whose 
true identities are unknown, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2010-113 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER. 
BACKGQUND AND FACTS 
This case is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment Plaintiff is a 
15 former Elmore County deputy clerk. Defendant Marsa Plumber was the elected Clerk who 
11 supervised Plaintiff'. Elm.ore County was the employer. The record does not disclose any attempt 
11 to identify the DOB defendants and there is no discussion in the motions, briefs or other 





than the named defendant& The followin1 facts are either undisputed or are taken from the 
version most favorable to Plaintif£ 
Plaintiff' Ivey Romero wu employed by Elmore County for approximately eighteen ( 18) 
23 years, startln& in Jammy, 1991. Romero bepn worldna as a lull time regular deputy clerk In 
24 1993. Romero's fiicad Maya Terhaar bad 'WOtbcl In the motor vehicles dep8ltmmt for B1more 
25 County. At the time pertinent here Ter.haar no lonpr worked for the county. In late July 2009 
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Romero received a text message on her personal cell phone fiom Terhaar after work hours 
1 
2 indicating that Terhaar wu aoina to be arrested. Romero loobcl in her work computer to learn 
3 the bond amount contained in the anest wammt. At hil point the facts are not entirely 
• undisputed. but the dJspute is not material to the outcome of this motion. B is undisputed that 
5 Romero and Terhaar met. Romem was in the proc:eu of driving Terhaar to the Elmore county 




by Elmore County Deputies. The Deputies arrested Terhaar. Terhaar was met at the Sheriff's 
office by a bondsman who obtained her release on bond. It is not disputed that Romero told the 
Bond agent the amount of the bond. She does dispute advisina Temaar of the amount. It is also 
10 
11 without dispute that Terhaar was aware of th, outstandina warrant befbre talldna to Romero. 
12 Defendant Marsa Plumber was the elected County Clerk In Elmoie County at the times 








termination for violation of the Records Access Polley of Elmore County. The alleged violation 
came to Plumber's attention through Detective Mi«:bael Barclay, one of the Deputies that arrested 
Terhaar. Speciflcally, the notice alleged: 
On Thursday, July 30, 2009, you {Romero] used your work computer to pin 
access to infomation OD an unretumed ar.rest wammt OD Maya Terhaar, at Ms. 
Temaar's request. You th.ea provided tbJa Jn&,nnation to Ms. Terhaar. You or Ms. 
Terhaar also provided this infonnation to a local bond agent, CJ. Nemeth. 
21 The notice was based on Elmora County Records Policy and which prohibits employees of 





gain or personal use or to disclose such records to persons who are not employed by Elmore 
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County or involved lo official activities related to official activities of Elmore County." 
1 
Unserved arrest warrmta are coasldered confidential. Romero acfmowledpd tb1s in her 
2 
3 deposition. 
4 The written Blmoro County Penonnel Polley provides a procedure where an employee is 
5 to be disciplined or tmniaated for disciplinary reasons. An employee Is to be provided written 




proposed personnel action, and the procedure for requesting a hearing. If a hearing is requested 
by the employee, lt ls to be heard by the Elected Supervislna Official. In this case Plumber, as 
the elected County Clerk, WII the auperviaina official. Thero is to be a record of the proceeding. 
10 
11 locwding a tape recording of the hearing. The employee is entitled to representation by legal 
12 counsel. The stated purpose of the hearing is to provide the employee an opportunity to present 





no provision for and independent or impartial person to pieside at the hearing. 
After receiving notice, Romero exercised. her right under the personnel policy of Elmore 
County, as a "fWl-time regular" employee, to a hearing prior to any final decision OD the 
proposed termination of her employment. Sometime before the hearing Plumber and Romero 
18 
·had a meeting where the evems regarding Terhaar were discussed. It later developed that u 
20 Plumber and Terhaar had difrerfng memories as to what was said by Romero during that 
21 discussion. 
22 The hearina on Romero's proposed terminadon was conducted at the Elmore County 




1 Ma. Plulllblr wu elected County C'led ID 2006 and took offlce In J,anuay 2007, She wu not l'Hlected and Id 
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hearing. Romero objected to Plummer presiding over the hearing and rendering the ultimate 
decision over the proposed termination. Objoction was made on the bub that Plummer could 
not participate with penonal knowledge of the event, at issue and simultaneously render a fair, 
impartial, and just decision on the merits of the proposed tcnnination. During the hearina 
Plumber testified under oath to 1w memory of the earlier conversation with Romero when 
Romero dJsputed what was said in that earlier meeting. After the hearina the parties submitted 
written arpmmt. Romero again objected to Plumber acting as the presiding officer at the 
Plumber issued a decision findina that Romero had violated County policy in accessing 
the warrant information and in disclosing the information to third parties. Plumber found that. in 
doins so, Romero potentially endangered law enforcement personnel. The evidence would 
sustain a fmdins that no one was endangered by Romero's acdons. 
Romero sued claiming violation of her constitutional right to due process and equal 
protcctlon of the laws. 
LEGAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY MQITQN l9R SUMMAR¥ JUDGMENT 
In the motion for summary judgment, Defendants raise the following issues: 
a) Did Romero have a property interest in continued employment so as to entitle 
her to raise constitutional due process clauns? 
b) Assuming Romero has established property Interest sufficient to raise 
constitutional protections, was she denied due process through the course of her termination? 
office In January, 201 t. 
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• " 4 ' 
c) Does defendant Plummer enjoy qualified immunity against the claims raised by 
1 
Romero? 










Romero•s suit is based on 11 United Statel Code f 1983-Violatlon of Constitutional 
Rights. Here, the plaintiff alleps her constitutional rishts to due process and to equal protection 
of the laws have been violated. To pursue these claims, Romero must first establish that she bu 
a property interest in her continued employment. Gibb.ran Y • ..4da County, 142 Idaho 746, 133 
10 
11 P.J<t 1211 (2006)(citins Board of R1g,nt.JY. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 92 8.C.T. 2701. 33 LE.D 2d. 
12 548 (1972). The determination of whether a public employee bas a property interested in 





In Idaho, unless an employee is hired pursuant to a Q>otract which specifies the duration 
of the employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may be discharged, the 
employment is at the will of either party. Mltchdll v. Zllog Inc., 125 Idaho 709,874 P.2d 520 
(199-4); M1tca/fY, fnt,rmountaln Gal Co., 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989). Thus, the 
18 
burden is on the employee to come forward with evidence that the employment is other than at-
19 
20 will 
21 A limitation on the right of the employer to terminate an employee may be either 
22 expressed or implied. The existence of an employee manual may mate an issue of face 




lntmnounlain Ga, Co., .n,pra; Parkar ,,. Boll• T1lt:0 FIMl'tll CmJII Union, 129 Idaho 248, 923 
P .2d 493 (CL App. 1996). Where an employee handbook specifically negates any intention on 
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the part of the employer to have it become part of the employment contract, the existence of an 
1 
2 employee handbook alone is not sufJlciem to rebut the presumption that employment is at-will. 
' 
3 Jlllkbu ,. Boin Ca,t:adtl Corp., 141 ldabo 233, l 08 P .ld 380 (2005). 
4 Tumin1 to the cue at hand. it is clear that the existence of the employee manual alone 
5 does not negate the presumption tbat Romen>'s employment wu at-wilL The Elmore County 




personnel policy is not an employment contract" 
Romero does not rely upon the existence of the policy manual alone. She points to the 




final decision could be rendered on a propooed diseipliruuy action, including tennination. 
Probationary and casual employees are not entitled to any hearing. All parties recognized that 





the right to a hearina together with the procedures .set forth at the hearing give Romero the 
entitlement to continued employment. She equates the purpose of the hearing- the opportunity 
to rebut information upon which the proposed personnel action is based-with a requirement that 
she be terminated only for good cause. 
19 
u Tho existence of a grievance procedure contained in an employee policy manual is 







"Further an employer may provide auidelinea which are necessaq conditions for 
continued employment, and avoid having them read u a guanmtee for a spec:iJic 
tean of employment or placins limits on the reasons for discharge.,. 
Jenkhu v. Bot.r• Cazcadll Corp., 141 Idaho 233,242. 108 P.Jd 380,389 (2005). (Citing 
Thompmn v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho 587,887 P.2d 1094 (Ct App.1994). 
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1 
2 betdllltiiiiliiildliW As atatcd in tho handbook, the purpose of tho discipline policy ii to establish 
3 a consistent procedure for malntainina suitable behavior in a productive woddna envimnment in 
• the workplace. Tho purpose of the bearina in that procedure is to provide tho employee an 
5 opportunity to present evidenco and to rebut information upon which tho propoaed personnel 




tenninated. The hearing aff'ords the employee an opportunity to show the olected official that the 
conduct upon which the action is based did not occur or otherwise explain why the employee 
believe the action should not be taken, but they do not create a substantive right to only be 
10 
11 tc,r,dlinated for cause. 
12 Romero's case is grounded on the right to a hearing c:oatained in the Employee Policy. 
13 That same policy makes clear that only the elected official lo charge of a department may 
u terminate an employee in tbat department. It clearly puts the elected official in charge of 
15 
determining on what grounds. if any, should be used to term.inate an employee and whether those 
16 
17 
grounds exist in any given case. There is no requirement in Idaho law that a person in Romero's 
position be given any bearing. She cannot bootstrap the opportunjty to present her version of 
u 
19 eventJ into a full blown right to continued employment Nor docs it give her the ability to fora 
20 Elmore County to abandon its policy of having elected county officials determ.lne who will work 
21 
22 
for the county and for how long. Yet this is the logical outcome of Romero's position. If m 
independent decision maker is required once an elected otllcial determines to terminate an 




Under this scenario, the Blmore Count:, ls ftee to allow an elected official ttt terminate an 
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employee so Iona u that employee bas no riabt to araue apinst the tennination or give the 
l 
2 employee'• side otthl stoly to the employer. 
3 In dm case Romero was aft'orded the oppommlty to iebut the information upon which tbo 
4 decilion to terminate her wu based. Romeao ia not happy with the outcome of that bearina. Sho 
5 also complaias biu.Iy of tba &ct that tba very penoa who decided to terminate bet ia the same 




procedure. The fact ia that Romero, u a deputy elm: of the court. answered to tho elected county 
offlclal under whom she worked. The personnel pollciea of Elmore County specifically put the 
elected official in charge or makfn1 the decislona involving employee diacipline and termination 
10 
11 in the elected offlcial's department. Romao was entltled to appear before that elected official 
12 and give her rebuttal to tho proposed termination. She wu aftbi:ded that opportunity. As an at-
13 will employee. ahe wu not entitled to anythina tbrther.1 If the issue wore whether there ia a 
14 rational basia for Plumber's decision. there is certain.ly a genuine issue of material fact.a in this 
15 
case. If the issue 'WeI'e whether Plumber made tho riaht decision, there are certainly issues of 
16 
17 
fact. But those ans not the issue. The issue is whether Romero could be terminated at will or 
whether she had such an expectation of continued employment such that the constitutional right 
18 
19 to duo process could be invoked. Since Romero could be terminated for any reason, or no 
20 reason. she could be terminated for the "wrong" reason. She bu no claim cognizable under 11 




MDIORA.NDlJM DECISION AND ORDD-PAG:S I 
154 
ADDENDUM 2 • P::an• A s:1 unru: r.MTV ?a 
... , ,.. .. 
1 
2 
Tho Court having determined thcie ts no genuine issue of material fact as to Romero's 
statm as an at-will employee. pJaintiff's case ma be dlsmis,ecl The Comt's deciaiol1 reprdlna 
' 

























There bein& no genuine issue of material fact, the Court finds that defendants are entitled 
to judpnent as a matter of law. Counsel .for defendant is directed to submit a judgment in proper 
form dismiasina plah:dift"s cue. 
1T IS SO ORDSRED. 
Dated this _i__ day of April 201 I. 
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CERTJFICATB OF MAILING 
1 
I, Barbn St8cle. the undenipecl authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed. by 
2 United States MIil. a true and com,qt copy of the within instrumentu notice punuant to Rule 
3 77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopea addn:aed u follows: 
4 
SAMJOHNSON 
5 JOHNSON cl MONTBLBONB. LLP 
1 405 S fflf ST. STB 250 
BOISB. ID 83702 
7 
MICHAEL 1. KANE 
a MICHABL KANE AND ASSOCJATES, PLLC 
1087 W RIVER STRBBT. STB 100 
9 POST omcs BOX 2865 
10 
BOISE, ID 83701-2865 
BARBARA STEELE 
Clerk of the District Court 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, 1D 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9S11 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9S 16 
Email: kirt@naylorhales.corn; jake@naylorhales.corn 
Attorneys for Defendant 
r-\LED 
' 
20\3 MAR -4 Pt'\ \: 28 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 




County of £lmtxJ_ ) 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA STEELE 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I, BARBARA STEELE, having been duly sworn do hereby depose and say as 
follows: 
1. I am the elected Clerk of Elmore County, and I have custody over documents 
held by the county in its normal cow-se of business. This includes the Elmore County personnel 
manuals and personnel files of county employees. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA STEELE - t. 
1s1 nR \ G\ NAL 
2. Attached hereto as Emibit A is a true and correct copy of the Elmore County 
Personnel Manual. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Notice of 
Disciplinary Action - Notice of Last Chanco signed by Cherri Nix on Febnmy 1, 2012. 
Dated this_!/.!. day of March, 2013. 
~~ -
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3/ day of March, 2013. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day ofMarcb, 2013, I caused to be served, by 
the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 






QA/--·· Jaco Nfor 
M:\ICRMP\Nix v. Elmcn County\Pleadinp12_06 Afr of Steele in SuppofMlmo In Opp fD Pia Ptrtill MSJ.wpd 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA STEELE - 2. 
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EfRCTI\/E MARCH 1, 1999 
AMEND£DJANUARYt3,2003 
AMENDED FEBRUARY t 3, 2006 
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TO: 
i: ,. r.i, ~~ ... ),o· ~ ·} '\i..~~w ;._ .. 
" "··- -1v.lJ!i1v1~ KA.1'!.U.UM .... 
ttY'dM cd~ iMi>trittis .... 
FROM: ELMORE COUNTY BO~ or COMMISSIONERS 
DATEt,:. ·-., January 27, 2009 
RE: EMPLOYEE USE OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS (INCLUDING 
INTERNET AND EMAIL) 
County e-mail, computer, Internet and voice mail systems are Elmore G,obnty property. 
Anything you create or load on the systems becomes the County's property. 
~ .. ·,:.,·, :, ... J. ;·:,~ ll { i J ... ~ 
Elmore County reserves the right to intercept,"monitor, copy, review and download any 
communications or files an employee creates or maintains on these spt~, at any time, vyithout 
prior notice to the employ~ : . 1 · i ·, -~. : . · ., , · · • i , · • 
It has recently comg ~,,t}.!.~f.Jc;q~?! of~e fllp\or~..9~ty,1~9Ji,rd of Conunilsidners that 
some Elmore County employees 1:iave been using Elmore County e-mail, computer, Internet and 
voice mail systems for personal use, taking up substantial Elmore County bandwidth and 
employee time resources. 
' ' ' : ....... : ( , ~ ' .. , ' '· ... t.·" ;. t \ ., , ' { 
The ECBC<1 ~~~i.1 N}}'1$!=!i{. ~F\o;:e,es;. ~i\t ,it . !Si VY.<?rk:wg og a3 p.oUcy , ~gatding 
information~ file· oy' county emplo~~. Th.C? poli~ .W\l) ,b~~e pfJJ.-<?f !hft~Elmore 
County Pmorlnel Policy aifd:wfll!lfi ati,rln.1anctcbndition ofemploy6ieht.. . . . .. 
·; :r:!1!. : , ! . :.:• 
At this time, the ECBCC wishes to put all employees on notice of the following interim 
personnel policies pending completion of an information systems use policy: 
(1) Downloading pornography in any form is not an appropriate use of County resources 
and will not be tolerated. Downloading pornography will be grounds for immediate 
termination. 
(2) Excessive computer use for personal reasons will not be tolerated and may be 
grounds for discipline, including verbal or written warnings, suspension or 
termination. 
The ECBCC appreciates the hard work of Elmore County employees in completing the 
public's work. The Board welcomes input from employees regarding the information system use 
policy. Please contact your elected official or a board member to provide input 
Employee Printed Name: ~ 
Employee Signature: ,o.= Date: _____ _ 
Return to your Elected Official or Depar0t Head. 
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• 't 
EIJl\~r~ \ Co~unty 
Board of . ~911\JP,~••to~n~.rs 
Phone (208) 587-2129 Ext. 270 ELMORE COUNTY COURniOUSE Fu (208) 587-2159 











•• t •• 
•<#-: 
FEJ3RU:ARY 2, 2009 . . . . . . 1 
ALLELl\'jeJ8l.coUNTY~~io¥E~s 
Et.~ORE co·eNTY col\00Ss1QNEP ... 
f. f. • • : ·J~ :... 
"'rt,. . "". 
· ; Arlt• Shaw ' 
587-4053 
Due to gne1q411s »,nd, ~9-~bis, clar\fii~tjQ~ i~ --~~e.4e~ ... 
regar<Jftt'~"t\l.e dse;oft,:t}le·eoijh~JnJ~nt"t.f-'i1j,J,~,ma\l,, · .. , 
Effectlr,~ti~-~jj.f~It,"tlrt.i1J,~tJJ~i.f:$fu,l em~U is ndt i({owed 








Legal Counsel for Elmore C()~_ty ~ _q9t cov~~~ l>Y- t!a• pr~V~QQ qf fful policy • . . 
1/ .. " -: ';' ·; ' ,; .. ~;ti!::\~ .. -· .;;\ :l, ~; .. "'! · ' · ·.'· !,.): , . • · · · • .•• • • ~ . ·· . , • .... ,, . . ... • ~· 
1: ·-·q.~~f!~,~ ~\1f.1C'-~ ;\ ,.:~--~ ·... _· . i . . : ,, , . . . . . .• 
. . . . . . . . ' 'J 
A ,NrRooucrioN ·ref ptfauc eMPi.ov·MeNr 
~ -~ ! . 
THE ORGANIZATION IN WHICH YOU WORK 
.. I , ·. t • ' . ,} ·: · 1 • ,,:,;. ' ." • :,". · · : ('• l ;: ~ ....... t , i f. ·, ·~\'" · .:: ,, • ~ ~ . .' ,·~- t' • · :~ · . • . 
: .,. _'JV9rklng for El~ore County rflaY·be!6rt1~~it~~(fi~1n.,~l,mpt.ot~r f~f~~hlch you 
m,ay h"ve worked in the·past. erntore County Is a political' J~~lvf~!OJl.C?{~ State of 
Idaho, though it Is not a part of state government. The Board of eomtnissfoners serves 
as the govemin_g bodyfor_~~'!'~l'.8 C9_,'1W.: ~~~.~t Jo~J. l~gl~!,~t ~~,:• c!n~ fu~mng 
other obligations. The Boarcf~f c6mi'hlssfoh'ers nas primary aotfiority to establish terms 
and conditions of employment with Elmore County. Th' s~,rd of: <;on:111:tft.Jloners also 
apP.,Oln~ p~(Sonnet to lie!p carry.out its admlni~e re,-1f.q~~n5lii~~~- · · ·· .. ; 
, .. (. }' .. 
As with all elected public officials, the Board of Com,ml~s.l9!',~~js p!~"-l~!eN i;e~P.p.nsibl' 
to the voters of Elmore County. The terms set forth' In this obokJet reflelct public entity 
II 
policy at the time ~ 1ts printing~ but ther ~.A! s~~~~-to <?t"!~pg~ at •~-~ Pm~. ,atte~ notifying · 
the Elected Offioals and at the afscretion of the · Elmore County Board of 
Commissioners . 
. • ~·:t ·#i: , .• : '.  • ·:; 1' ·=- -~;_ · ~... . . , .. , J <.,, . • • .. • _ -· -~ _ • 
Only the Elmore County Board of Commissioners has' authority ta estabRsh general 
policy for Elmore County employees. The terms _and conditions s.et for,tl:1 Jn this policy, 
and In the resolutions and policy statements whi~ ii0ppoi1tt, #'1P.~t~· ~l;i_perseded by 
any other officiars commitment, without the express ~tsr -~~ref.iM~iif pf ~fie ~oard of 
Commissioners. That is partlc:ular1y true for terms or cbnditlons~whlch would establish 
a financial obligation for Elmore County; now ·or In tt\i( f.;ityre. It i{impQ.rtant that all 
employees understand' the ·relitiofi·ship· ~C!en: policy' idopted ' by the Board of 
Commissioners and department policy implemc,f,l,t!!d by ot~~r E!I~ offlclal,s-., 
-2-
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• t 
C. VETERAN'S PREFERENCE 
e1more· Cotlnly iMt, accord a pteientnclto em~l6yment ~f ~;t~~~ of th~ u.s. A~ed 
Services In accord with provisions of Idaho Code§ 65-602 ~!J~.s~~.r~Jr,Jfi.! 4'Vent 
of equal qualiflcatlona for an available position, a veteran'wtio'ijilitffles for preference 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 65-502 or its successor_ wj_H pa employed. • . 
ti'•~\\'. ,J • '·. • 4•'• . .' ~ ,~ ;~ .,__ ~ ~ I , • /~ 
D. NEPOTISM PROHIBITION 
t"'•,··· . \,. ~ ·. ; . 
No person shall be employed by Elmore County when said employment would result in 
~ vlpl~~n. ~ .~f:IJ, ~r,rtl·'1~-~llm,P.f<?Yi~l.9n~ fO.\.IJ'.1~ Jn l~aho Code § 59-701 or its iuccessor. 
Ai1Y.~~~:~:~~1~tin_.e11tn;tfY- bf! ,yqlc;l.ed by- u,, Bo~r~ ·if no_t done volunt~rly by the 
~.P,R°'P~:')Q 0 !.!~~,~ \· :; h· , · · - · · • • · , . 
E. PR~FE;R~N,¢~ Fq~ 'i:~RQMO.TIQN iRO.·M~WITHIN ' ' . 
· ... QU'.~l~fl~-, lndMcf~~~ '~ro clr,, already.: ernpJ~;ees of. Elm~ra Coo~ty .·· ma; be given 
preference over outside applicants to fill vacancies in the work force. 
U: E:MPLQXM~-~T ~T.ABJ-UP..;: .. 
~ • . '• ,• " 1 • , i /', ~~ 1"( I :;.: :. • • .. :, 
1 
. • 
A .. E~MPL.Q'lMENT. f.QRMS TO BE COMPLETED 
The following pre-employment forms must be completed before the errtployea may begin 
work,~rJ=~~,pr~ C,9y~ty: ,,· ., ~ 
• • ... • • < ' • i~ ... . . 1.= .. : 
t· . · 1. Eo, '. . ' tiJ,\~.~ _·a~pll~tjQn fq11TI. • 
. 2, tn$k' ~f~m,, .. ,.,;; 
3. lmml o~, fo_m, (k9),, , . . - · ,. . ·, · 
'"4 .. insu' a. infOrrriaflori about dependents. c •' ,. · · · 
- • ! •. ~.; ,.. '{ . · ..... ;'. ~. . . \. l ; . . : ,· J •, .; • ,,. .,,, ' 
· 5. Any o~,~~e_n~t fQfTI'.'J ne~-'8iry for employee Information. 
_; . 
B. PAYROLL REPO'i:tr'i'NG SYSTEMS 
Reports of hours worked and time on and off the job must be completed in a timely 
manner in accord with procedures established by the payroll clerk and a record kept by 
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C. DISTRIBUTION OF POLICY 
,-. Atti..{!}!"ef.'1Jl.f?l9¥"l~"·~ omployee sh~II recerl!_a''COPY oHhl~ .~,~~~~ poffcy. It la 
.. . 111,~~~o,CPifltY. o(} ti, .~ploYff. t.~-f-,ntftarize him ot hmelf with th~.~~nta of the 
' pr-r10Miipo11~ :.r.i1f .t9. a~owt~g, Its recei~r ·PerlocHc u~ateii ·tJt ena~es shall also 
be acknowtedgea: . 
' ·. ·; \);~:· ,,.. ·,. ,;.J(t~ : :# ... ' j 
. ·m: ~i;J~~~· Pt];M~~~X~E ·cbti1iuc1-- .· . ·. ··, ·,'· . . _r · · 
A. · petfsoNiL PeR·~oRMANce AND ·a,iHAVIOR 
. . ~~ch .,q,e{9ye.,., QfJ:lrne>1'1..County is expected to :cein~ ~ttl"!\~r.lf~',lf In' a manner 
which aoea not reflect adversely upon Efmo·fe·county;· !sch •mployee must recognize 
that public employees are subject to additional pubffc SCO,ltlny In tt:,eir pu,bl{c and personal 
nv,-, ~MM tt,e RUbllc'•. bualne,u.requlr99, the.~~~~ l~~W,~g
1
~. In order to 
. _a~n,_pl!fb Jh"_gQillsi of Elmore· Couniy 'as a P4:Jbll~ 1f!rM~~· _ .d..ch employee is 
expected to scrupulously avoid personaJ behaviors wti°tdi woti1a Bring ui\favorable public 
impressions of Elmore County and it's <:>fflcfals . ., _ In_ p,ro,,e~ -~~ a~~ltlP..-fsh this, each 
:~rpplOY!~b, · ',,_; 1<:, .. ..;r ., .. .- '· :· ·, · .·., .. •• .• : . . . · a., 
1 
• :~t sh:11\~'proropt.~nd regu1a/'1n .. atte~dance 'at ,~orlc"';or ot~~r'tii~ulred employer 
functions. 
•,. ···!· . ' .:: • . . ·; .. . . ¼ • .': • ... ~ ~ ~~ • '·. 
,,·_2. ~-$~"f~rrn~Jy ~ ~ress -~tan~ards ~s~.~l!s~eij _l~~~:~!P.amef-~t)or which the 
... ~roS?.!.9Y~e~ l(lj).rf<S, ( Ore~s standan:fs",shall. ~ -s~t b~thE! man!igfl,nl, .~al, but In the 
a~i,n~ _0,{.c,1ny,~•partmental dre~ Jtal1o~s,' ~~.lrif,:l'ajL~-, ~ .Pp,:>prlate for the 
.fu,:1~9na performed and.shall p~~~~a·.~-~es~.l~h~l,~!J :,,,. 1~j6e public. 
3. Sh;ll .dedj~~ ~rt~~ry eff~rts t~ ~l~&al. C.oiinly: Se~ndary° ern~ib~~~nt Is subject 
to approval by the appointing official. ln~lvldu~. _d. epm. ~~ .. ™. ~ . . .. may 'pell out 
~ti!ssible examples of "rt,oonligh'tl[Q~-~~n~~Jnp1~.1,,~.ro~-'.fh9ld additional 
pos, one. . ,. , , ·. · · • · '· · · · · · · · . . 
· .• . · . · · . _ ·. • . •• 1 • ,·'., a· ·, _; ;'. ', .,, ...... -:1r 1 
•t: -~~-~ji~v~ld nepotism In app~intm~nts a!'~ ~d,~~rig
1
~l~~~,h!~fw]ttt9~~r employees 
. irt t;!mol'.'9 County and related· agencfes. No err1pldY.fje~_~h~II Q.ng~g" In conduct 
. . .. , ... . · - ,• ~: - , , ' .. i-- . . . . ... ,. .. -~;-, ' " 
which violates state· nepotism laws. ·· · · 
- ' . :! ._. ~.: t. -
5. Shall not accept _gifts or gratuities_ in_ an~ p~rsop~I, ~r. .~rp{,~J~~al. ,9~pacity which 
co4l~ !;:('eai.:the impression that th& giver was:s.~'9ng tava'r fi"Qni th_e ,~mployee or 
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B. WORKPLACE CONDUCT 
·, > i · •. · . • 
l;~m~!\11.wtq t>e expeeted to conduct him or hei$4lf'!n ~ -wc;~e!f~l.~accordance 
. : 
1~tfftfl~J9,llAVJ(r,g_ ru.1••~ These· rule•~· i,ot -~l~cl~~~ .~ .~~~~~-:~9 of Elmore 
cqu,gty ~pJc;,y,~1.-) Eaeh19mployee of Elitiote Cbunfy sH,~\ ;,ii,, . . . . 
1. Give his/her beat effor:ts to accomplish the wor1< of Elmore County for public benefit 
in accordance with policies a~ _ ~~,~r~ .ad.o~~~Y.1 ;th!-'. ~c,ard i9f 
Commlsslonera and elected offTaali.·-.· ·Eac:H empfijee snilll be 'iObJec:t to the 
administrative authority of. the._ ~cl~ who ,~e9.~1sc,~ tJ,t9 A~au,~ wh,.re the 
employee works. .-' · ·!', ·· r. : ; . ,. ,, , , · , · · -
~- Ad.~-~ ,o a_r,y cgge_,¢ .~l<:1 ln:his/her profession anif avoid i::onfJJcts:~r.tnterest or 
.u,tn.9 hl~ers:,yblic p~~tticmfo~person~I gain; , •·. · · . _ 
- ~ -.. ,, ·1 -~-- i' 1,.,, · · \ ;:.t ... ~ ·-. ·- -~ : . , .. : .·, · ·. ·. ':...:' ., ;;~, _ · .;r' . _-
. :3. · ·.fi:>~I~- ~,~ -rul,~ f9t. c_a"' .ar'\4 -.u• of,publle property to ~~~~ Jti!t_ the public . , 11\X~-~~un=-~.w_~,,nt I~ P"?.te<;ted_ and that the·s~ety d~ ~~Pl:l~~~c-~nd other 
· · WQJf.(Clr.s Is rna{otained.-- . - ~; ·:,~ -· 1; .. •; ·, . •. • , 1 , , "· · . -- ·' 
1-:\· _. · -' ". -: ! \~ .. -u :f: ...... ,i.:.~ ,• .. ~_·;·::, ;· · · ~: . . ,; . ·; ;.· _. j",- .. ! ;- ,). ,t· .( :~~ ·. · ; · ,_;; ·... ' 
-4. Abide bj ~I dipartmental rules whether they be written or issued orally by the 
suP,ervisor. No employee shall be required to follow the dlrectiye Qf a ~upervisor 
< ~~ Yj~,_\e~ J~,c;,f iJnY lp~!-J4dsdlction; the state,' ornation~ ,'''," .. ·: . 
5. Abide by pertinent State and Federal Statute, and Elmore County rul_es concerning 
. th_e..,. I ,.~l'f2f,9,.'1rPfJnfgmJ_. atloti ~Qth ..e p~bllc fro_.i:n_·publi,c·_·.re~r2_· i:·?t about public 
· ~i , .J~q,c!!I~ t9:.r~l~i~-Jnfonnation from the publ1c r~cCJr9._s _or to disclose 
_· · ·-__ " ··  .•. ,:{ QfPJTI.'.I __.  @ti~P-..lllji:ttle,, li_ ands. of'a ·J)'-1~11~·~ffidat.~el~nga with the 
" · ~· u •. !\,, .. ~~::h@~t,o.!f191ill ~,tody of that,Htcoltlf: · Eact; ~mployee shall 
· ma e co ential nature of records which are not open to pu~llc scrutiny in 
, ~~~'1-~ ~-.Yl, dlf~QtH>J: Ul-..~sponslble official. . · - · 
e. -~~~~~i~Wi~~ir:ti-f ~;:!.th:e~~:tr8~~:~t:ts~ :c=~r:: 
far In advance as possible and approved by the supervisor. Each ar_nployee shall 
~~IJ9,,Jh~-™19:.t~irn,iJ1i, tlJt re~rtjng . of w~,ri<,hours art~ Ute app~~val which must 
b!.·~~en}~tPl,1,fl~~ ~ypr111t1~,".if~ilure to follow such rules nfa'1 be grounds for 
delayld'· ·payment of wages, salari_e~. or ·reimbursements· ·or for imposition of 
appropriate disciplinary penalties. 
7. f ~ll~J~R~~tr.uJ'-f-.~~~ii,g_._bre,aks and l~n~ ~rtods; lricl~~!ng provisions 
granting supervisors authonty to adjust them. Timing of breaks or lunch periods may 
be changed to accommodate the completion of necessary wor1c. 
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a. . Fc;>ll~ II le~ l'll 1JP2Jtl .. ri.g~a~d!Ol$ AO .~9:Job. Each employee shaft cooperate in 
. ~- m'ta~nF.Ystl~n ~ am.,iobrrelatechccldrilnroh:ter that workplace 
~~l ·, .,.a·, S. ,: ~!roJ~~!(i .. ,~~ct.~@t P.roper co~ide':811011~? ~: a~nted to injured Yffiffi'ts Mg the pjlpQs:. ... , , , '. · .,~, . ;. ·.. . , ,. · .. , ·'·' .. :, ··~.·· . ,.,:' .· li: ... ~.· ··i,-~.. ·~"·., : . i :: .. ·:• ._.:,: , .. I·':<-• ,,;;: .·. ~ 
.. ~~·~-.~¥i~,\O ti8'f•.bappened on ~1r,toperty or involving 
. . .. .. . . , · '_ ~0E_iqfi_~A.t9.Y. , ~ .,h. all gro~• as much l~fo~ati~fl as he or she can 
• ! frir . , ., , · · 1 .ffl':99.'1.ro~il~ .J~-1 g,µrse of activities ~•te4· With one's work. 
~. ~-I .. . ... , 9n. ~ilP~ld ~ ~P.:9""4t.Qth• .~ployee's Immediate supervisor as soon 
as· pfi'~\Jcatly po~lble and reasonable efforts shoUld be made to assi~ those in need. 
1. \ ~ ' .. ,,¢··· ·.t,.-.:.- :1'"· ·~r:···,,t.-'.'ic~:-:-'. 
10. FolloW all' ruiei regarding safety In thtsworkplaca whether established formally by the 
dep~rtni~otqr. t;>y ,£W,!l(ht'. ge., ncJ.e@~.1~PIOYffS are encouragEid to suggest ways to 
make tht"w~Jp,,~~c;ir wO:~ p~~,. Jaf~,. ' 
11. M~lri,~I~ .,,CUJ!!_n, p~~l\Jf90ns9(~~ Q~9••s~ry in the conduct of work for Elmore 
C~14nty. WH~p ~rM,ng 1s tf·l'.l~sary ,..q~lrement of your Job duties the following 
ooridltion• 'a1pply: . 
a. ~ad'! s~""~- e:,"!Pi\9¥.~ must report any. ,tats-imposed driving restrictions to 
hlslfler Immediate s.uPC:?~isor. . 
?· E;<11c,!:t ~ch .1!9~~,~~-~,!~ ~~~~\O~lig~ted.to notify his/her su~rvisor In the event 
that his/her dnving abilities are impaired by anything otherthan·state restrictions. 
12. Perforw ~u~9~1i~~t;~ps ~~ a~ .. r,~~f9' to.~!TY out t~~ work -~f E~more Couno/ 
In ari 6fflc!eot ~~. effec'tiye,,nanner ~ l'Jl.tr;um•Lcosts and with limited risk to the pubhc 
'~ncffel1qw ~o~~rs'. ~ . . . "~'.:' . :i . , , ' 
• ., • ' < ~ .. ~ 
13. ErriplciyE!e, s~~II b~ a~entive_ t~ ~e!r Y,Q~ .at ctll times. ; · · •·. · 
. '.. . ,. . .· -·r· .• 
C. PROHIBitEO WO~KPLACE cdwouci 
. , . ';., 
Wrth~!'l th1! W~rkpia~~ emptoy~~· of f;f!JIQl'tl C~unty shall not ' 
., 1. , Be pr~seirit In ttie workplace ~rider the influ~n·~ of drugi alcohol, illegal substances 
or other substances which would impair the abiHty of the employee to perform hlslher 
wo,rk fgIT,lP,f~n~tly. or wbl~t, woyld .threaaten the s~ety or w_efl-tiei~g qfother workers 
or tti,·~~h~ .. N<l worker s.hould ~~.a.bsent fro.m work on accoun_t of ~uch conduct. 
ev~rr ttiAY.9~ ~µcl] co~dµ~ dp~s ,:1ot oc(:ur dunng regularworklng h~urs. 
_, ' I ' ,,.. ' ' ,,, • ' 
2. Eng~~ i.fi' a~~~lv~~ 9oiJ9.u9,t .t~ fellO?' Eltfl1P.ioyees or to the public, or use abusive 
larig~~~Elt i~ tfiE! preseri~ Qf (~lloYf ~mpl<]yees or:. the public.; Employees should not 
attempt to ffli'ce their Ideas op {E!ll!)Vt ~mp(Qyees or the public. Abusive language 
shall incfude profanity and loud or harassing speech. 
3. Sexual · Hara,smenf is Illegal . and cont~~ to t h~ p alleles of Elmore County. 
HaraS$ment involves sexually harassing a fellow worker or member of the publlc at 
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.. , .. 
. , .,arrt1•1m, while.In the ,Elmore.·. Cob .. ntu. · · ;ictlv•. · sWA.~n~~>s1· a'' 'i~a't,. · •;· ssment shall be . d ~ ' unwelcom~acNantii~ ~Oi~i. fof•~ e:hfarr , ' 11: .,,,ti, other offensive 
JnJcaJ:.,d/Or. :verbat· eondact ·ii'· a)leMl~~•~f .. r, ~~1h..'t \'' workplace such 
conduct must not create a situation that alters thi ecncfltidl1i al\lfflStoyment or create 
an abu~ostile working envlro~·rtt. -~~~~ ot · m"!"ent should 
-, . ~-. tl'9mht to the1 a-,,tfci\''bf tfNt ~ar{inenf R.-'a · Elmore County 
. -~mroi;l'Q.ners, or the PrbMM"9'A.:~cfffte. -.~ ,'ql.~rtcf.1~'8~ - l . of the alleged . "'~~t. ,Any!clalma of·~6J ~~~ atf~1f~ijt ~-· . . al unless they 
~ot be resolved throagh ittlQVif-~l<iti b~ ~~ a A • _ ~ . • • • • . • bqljty. 
·· ; ·~:! ..... . ,: .. . · ·=·~···· . : ·;~~~-.... ~- ~,;.; ·,,. .• _(· .:.i.~ , .... .. ~ ...... ,,;1~ ... - -. t 'I .. . 
_ .~~-f~!~~'.~g a:9 ao~e ~~l!'.~I~ ~f -~~~~~~ ~~al ~~~~lO.t; 
. a: -V~rbal:· - . S8Xlla~·lnnu~~·se)aj~lly·~~gg_.,; Q6fu~erits,:lnsulta, jokes of 
a sexual natur'ii;oi' sexual propdsitions: 
b: Non-verbal: M,akirtg;~~g~•-.:Br.,i~(.i.iitj~_JtQl~V~ ~~-~g,_ Yi. ,~i~Jng, making 
.~ . · :. , sexua11Y.;re1atea 'be~ris, posting ·s~~ly expRcat pictures or 
drawings; · · · 
c. . Physlcal: Touching, pfnchfl'lg, "9~~~1
1
1a.:~~ ~dy, ~rcf ng Intimate contact, 
sexual Intercourse, of adaull 
Thia n.st Is not all-Inclusive. Any conduct'whlch. ir)tght be ~eme.d offensive should be 
avoided. · .,. · · · · ·.·. · · ... , · ' · ·· ~... ' 
A.canfJdentlal lnvestlgiitlon (to. the'dent tfiat confldeiitf.a(~h• illlo.wed by law) of any 
'co1]1plalntwlll be unda·rtak4ri promptfy; Employe'el alid ~~ve tnEt 'rtght to contact the 
idaho Human Rtghts Commission (Phone (208) 334-2873):'tH• Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm Issi~ ~P~o~e {.f~) 5,.5_3,-:~~6§}, er~ P.riy~~~~~~r\o d!scuss their 
legal rights. Elmore County eti'tO0rages each employee to use tAe procedures set 
forth In this policy to address a~y ~~~l.t,~ra$,me.11t ~9b.l~~S, ~ q':J_lckly as possible. 
. Any employee found by the employer to have sexually h~~,s-~d anott;,~r employee 
will be subject to approprlate"cftstlpllnary sanctfdniii" raniil~§ 'ftom a· Written \vatnlng to 
termination. Retaliating or discriminating against an em~oy,._for cop,plaining about 
',J!'.?<u.al n~sm.,m ls.strictly prohll:ilted.:. ·- ·.,: \ :, • . ' . . . . 
. ..~ .": ·~: -·~ - ; ~\ i.~ ' j",·.:. -·. ; ·". "; "'f· • ., ·. I . \ ·. . .. 
Ett1'9.r.tt CQIJ.nty ~nizes that whether s·exu~ harass.me~t'1~~-oci;urred requires 
~ f~ctual determlnatlon:b~s~~O~il al~ -~~}~~~ b_!ai'~~~. :~8Pifl;\n,~; Issue. False 
a~-~t.1,.~ons· of sex_ual harassment can have serious effects upon those accused and 
others in the workpl~ce. All. employees ar~ r~uested tC! ~trt~ foJJow. the reporting 
procec;lures-.set_ forth, frTf_thl§_ ~~lr~fa~d ·r~_'1fiect' toJli1jt[ltJin f4ry~~~ntiality in all 
t11qtters pertalning·.to cla1tns'of sexu~ _Ha~ss~ent. Se~~I hara),~f\'nt will not be 
tolerated In the Elmor•eounty•worfq:,l'!ee; · · ··' 
.-· '.:. . ' 
4. Use work time for personal business inclu~l'1Q _seJljng of goo_(fs 9p~,rv1~s to the 
general public ·or preaching relfg1ous; or'J?9!itj¢al ~~~ tct Memb{trs of the public . . . - ~ . . 
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during the work day. Employees should !"lnimlze ~e !lmQ~~t pf w~rk ~r:rJ~ spent. on 
. . sjl'Jl~!f il~.ti~~-1ngagid IIHvith fellow .. empidyee1. ·- : ·: · · --- · 
5. Engage In political activities while on duty In public service •. This· n'.Jla ·~iill not a~'ply 
to elected offlcfals or chief deputies to an elected official. Employees shall enjoy full 
poUtical rights when not carrying out their work obligatloni, butshall not use their Job 
title or position in connection with political activities. 
. '-"' ".•A."',. • , · .. ,~ .· tt"" ... · :· ''" i.;.' }4·:i t;•~t~· 
a. Pr9vfd~ fa~ ~r1~1¥~4cfftjg)~o'111 ... ~on ~JJ ~p,ploym~nt apptfcationa, job performance 
reports, qr ~~Yiptijlr ~f~ ~,s~r.,nel ~C?~ments or papers.: 
7. Discriminate in the treatment of co-workers or: m•mbera of the public on the basis of 
race, religion, gender, age, disability or na"tionai' origin • 
... ·l > •••• ' \ ..... • ... ,. •• ,-,~· ... ·,, .. ·,· .: ~-:··.· .:· ~ ... ,. • ·, 
a~ N,<> !i!loki~if~fn ~e RCJR!k= office or o~tr pu.~lfc buifc:fings. · • . · 
,, : .A ·: . ~·, I '" . t· H \ . 1' • ~ .;. .. ~ ·., . < •· ,;.__')j'-/, ', ' .:; _;, ~ ~ ~ •. -. -~ \~ ..:;. i,"\ ~ '•-..J ,.i ·,: 
9. Violate stat.-· statatel 'or locar rules regardlng,Jfbl in~pproP,rfate use, alteration, 
destruction, or removal of any pubffc records requ(red by law to be kept by the entity 
or by other public officials. · .. ..: 
1 O. Abu~ ~~P.'9Y!~ b~n~rt.?.~efirig~ .~y ~king .':'l'.'IJ4~i!l891:Jlc;k_leav,, unearned vacation, 
of' 9ther:wli · ~aft,J~p~\~ }~. a f~Jmt-.9~ .. d~~pjjQrJ · ((~signed t6 create Incorrect 
pe[!_~!W,l t¥ot~l sii°Jff~l~,m q~nefl~, V)(f11~f:i ar, r,oJ deserv~d f~ ;.acco~ance with the 
Elmore Cou~~_poUcy, . . . . . ,, 'ol,l.!f;•,<", ~ . - .. . ·•r V ·, 1 -,('( 1 JJ.i. \ :,.._~.,: r ; ~ 
\ ' • ~ I I lr, •' l t • """ ' f ~ 
11. '?iol~e rvte1 :.oolt~~ming ,bs.~l'.l.<;e ~~JI\ the w._qr:J(pl~c, witho·ut proper: leave and shall 
' obtal~ ~efm~j~ -~ ~ul~ J>Y .th, ElmRr.• q91:1qty, polfcy for:use of vacation, sick, 
bereavemeril;·or other types of leave granted by this personnel ~ollcy. 
• . \ hf •• : '!', ;~ •• ·:~: .• t: ,.' 
12. Engage in any non-work activity Including prolonged visits with children, friends, or 
family mei:nbe'1 .. ~. -~·i<;:h 1.nf~r;ff!'ffl r'itfi the. <;QtJ~. c;,f WQrk·in the office or department 
1,; wnlcH ttie E!lilp!pyee ·~,:i-ve,, .. ,. . . . - . 1 i:::· : · ~. , . 
. , ,. ' ,:, i::,:a ·", ::- ~ .... ~- .' •. . . . ' . .;· ; • . '!' : :· . , . 
13; Use telenh
1
qnes il'l th~tof'ff ce or wo~p~~ 111 a manner that disrupts the work or work 
flo~: !'-" · · · ·· . · . 
~ • f • • *' , ' : • ; r 
14. Any rule established by the appointing 9.fflcial to m,aintaln 9rger and productivity In the 
workplace. 
15;f Elmote Cduttij empl6ye'e~.~i:e ex~ected to tiehave in ~·l~~I ~anner. 
· 1,~e, ~~eJJo!ritoil~~~i, ~9t~1Hnc1~sivet. · · .. · · : . ~ . · ._ -. 
Potential penalties for violation of any such ruies may include but shall not be limited to: 
1. Leave with or without pay. · · 
2. Suspension for a variable or fixed period. 
3. Demotion to position with!o~er ~01T!p~r:,sa~ionl~11c!/~r aUU,g(ity. 
4. · Reprfhtarid, vemii dr written · · · · · · . ,; 
5; Dismissal~·· . ' . . 
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• •''. .· ..• ~ ; ' .... ' \ •, f . .. • ' 
1Vf 'EMPLOYE1{ctAss1FiCA110N, CO,MPENSATION; AND BENEFITS 
.' 
A., CLA~SlfYlt,IG EMPlOYEe&. 
• .. ! .. ·~ • 
+ tJ'," . :, . . I· 
. ., .. 
I, 
I:·''•.,, ......... r..;,.) "f.. "t-._'\'• • ·• ,1·~ 
.1.. Employ• Glaaiflcatfon ·· · 
.. ' J:!: 
,, 
_ ·• · a;• · Fult,.Tlme Rd'gulaf Employees 
'~ .• tt:,' • ~ ', I • :• \•~ 
.. ·. r.,.. .. :·· . 
Employees ~~se ~l~I wof!< ~~49<:I'!~ caU~ f~~-i-'l.t r,.,Ji~O ~pu ..... 9{ f,cheduled work 
during eac:j;':MekiY "ayri,11 perfod. Ful~tlmi regulat employees shall receive all 
employee benefits provided ~ Elm~re Cou,:ity ~J.~Y,cil b•nefrts IJC?W .exist or may be 
· subslK(treritltchan»ecf ,,:- 0 ·- · · ·, .:.· · ,, ·· · : · · 
* •. =::} ·:·!' .1·'. .. •ht~,.!;'.:-.. . , .. ;'', ' 
b. Part-Time Regular Employees 
Employeea·whoie~l~I Wci~,~~~~.:_1e: ~Ua~~~-'-tl•,itl9.~~Y-~ byt. not as much 
. as 34~th~~;-of lctildul~ ·woA<·(tjt1pg_ ea\ti · .. ·ek,.' ~~JJ-tfni111. re9.1,1Jar employees 
, shall receive r'edUced 'Eimploye\i"'6enefiti' In Ba:a~ir\ie~yt!t\f ~GJ~;~,dopted by the 
Board of Commissioners. The scope of benefrt¥rece1ved may vary proportionately 
with the n1.:1~~r of hou~ tyl)!~lly~_~u,!99 f~r 2'.P.~tip~regy_la,r.,ooployee. The 
. num~Qf J1<5~til ldiecSujid ifiay also. •a~~"the_ ~rrip1~¥11'.i ~~--,~~~~iqp to participate 
in certain m"11'dc!ltO~ state'beh.;tif_~~~~- Cert~l!l tin,y~ ,q,~y n.9, be available. 
,:,f~L., ~,-,rt;::''°l=?,'tf··~; .... ~:·!' ·,_;l l· , . · , t 
c. Casual/Seasonal Employees . , 
~, ·Hi~ (( :'J: -~ ... ·' ~ .... ~ . ·i·, { ., •. ;, • • . , · 
Erqployees wf1c1'pro'llde-serviees fofEim9r!J, fq~"'t,~Kai1.1rregulr'r or temporary 
basis, less than 5 months per year or 19 hotirs a \.Wek or less, are classified as 
casu~I employe~s. Ca~ual e~p!~~ w,m '!~iV~ 99 ;b.~e.f~f Rrqx!Q.ec!Jo regular 
., employees',· 8:it'dept·tlicfse tequ(ricl· 'fJ/' law or·tnose prov,ded by express written 
authorization of the Board of Commissioners. 
·, 2. . Significance ·of 6irl'ployee Classffiaation' ·: 
-; ''I .. , 
The procedures for hiring, promc:rtJon, ~l"!sl t,ran~fer, .of {\.llliUm, ~nJploy~es shall be 
subject 'to"u,"'$ ·provisions· of t~J!)~~Pcy~ .:P.e;~~rfna.l. ~,~PW1!,~ci1;1cero1ng,part-time or 
casual employees are not subjeato guidelines seffortH Herein-unless the handbook 
provisions expressly provide therefore. 
"'! • ·' '·::· • , (! , ~· :\.,.. ;_ l , .-:1· '• -:.·· l 
B PROBATIONARY PERIOD 
, .. •n ··~ •. . ·.•. ,.,,... ':' . ;{'.I'. '. i{,/. I ' ,. . \ . · .:, .~ 
The procationary period shall be regarded JJ,s aJ1 !nt-,g~! part Qf. the s.election process 
and shall be utilized for closely observing the employee's work;; for se'CUrihg the most 
effective adjustment of a new employee to his or her position and for rejecting an 
-9· 
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. Ir,~~- !~Al~; ~ perf?rmance. is not satisfactory. ·. The probationary 
· . p
1
~Q~t~ll~P-1r,.ally t>, ;a $tand,ard 90 tq 18Odays,;;:· · -~ \•. . ; · 
C. GQ\1.#~NM°tlON;P,QL.IOies .: ' .. :.- .· '' . ., ' ':: . ' .,. ,, .\,. ' 
' "· , ' ' • t,. ' :,. ' , ,.~.: 
( ·--~'1;1~1,hment of P~y Sys~ .i . ·-·.· 1 _ , .\.' 
,- · • ., I Ci •• '• '. )• ,•,' ;'~ •. • -('l '• * t'. •, • ,•. f ,\ ; i '-., •· ' "'I.,• ·--.J • 
El~o~ County compensates employees:' hi: accoid 'wi'ffi ffili· salary schedule 
estabUshed by BOPA ln~rporat~d. Fi~! ~~sJ~t,r•:-P-1~~t_.bY the Boar~ of 
Commlasfqn•ra as budgefs lite set'ttnd fax levies are atiifiijrfied. Pay for any given 
position is subject to the annual ~udgetary P.~\! '1~- a1. ~l.l r.n.~Y be subject to 
lnQag1:i1tduction, or status qua malrnirliinde f<>f a . · iJHiJ "~ . . The Board of 
. C91l1P1r.11onera rese~es ~-f~Ji! ~ ma~e ~1fa(e~·~; .. ~p . -~ .''d consequently 
pa):adJQstment .. si:durfng the·e<>ursii oft~•.bucJ~fy,a. ,· J.d .. 1.r., ifi~nage cash flow 
. or: to : deaJ~ with ·oth..-.. cf l'C\imstan~s wtitctF itef' thfn:~ juijtity . 'ghanges in entity 
: . expe.nditui"eSF.i"' . .' ;I!' '. /! ·, ,i ,:, : )I'~' i,; . .. . 
. ' 1-. ~· ;-. ; ':,,> :';,, .. :· .• ~ : F--. ·: _; :,-. 
2. CompRance with State and Federal Pay Acts 
Elmore County shall comply ·with ·1a11 Stat• arid Federal pay acls respecting the 
. compen~~ti~~ ~ ~~~'.~r~es f~~ ~e:.j'J~s. ~,~?rrntz.g.i~9JP~-.1?1Jg!ic ,.~Ice . 
.. 3. Classification.Plan·· ... ,;.· ·· , ' ' · .. 
• ,: . , .. , i {' • ~ ' . J • ·• "I, • ; , t' 1 ' .• \ • ' ! ' • I 
. ·Au -~~~~y~es-ot-etriio.-.·'e::aunty.st1a11 be q1a;$mec1 ir?tne ·i:>o,1u,3'n they hold with 
·, . , _., .J ;,;.. :· ' ,,~ '•· " . . • •. ' .,.. . . . . "' 
Elmore CQOnty In the following manl'.l~r. . 
l . • l; • .J • ', • ',, ,I . :, _,.. ' " 
a .. ., Elected: offldar,~· · · ' ·· · · · · · · . . . . 
b. · ~erjtpt eniployee!fnot,subjectto melij t,st1~g.qr:other selec::;tlori criteria provided 
,, . ·, by. thifJ·-fr!anJial:· (Ghfetf Dep~ejl ,are _noi e~emp~. unless they strictly supervise 
, ovef 90%:of tfie tii'rla.) · ·' · r . .. . ': • . · 
. c/ Cittutsifiij(f'ftilf:OtimEi l!rtiployeis s1,Jbjecfid th~ t~sting and pla~ment standards 
establfstf ed by this· pefson~ pO!lcy '!l~fll:'§1. . ' ' 
d. Part-time or casuaf'employies exempt from placement standards cited herein. 
4. Right to Change Compensation 
Elmore County rese,:v~ the, rigiJ! to_ ~tu~ng~ ~·~~~l ¢QJl1}?en,atlo,i fqr any reason 
deemed a}:>l)ropriate by llie Soa~d of Commis~lqiief.!. Compensi!Jion may also be 
•• < • \ , -. ·.~- f. ··'! "/ 1,,,. •, t·-:·":t·,,, .. , ~ :"'· :~_ ........ •.1...-i.. .. ... 't'"~. ,..... • • 
adjusted ba§ed upon Job peiiormaDCJ9 a_nd the .ava1lal;>1hty of. ryjng, to maintain a 
solvent entity budget. · · · · 
. ' '( . 
5. Overtime Compensation - Compliance with Fair Labor Standard, Act 
Time over 40 Hours per Week 
All employees are classified as exempt or non-exempt for purposes of complying with 
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The FLSA is the Federal wage and 
-10-
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. hour l~.Wbldl govemi, the obflqatton ~! eth~loy~ to p.at~r1.lifte compensation. 
Certain emplO'fees.~r,-tnpt from OS)tnitlon of tt\li ltw ~uae they hold positions 
which are professional or primarily execu~ .o~_ajml~l~,J~.fll,~~· ~ such, 
exempt emplO'fee• ara not required to receMl btiarthffe ~ijf&houra worked beyond 
the limit• provided by the statute. Employees who serve as, ~om law enforcement 
officers may be subject to special exc:eptlon1ffouhi:i'lh thll F~SA~(~ie 2071<). Please 
contact your department supervisor or the office of the chief exec;utive for further 
. Cl@.Jffle&~Q.!'!ofY9.YIF\..SA.~ij_S:~r.. ,. ·· ~. r···; · ,;,1,:·: •• ··:~· ··.,~-J 
• r-,.c.4·. . .-1,; . • -··· (':',,~ :::.J. lt.: ·"· ... . ., . .. :. ,t :_·- . -1." ~- r·. · : • ·, ·~ , . t . '/ : · 
~- ComRf!i~•;JtRO' Til!l,.fp,lley.~.TJ~,oyv 40 .hours·perWeek , ·.•r.- · .: 
-. ,,.·l: . . ' ·~.· · .. <.~ .• ;-~ ... ~~,., f ,• :-t · ~~~ . .. :\·<-·· ,· · , .. " ·: '--~ \..··· .. , : :: ~r ,,:t··~ 
Eal '·- .,. _, ·~~-·· __ ,m,@~~J1JuJa1fc:,n~tcompensatory·_t1111f1lf'Mote than 40 hours 
c.l' . . ~ - . ~t\he .4.•~-nth,~i-or:~e ein~loy-fapproved by the 
.· . l!.tJ .. #i!f .. n~_tQf2C~a~r,iu1,tJ_Qn ·Qf·BO.h°'.1r1. No more than . , .. ,.t: ~ .· . . . ~"1.'ro~.bt.a~Mmulated lrUotal-. AriY hours acaued over 
' , · th'j ·ax1Rtun wi t>e paid during the pay period It was a~rlJed·or the following pay 
period. Compensatory time wil be taken when designated by the Supervisor or 
Department Head. :. ..- . . , . , . · , ~: ~-.. ,: · ,. (,, .. ,, ,' , 
7. R9,po~~~an~y~~lo_9Tlm~.Rtte0~· . ,. ,:, ·,,,.-: , · ,·.' : 
It l; ~t~,Jibhil~Uitf ol~ia{ :fup;I~~~ t~ p-i~riy· ~~-~;e I~. ink that he or she 
has worked during a payroll period. Each time sheet.,sh,all beafi.the signature of the 
employee with a statement verifying its accuracy and a counter signature by a 
sl:Jp,~~o,:l~difatl:~~~t~, ~~'°'~·5'f;!m!d~wt°':~~au~,-~~rked. :'Any changes to 
the exfstlnO tt.9ie ~ ri'lus\ ~\l!J~&.',g, 9Y.J?.Otb· ~~ 4'11'Pl_gyee and. the supervisor. 
Total sick, vacation and compensatory time for all employees will be reported 
monthly on the offldal time card. Each elected offl9!1iLqn,Q~P.;iirtJTlent head shall have 
~ ~eX of.~,,!!rn~ ~~9:~t!<?Wf O,Q Y~~jl.~~ .tj~ ~09 .. AQ~_penj~(qry time:' Balances will 
, ~. carr!~a, f~~~J~:m,, fp.~~Q~.mei.ffl'k.rh~s~~-~r.c;l,1 ,'3~~!1 bf/1:l"etained for a least 
fou'r years fdllowing a fiay period of tlie conC?fµ,~IQr, ,of,.ao·e01P.1~yee's service. The 
official _time ca~wl/1 ~t tne. ~~ ~!.!?-\ l,;t,th~ P@YrOfl_pffl~ ;~nd no other record of 
·ti11hs'wid be'cons1derecfy~~1~;, 9-'!?Jl~~,riu,u.¼~,Jo. carry out these duties may result 
In dlsclplin~ acf!9n. ~t\~d]~~ 1l.s. a ,ampl~ time c;ard. · - .. . · · 
.- . ' 
8. Work Periods 
Overtlm'~ 1:9.~pe11,~tl-9[1 $~~,L~.~l_n to ,c:crµ~ ~ije~ the ~mployee's applicable work 
pe~~: ··-~~-~ldy~~ Y!Jl ~tafJ~8!l-~~~A<9nt h;~Jf C1 ~ 4> ti.m~• the regular hourly rate 
~f p~y _oc_We>µ~ r.~~JY~ ~mden.s~9.fY ~m~ off at the rate. of one and one half ( 1 1 /2) 
ho'tJiEt 'off for e·ach lio\Jr Worked after 40 hours. . . ·: . · ·' , 
Questions about overtime and compensatory time should be directed to your 
supervisor. ,·,,· , . ·. . . . . . . . 
-11-
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. - . ...... .... .. • 
-
~:..,.., Da:tef 
~ .,, .•l;t 









Holiday Ti- J!larDed 
. 






_Pay Straight Overti- l. O 
.Pay Overti- 1.5 ,.__ 
-~~tile Dmed .1.5 
. 
"15 H 17 18 1'9:: 20 21 
I, 
rr1nl' SUn - Tue Wed Pri Sat 
., . ,. 
. , ... 
lteflllu'llourll 
Pay Straight o..rtt- 1.a 
Pay Oftrti- 1.S 
Cc:ap•T1• 1larmid 1.a 
a,ap-Tt• ltamed 1.5 
























· "' Regular Hour•. 
• I 
Pai' Straight averti111e 1.0 !· ·''· Pay Straight Overtime t;•o,-:.. (:·:--_._ 
Pay ov.rt.iM 1.5 Pay overti- ,1.;.s . ;.: .. _, 
C'ollp•Ti.._ ~med 1 .. 0-
COlllp•TiH Barned 1. 5 . .. :~.: Comp-Time _Bi(rned 1. S r-
0 : Holiday Tiu Barned 
' 
22· 23 .. •. ;ltti,i ilae1 Tin . 
Sun Mon Tue ~ IT!iu Pri Sat ~ sun Mon Tot Total Al 1,. Week a: [TYJ,i 
. .. ··•·• " .. - ) ' ~ : .. 
; ~:.- .. ; 20 . .· ... . 
30 
.. 30 .. : .. . " 40 >· 
' ; 
.. . 60 -· ... . 
.. . . .. 
61 
.. : .. 02 .. 
Replar Roura ' . 02 . 
Pay. Stratght OYert:1• 1.0 02 
Pay OYe.rt:1• 1.S 03 
COlllp•TiM Barned 1.0 41 
COlllp-TiM &unec!:. 1.5 42 
Holiday Ti• Barned 61 
Dates: 2/24/2009 - 3/23[2009 
Prior Months Hours 
Prior "Months • 
Corrections 
Va<:aticm 
Current Hour•: trarned I+ 
:======! Current Hours:uaed j • 
::::====! 
current Hours:Totalj ~-----' 
Prior Months 
Corrections 
Current Hours Barned 
current Hours used 







I hereby certify that the above Time Sheet is a 
true and aeeurate representation of my hours 
hours worked during the above work period. 
Employee Signature: 
oat@: 
Verified by Department Head/Supervisor, 




8oatd of Commt,sloners 
Phone 12081 587-2129 ~ 270 
Conni• Cruaer 
587-4630 
MEMO TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
ELMORE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
150 Soulh 4ch 1:.-Sula. 13 
Mountain Hdine, ~ 83447 
Lan, R~~ 
366-2226 
RE: REPORTCNO AND VERIFYlNO TIME RECORPS 
Fu(20l)517-2159 
The Elmore County Personnel Policy, Amended February I 3, 2006 on page 1 I, section 7 states: 
"[t is the responsibility of each employee to properly ~cord ti~e in intc: that he or she has worked 
during a payroll period.· Each time sheet shall bear the signature of the employee with a 
statement verifying its ac::curacy and a counter signa1:Ufe &y a supervisor indicating that the hours 
claimed were actually worked. Any changes to the existirtg time cards must be initialed by both 
the employee and the st,1pervisor. Total sic~ vacation sq~ compensatory time for all employees 
will he reported monthly on the official time card. Each elected official or department head shall 
have a copy of the tini.e ·card showing vacation, sick and compensatory time. Balances will be 
carried forward to the foUowing month. These records· sliaU be retained for at least four years 
following a pay period of the conclusion of an employee'~ service. The official time card will be 
the record kept in the payroll office and no other record of time will be considered valid. 
Consistent failure to carry out these duties may result in disciplinary action." 
There arc some employees that are not recording their vacation, sick and compe~atory time each 
month with balances carried forward. CONSISTENT FAILURE TO CARRY OUT THESE 
DVJIES MAY RJSULT IN DISCIPLINARY ACTION. 
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY - TIME CARDS SUB)tITTED WITHOUT COMPLETE 
INFORMATION WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED BY PAYROLL BUT WILL BE 
RETURNED TO TUE DEPARTMENTS FOR CORRECTION, j • 
/ J) . ~ . 
/I . .1.~ ·&· ~/, .... ~ ~,.c, 
Larry . 
• ( ; I! t&' Ld /l7 I (~ (i,-;.,ct:,: •; ,• 
Connie Cruser, Commissioner 
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9. Promotions and Compensation 
Compensation for aH empl~y~s is ~ta~,!~~
1 
l:>y,t~~ 9,,,~~'lIT' ... ~'11 J;ead as approved 
;_ • by tt,e .. Board o. f eommlssl~ne.... The _an.~~~ ~y~git otJ'ljtl11~.County sets the 
. :. ful'.'lding /·ci'lat!Elbll·~- for. cari'l~satrori •; . of. etnployie'l lh . 'y~fjo~ departments. 
Promotions and changes In status may be recommended arid irlide by officials In 
each of the operating departments but fln~!
1
~1:1.1f,qfjty ~,sardJng cac>mpensatfon rests 
with the Soard of Comml1sloners: · · · · 
10~~,~ar~~-•andP~,, .'··. ,, _: . ., . .'. ,··:·, . 
: Employees,~~~id.·011 ,t~tt. i~sl~~ns}, '.d~'f'ot )tj,e:~fq_i,TuJ~~u_ghout the year • 
.... Pa9checl(i1' ate· iulie\:I ~t ~t.off~;Atjne AudJ\9('. , r,i~tC,,l<s compensate 
employeea for work perfo~ iri th1 pay ~nod. Paychecks are to be distributed at 
the workplace prior to 5:00 p.m. on payday. .. . . ..,.. .. , .. , 
It is the obligation _of each _e~p!qY,~ ~c;,, fI1.0f!it9.f th~ ~~OJpY of ~ach paycheck 
received. ., lnfo'rmatr~· St1p~. ,o'~ ,!$, \ ,mp.l<iY'j~•. e~f-tf ~ 8'U,p, Is provided for 
lrif<>1rt1atf6ii only.,, · ·Actuaf it~~~· ~~p,cU,!'ig' l!,e l$S~,a,;i(?e,. qf. paychecks and 
alloqttto,n 0~ e~~,oye~··cen~1!tfm~ ~-/~~ts~QJit,_Y#t~~tj~tP<?ll9Y of the entity. 
In the ~e~ of· dls!19i'EH!ri'.1eflf ~e'el'l. !J'lt? 90,f[I_D~l!!l.:O~r)f.,..~ec(_p~y9heck stub and 
official polll:y a'a lntetiiet~ 8j thi'iJant of' coih' i' 1tltoo,rs .with the assistance of 
. tfi~ departmeht head and the' empiciyee, th~ poli~i_i,'~li-pre~~.ii. ' .. 
11. Compensation while Serving on Jury Duty or as a Wltnes_s in cJ Court. Proceeding 
Leave will be granted to fuD-time employees called, t<? jury c!Uty or J,o. !5erve as a court 
witness: Full- pay· will b'e prov~ded for .th~,.d~~~l?ri!9t ~u9,ftj~m99. Any other 
compensation, other than expenses, received tsy tfie_ emplo1~e wtlf be turned over to 
. f;:lmore,County. ,, ~ '. 0, · • -~ ' , • • · 
• ,<:: • 
12. Military Leave ., • •. f.· .. 
Unpaid leave of absence will be granted to participate In ordered and authorized field 
training. Our public entity employment policy will comply with the pro',(islons of Idaho 
. y09~.§ ~224,Jft_seq., or Its successortas those C9de ptovl~rons govern leaves of 
aP.~'9~~- for:,:military service · and Uniformed Services Employment and Re-
employment Rights Act of 1994. · · 
13. Reduction in Fo~ 
Employee assignments may be affected by reductions in force made due to economic 
conditions or to changes in staffing and workload. The ~o...r~ of .C~mmissionars 
reserves the right to make any changes in the assignmeni·e,t ijs9,(i~s that it deems 
to be in the'organlzatfon's best interests. The Board of Commissioners may also 
specify at the time reductions in force are ma9e whatreln~tat~me.r'lt p~ferences may 
· accompany the,' reductions. Said relns,tafeme,nj Pr~fe~ncefs' may. be tied to the 
clas~ificatlon of the employee or to speclallz~ skills ~sassed by the employee. 
-12· 
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... .. 
, ... , 
":i· .. ·• ' ..... 
An employee on entity business s~flL~e. re.1.mb..._~~.Jon expe1nses lnairred In 
completing his/her work-related assignment in accord with the policies established 
by ~"~°"rd, ,9;f C?o~~l!fJjll$l~· . .J:,,q, .e.mR!PYiee ls:re,sp.on$1ble for providing 
y~~,g _i'~. p._t~ fdr: a~Y..~t?XP.8P:lfl: ....' #qr_.~h,lq, ~ro.burseme:wt IJ ~~uested In accord 
wffffictaH9 C,qde § 31-1,;;,0e Of lt.! s"cce,~pr .. .... _: . .. 1 • , . ,. . " , , 
• _J •· f1, 11 I ",t • : ~ ' I • , • ' • • I,• .:, "J "' • •,. 
.. · ,· .. 
18. On-the-Job Injuries 
c; EMPLbvee· sE·Nef!1Ts· .·. . · . 
... . . . ·,··~-.. ~:, .. ·:,· . . /,,,,, _:: ,_·· .:..,. 
~-~~9.r,_<;.eu~J:Y qjf~_til ""'n:iber of employee ben~frts for full time ~r'nployees. These 
· b~r\Wit.. ~(f.EJ~~~ -~'A s,49ject to change or termmati~n. att~r ~?t1fying _the Elected 
Offle1als and at the discretion of the Board of Commissioners: Each 1s subject to 
the specific terms of its respective insurance policy and/or official resolution of the 
Board of Commissioners. · · ·. -·i·,, 
1. Vacation Leave. ,. '• ·. '. . 
.. A~cn.t.f1,9 _vaa,:itjQ.11 leave ls available to full-time empldyees who have completed their 
E:'roba~9na,y~P,~riod. Vacation accrues from the start·of employrherit (anniversary 
date) in the.following manner: . ·.f, . ' 
Length of Service 
1 to 3 years 
4 'C? 7 Y~@rs . . 
. a to.12 yea~ . 





25days: . 21 I .,. •,:. , . 
. tY,~f'-,, .... 25 days +1 day per year over 21 years 
. ' 
, -,·, ,,. ' • ~ ' • • • ', ~ ' ".!;; • • 
All vacatitlri acctued must be taken in the year following the, accrual,·· except upon ' r·· ~ ' - H , · •. .., · ,, ~ 
aP,pr_ovat yy· elt;pfe;ct 9fflp~, the u~ of v~cation -t.ime can be extended for a period 
of 3 ·months. Vacation leave time not taken, will be compensated for only at the time 
178 -13-
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... .. 
Cieri: oldll DISlllct Coad 
Pboalt {20I) 587-2133 ExL 501 
Alldit«IRecalde 
Pboa1t (20I) 587-2130 ExL .500 
D.~e: . December 23, 2008 
To: Elmore County Employees 
I., l 
From: Marsa Grimmett, Clerk· 
I , ' 
,,, 
MEMO·.\ 
... ' . . : . '!$;' . 
Please µnd a!fached Reso.lution No. 416-08 signed by~ij COJfiinis~ionm on 
December 1 ~~of trul:.year, which defines vacation ~d ~~k·l~ve apd probdfi.onary time 
for County Emp{~y~. Pl~~-iiiseit pa$es 3 andJ 9f ~;~cJ:iii{'eQt in ~ Y#. cui:tent 
personneLp,;,li.~)'i{page-13. Thes~ tw<rpages wil11fepJ,~al) of_Sectio:r,i Cori' page 13. 
• .;.__,,. " •,J • • ' ~: \ ' :/:"-.::it,.- ,..,_, (.\, "•., • • ,t,i i" ·~,· I 
Ple~e n:~te ~t after-September 301!1:>f 209i'.hll employ~ may nofiEenie'more 
vacation l~v~ than they can earn ~ ~n7 Year, IJ ~ be ,~upt~ for th~ l!airie as i;i9k 
leave ~~tly is which such ac~~iµi}.ti'.9n m~fu\izes at 480 b~ilrs! Electe"d p . _als 
and departni~t heads will be wori,Pns w;.~ those emptoyees w11,i chirent1:1 W\?e · · · · · 
accumula,t~ more than, OJ:le year' S vacation leave SO that the proper miQllllt p{Jeav:e. time 
.is accrued as of Septem.ber-30, 2009. · ·.i ' " • • • • - • : 
• ' t ! '. "i ~ .. ~ ... , "f.' .. 
Feel free to con~ct me or your supervisor if you have an.y questions. 
1,1~~~~~ s. 
Marsa Grimm~ . 
Elmore County 0~Jc 
179 





Elmore County has established a written personnel policy. and 
The policy states in Chapter IV, S~6.n-B/entitled Probationary Period, "The probationary 
period will typically be a standard 90 to 180 days". 
The policy states in Chapter IV, Section C that employees accrue a certain number of 
vacation days per year based on years of service. 
The policy states in Chapter IV, Section C, Paragraph I, where length of service is "21+ 
years", v~tion accrues at "25 days+ 1 day per year over 21 years~·. • 
The policy also states in Chapt~ IV, Section C, Paragraph 1 "Accrued vacation leave is 
a~~labli,,J~ ,;-~~!ll"- _tup:-t\m.~, 1111d part-time ,employec;s who have comj.1eted 90 days 
ern,P.1o~ep.t,''1 ~Yi '.'A!J .v~c;,n ac9nled m~t be taken at the end of the 1 · y~ following 
Ai.~-~~- VP.~ ~-Y,~ by el~ o~cj.al? the use of vaca~o~ -~e ~-be extended for 
a peqptf of 3. m.QP.~~. 9,)JFP~ati9n will be made. upon t~ation within the first year. 
Vacation leave time not taken, will be compensated for only at the time of separation or 
upo~ ~etir!'W~t, ~Q th~ D?,aximum ~l9wed in the above listed schedule}~ 
" , ..,. •• _..;' 1 :;f•• ,.. ,' , I ' ' ' ' ' ,; ,,' ··, 
NOW, T~~fO~, QE ff ~~9~~D by the :aoard of Commissioners of Elmore County 
that the policy sh,all be am,er\qed ~ follow.s: · .. · , . 
'%e prbb~~nazy period will typically be a standard .90 to 180 days" shall be changed to 
"The initial probationary period will be 1 year". 
. ' '! "I 
Employees shall accrue a certain number of vacation hours per year based on years of 
service. The actual schedule of vacation accrual rates is set forth below: 
Length of Sqyi.ce 
1 through 3 years 
4 through 7 years 
8 through 12 years 
13 through 20 years 










35 hrs 20 - 34 ½ hrs 
70 hrs 40 hrs , 
105 hrs 6Q hrs 
140 hrs 80 ·in:. 
175 hrs 100 hrs 
7 hrs 4 hrs 
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Vacation accrual rate will change to reflect that an employee who works more than 20 years 
will accrue 200 hours plus 8 hours of vacation for every year. o:v~ 20 years of seMce,· for a 40-hour 
work week; 175 hours plus 7 hours per year for a 35-hour work week; and 100 hours plus 4 hours 
p~ r~ for~ 20 to ~.4,5-,hour W<?,~)Y.r~~ . -' , · , . · •) ! · : . . 
·,'• t '. < '. .;. • •• ,,;· ' • .. !' •· 
. . ~ ~. ~.;8~oY- G!.l~~h;J sJ?!l ~e. ~h~g,:4 to ~-Vacation leave is available to 
re~ full-tune ,8.1).d p~-titt)e ~pJ~~,who have coipplete,1"3 months of employm~tY: .': ·. 
>-:. ' • ;t, Ii~ ' ii • 
An employee may only aca-ue vacation leave up to the employee•s yearly maximum 
amount Any excess vacation hours accrued in excess of the maximum amount allowed that are not 
used will be forfeited, without right of compensation, in the month following the pay period in 
wbich ~ ex~ \\QQI"f ~.e ~ "ne r~nsj.b.le elect~ officiatmay grant an employee an 
~~tt?~~ ~.mon~ ~~ .. ~~ ~i ~~ .a~ed yacaµon. hours. s.~~ exception must .be gr~ted 
by ~ re5P,ons1~le el~~ed o,fijl;i~ !-11 ~~ng at1Q ~wledged by, the employee m·wnting. 
Vacati6il leave is to be scheduled with consent of the responsible elected official or dtpartment 
supervisor. Efforts will be made to accommodate the preference of the employee in vacation 
scheduling, but first priopty ~ be the orderly functioning of affected departments, Upon 
separation frpm t;mployment, any µnu_sed vac.4-tion hours up to the maximum allow~le accrued 
amount will be'compensated by lump-sum payinent at the then-cummt hourly ot·dit.ily}ate.· ,Upon 
separation, any excess unused vacation hours will be forfeited without right of co~~~ns~on,. · 
The Board understands that the employees tnay need time to co~e i~tq 'compli~~ wj$ this 
change in policy. Thus, enforcement of forfeiting vacation time will \,egin September 3Q, 2009. 
"To regular full-time employees who work 35 hours per w;¢ek:, the rate shall be seven (7) 
hours per every month of employment. To regular part-time employees who work 20-34 ½ hours 
per week, the rate shiµl be four (4) hours P~· month of employment" will be inserted into the 
paragraph contained in Chapter IV, Section C, Paragraph 2. 
The attached page should be inserted into the current employee policy, replacing page 13 in 
its ~tirety. 




ELMORE· COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
-
CONNIE CRUSER, Commissioner ,,.. . . 
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"· 
,J' • ..,', ,f.'t''', !. 
C .. BMPLOYBBBllNEFITS , .. 
~ ~-- 1··\~: :~ . !~·t_.,,! . ' . 
ELMORE COUNTY offers a number of empfoyee· benefitif for regular full-time and part-
time employees. These benefit offerings are ~j~ to ~ge or t~ation ~ J?Dtifying the 
. Elecrte.d Officials and. at, the sole ~cretion of th~ Botrif ~~ ~oun~ .~?!!W!•~JoJJ~· ~ _be;netit 
offering is-:sµtij,ct to the spetific ten:fii of its tbsptctive ~~\;olicy a.hd/or officiai resolution 
of the Board of County Commissioners • 
. .. 
1. Vacation Leave 
I .,•,While vacation hours accumulate• frofa the date of employment '.for'. r~g\11~ full-~e ~d part• 
tiJne employees, an employee is· pemiitted to talce vaca«oii' l~\ie once he. or.~~- hM pqttJpi~pd 3 
. mQntbs of employment·· Vacation leave accrues 'from ·the s~ of eniployment jn the following 
·,·. m.SJP1er: . . , .. , . .. .. . ,. ., . . ," .. , ..... 
, 
Lengtb of Ser:yice 
!·=lr.~ ··, 
8 throtrght'l~ 
13 through fO years . 
aftct'2(l'y~ ofsemce, va~on 
h<:iifu will acfumWatc at the rate 
set forth above for 13 through 20 
years of service plus additio'nal 
hours for every year of service 
o_ver 20 years as follows: , · 
40brs, 
WorkWeek 




2QQ hrs .. 
70hrs 










An employee may accrue vacation leave up to the employee's yearly maximum amount. 
Any Vl!,~OP hQurs accrued in ~xcess of the maximum amount allowed will be forfeited, without 
right of compensation, in the month following the pay period in which the excess hours are accrued 
if the excess hours are not used or taken. The responsible elected official may grant an employee an 
ad.9itional three ~~tbs.tQ.·take any excess accrued vacation hours. Said exception must be granted 
by the responsible elected official in writing and acknowledged by the employee in writing. ' 
Vacation leave is to be scheduled with the consent oftherespqnsible el~ official or department 
supervisor. Efforts will be made to accommodate the pref~eh~J>ftl\c ewployee in vacation 
schedul~~-1?.~ tirst priontywill be<1th'e'orderly functiolllllg 9faffect'&f'oepiutments. Upon 
separation from employmeµt, any llnWi~ vacation hours up ,to the,mwmum iµ,I.owable accrued 
amount will be co~p~ated by h.i:tp:p~~ payment at the tlien-~ent houdy or gaily rate. Upon 
separation, any ~~CE9p)ln~:~!~'11a~t!'~!:¥~ will be forfeit~without tight Qf comp~sation. 
• ,,.. '~ ~ d. 'f!.. '\-~-.:~ 1:: . • 
The provision goven,.ing forfeiting vacation time wil~ begin Sep~ember 30, 2009. 
• • I,.•.~, 
2. Sick: ~aV:e .. .,. ' 
"l •,' .• ~ ' ..... '), 
Sick 1~ 1:)en~fits ~ prqvi4~ Jo regular full-tim"e ~ploy~ w)lo w9rk 40 ho~ 1per week at 
the rate of:~Jh.:(!8) _houri~per ·:eyery n;i.onth of employment. To regular fiill:;time·emptay~ who 
work 3S hours per week, the rate shall be seven (7) hours per ~ery month of employment To 
regular part-time employees who work 20-34 ½ hours per week, the rate shall be four ( 4) hours per 
3 
182 
EXHIBIT A • Paae 24 ELMORE CNTY 258 
• 
month of employment Si~ Jet.ve. is a·benefit :tci pro\ilciisf relief to the employee in the event of 
illness to the employee or his/her immediate family. It is to be used only in the event of an illness 
?t ,~Juq t~ ~-\\ ~e ~:P.tt:.ID}A1;.WQPQJ;lg~vdror:safely oifif iii ~y 
tU/l~W~ttilff~~ .. l?~~.-sJt~.' ,. :Y~J(or,_l):~.Sl,l¾c&n:. ~1~lCa\ve·m~ betrequ~ at least 
within fwo'hours Pf-!¥«~~-W.~~!tb.t.!J~~~ .. w:mt p~od,is· fd.begm, unless Circumstances 
outside the control of tlie employee prevent such notice. Elected officials or department su~sors 
asked to approve use of sick leave may, at Elmore County's expense, request/ an'· ind~dent 
review of reported illness at any time by a competent medical authority . 
. j 
Sick leave can accrue to a maximum of 480 hours for regular full-time employees who work 40 
hoUJS pc.r_w.ed.c, 420 ~qµnlor regular fitll-time ~pJoyees ~ho work is~hours per week, and 240 
houis for regular part-tlnie ~employees who work 20 - 34 ½ houn per week. Sick leave benefit 
recipients will receive their normal compensation when using sick leave. Implementation of policy 
regarding sjckJeave c~ be fow;id in resolutic;,~ adoptc;d. by the Board. of Cotmty'.Commissioners. 
All unused sick leave wHI be forfeited without compensation upon separation from employment. 
. 3. Holida~ 
Ten official holidays are provided for regular full-time and part-time employees. Employees 
V'{~o .. i.:r, r~guJ~ ¥1-P,Jp,e o, p~-time active st~ on the dat~ of any: holiday shall receive 
~~~pJ01~ ~~ ~y ~en ~ougq they <lo nq~ work. Hvlidays which,fall on Saturdays shall be 
ob~:erved ~ the 1-; , 
• t 
. : .',. 
\ .• 










, RESOLUTION· NO 403-08 . '; . 
Elmore County has established a written personnel policy; and 
• '. 'f, ':'",••
1
~• t~J "",'•:'• ' ~ ·,. ~f,t• ;~~·',. • I ' 
Certain County employees work 5 da-ys per weelc, 7 hours per day f6r a 35 hour'worlc '' ·,W~~~: .. I ·,1 ... ' :- I .'; •• , •. · ' .•• ··: '. ••• T :: ., .·~. ; • 
Certain Coounty employees work 5 days per week, 8 houri p~ day for a 4d hour Work: . 
. week; and" · ' 
Certain County employees work 4 days per week, 10 hours per day for a 40 hour work 
week; and 
. , ~ • : f •, 
The above-.descril;,ed emp~oyees' Vacation Time and Sick Time lire ~einJ ~cul~tec:f8y 
multiplying th CJ da}'S'of eanied vli:catioii by the nu.inlier of'hours worlced p~ day 'either 7, 
8 or I 0, which is resulting in a disparity among employees that are worklli:g 4 days per·. 
week, 10 hours per day versus the employees working 5 days per· week, 7 hours or 8 
hours per day. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Board of Commissioners of Elmore County 
that from the date this resolution is approved by the Board of Commissioners, that the attached 
shall be the proper and fair way to calculate the Vacation Leave and Sick Leave for Elmore 
County. 
Approvru Resoludon of the Ebnore County Board of Com.misslonen OD the 
~ day of~ , 2008. 
, •• t' 
~.,.,, ~1\ \.V.+, ,,,, 
~ (§,~ ......... ~~ir. ,,.,. 
~ ... . .... ~ ~ 
~ •·· -··-- \% " :.;1: .• ~: 
! ~f ~ A. '\.,JlP;j . - s i::, • .. -·~. . . ,-~ •Q: 
.. • ·- •• s;;; ,_ 
~ ""'·· - . .;;;:,,: # V; •• .• ~'>- ~ 
,,,.<I/, ·········'°'\"~'ti 
",,, ')tf e coul\'t"\' , .... ,,,,:al ,,,, .. , .. 
CONNIE CRUSER, Commissioner ar= WA_ ,M\ty) m.Jit: 
/SI MAR.SA GRIMMETI, Clerk 
Elmore County Board of Commissioners 
1 (SF 
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of separation or upon retirement, to the maximum allowed ·In the above listed 
schedule. · · 
.· . ,,., . \'. ;,.:iiij"' -~i ·.· .··· :; ~ ... .·· , 
2;· -St~Jt'.!-:l' V .,_.,. .. ·.. · · ... 
.• , , . .·!~·-1)'..· :_t,..,·1~.· • ;; • 
·! • .. ,.;*.,,: 
• ,,; j ... , • . ~~. • 
,. ;,\l.- :· ,• . 
*t· ··: ·~:, .· t' ,-,•/<::•i'TU"""-f1i.··!,~, fl~·1:.-.:.,,' .;•,: .• , ..... , ..,<°'.,~'·,... ~ 
. • ~j _! $f ck l9¥1·b'1!tlft.iiii1-Prqv.J4!~;!P.::.f~lbtlme· .amployen,'and accrue a the ~e of a 
·'" ~ plrfitoiiffi. Slcl<leave la a benefit to provide relleftQ the etr1ployee In the event 
of Illness to the employee or his/her Immediate family. It Is to be used only in the 
event of an lllne• or Injury that prevents the employee from working productively or 
safely or if an immediate family Ulna. presents no practical alternative for necessary 
care. Request for sick leave must be requested at least within two .hours of the time 
t .\h!f.J~W~M~'e'9.rfs. eorlQSL r1.t.P>.b'egio. 1 Ef~ed <>ffi~ats or department 
• r , ~\~AV~,Seli.t'° app~~~· !JJf.of sick~leava1 for a perlo:d longef tlian 3 days, may 
. re~ e.t·a ranp a P'1Y.'19'!111~,· .. •i •. · : ,, • : !'JJ • , I, t 
•Tt.}r, .. \~!"'~'1. .• .:6 .. 
Sick leave can acaue to a maximum of 480 hours. Sick leave benefit recfplents will 
receive their normal compensation when using sick leave benefits. 
"' . 1 • •.• '. • ~,1 . ~ ... ", • , • ' ': :.~ 
;,.·., J • ~-. 3., Fj9!JdfY!I. ; -~., . , . ·:, 
Ii~ §~~~, h.P!l~~~: ~.,,: P.!~,vfdetd)~r l!.~pla,y~:, J=~~l~yees· wtio have full-time 
actlvti statos on the cfat.\ of any holiday shall receive compensation for that day even 
tl!~ug~ th,Y..~ '?OJ ),,"!g~-: ljqll~~Yt wf,Jqi fa.fl.op ~aturdays shall be observed on the 
preceding Friday.· Those which fall on Sunday shall be observed on the succeeding 
Mond~f:,, ,.. .1 . '=' ., , ,,_;, - .. , · · 
:, . . '.. L . .. ·f"li·I .:. !. ·~·(,. • .._, • ~- ::•· ~'..~,: , ~ : ~ ·~;; 
Employeei wno Work ·on' hoiidays shall be scheduled to receive a substitute holiday 
W!_th J?~Y; .IJ~~ _1~~:~!'P~f'Q~J'!CY.~.~fk 011 hc;,lidays shall.be compensated at a rate 
?f_ory~~a':~-~ li~tt · r.; ~~.erpP,lqY.~ta's ~g,~J~r@t~ 0,f pay even though the work does 
~o~:~o~:,~!tqtf ove Jme (lvf<? _ijm~s. t,:te_ regµl~r rata 1f, the,work does constitute 
ove,umc:J . ' ' i1 )i--
:~ .. ;1l' ""i: ' · ~;~,; r : , ~ .1 
Reci>gn~~ Hi;iit~ys; i'1cl~~(pg ~ut r,ot l~mife.d to; 
i • •·~ • I . ..., 
:l,. 
4. Disability Leave 
Labor Day 
Co..lumbus Dar;!. · 
,VE;ljeran'~Oay,, 
.• Thanksgiving Day • 
Clirlstmas·Day · 
_ ~lr".!~!·r~p~~~ Jij\t~Ji~ ~~y -~mpla,;e~,who is dis~bled ·in str.ch a manner Jhat 
.. h}~l\t;~~.~t«!(!(!'lt~!'!<Js ~nppi_R.~; ,~:m~mum ofi1~2.1days;u~p~id leave for 
· pu~!S:,,•! ~1;,~ ... g,ffg!"l sia!ij ~l9!191JJtY..;1he.~01ployee·may, ·at h1~ ?" her option, 
· choose to use v . and/or. slcklea~ to r~ive pay as long· asrsucn benefits are 
~val~~l•)•f ~~.-n~. WI~ iii~ Fam.ily -~rid Medical·Leave Act oM 993. 
' . . . 
-14--
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; 
. 5 ... Bereavement Lea~e·,:· · i 
Up to 5 d .. of paid leave of absence, at the d~tion ~, fh.~~lt~ed Offl~al, for a 
death In the Immediate family (Spouse, children, '}>lh1n'Q; grandparents, 
grandchildren, brothers and sl~~rs. ). Additlonaj, '!It•.. b~: 9ranted by their 
~:: =~~·~~-,~~-~'i~l!i~, i·~J~&i~~tJi~-=-. -~·-~~~~absence Oeave 
.. • . . .~~~ . .:;_, • t ·•·t .• : f;'< '\•.(;!·'" ·-, - .':!~,.~,,"'.I tr.I 
' , • , 'i '!: ' •,; ;: 7'"\ ·":: ''"' .•· . ; .. i I 
. 6 , Leave~ of Absence··. · :.:'" "' . ·.: •. · -~ <r : .. :J,ti. 1 ,• .. • ~- ··? 
-1\,· •. • -- ' .. ' • ' ' • • ~ • ". -~ ~ • : .,. ;,'-t .. ·,. ·. 
. . .. : ,-~ ,p ·.;,·~"" i. ,'"•<:!"', '· ~ 
Up. ~ tt,lrty days unp'1d~1e·aivt _ca;; be gninted b_f 11·1·:.c;,~\.ltm~ot Head for any 
jl.!~ifi,ble purpos8l"Pald·l~av• 1h Anf~~u~· 8r u1JP.lli ;,t;TltJ,j~s of thirty days 
shao· require written approval of the So~nl of C"olftifi loi\lti; ' 
7. fMLA ,, · . . {-· :: .. ·. :~ -- ·~ .-. . ·; t:: -~ 1 • . ...- t tf· ' .. ,. ~ .... , . . r, > . . . . , .. 
I .,,'.J· "'- •, • 
.,· 
Employees of Elmore County may have rights for 12 we~~,; q{ Jtav" under the 
provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 if they meet the following 
eligibility requirements, from tt,e <;:od~ of. Fec;l~-~.I.. ~egvl~~' . (CFR) section 
825.1 ~o. ?\~
1
~11~~~,~-~~P,)Ofe~~~~~~)~~iil?X~if i.~~-~,r.p~yer who: 
a. Has bee~.~·mpldy~tl ,~r th't~m~~y~f t9~ ,(~~,tl~ inQ6V'181,ii~d.'. 
~ - , .. ~·-·> i:··~.'1,"' '. ··> :~ ,,"': ~_t: 
b. Has been employed for at least 1,250 hours pf service during the 12 month period 
. imm~~at~1y pr~~d~nt~~: ~'!1~:~s~,m!~?tof -~~ _l~Yf· ., .. 
' If.a~ -~~pl;,y~e meet~·the~f! ~D~l~Jr~ r~~i~Wi~t#~~,~~.,01•YJ~quest up to 12 
. w .. eksFOf lea_ve· where . E_li'.ri'~!:9 ~~~n~_:;wtH ~rm.nu~t·:Ya,~ ~mplpyee's benefits 
(employer portion only)"dilnn~ u\e llta\ie period. if tli6 employ~ d0"'J not return to 
work for reasons other than their own continued serious health condition or that of an 
eligible family member, _E,l~pre , ~~';'~. '!)~ ~M,.r,J~r.rv11~temployee the 
premlum(s) that were paia'for th~ employe,es medt~ coverage. 
~ • ~i ~ ~- : , ; · :n·* 
Employe!'.' are't'eq":Jlred to u~~ ~a,y ,~.t<i,p~d v~~!ffll,,'14.si~.leave before 
utilizing lea9e Withdut pay under-thtil=MUfpollcy. If 15a1a1eJY, .. ac;qs:ua)~ are less than 
12 wee(<a,''thcrem·s,1tiyee may take the remainder of FAA~.,l~~i,·ait.'i.Jnpaid leave. 
EmpldY!.~;wilJ_:~~~ue to accrue leave while utillzil"!9,tg,1t ~~Jg:,111!*..and_ vacation 
leave; \They will ctfase to accrue vacation and sick ledve dunng the unpaid portion 
of their leave. 
186 
EXHIBIT A .. Paae 28 ELMORE CNTY 262 
., 
,: 
be solely Elmore County's, in compllancit~with the· provisions of the Family and 
Medlcal Leave Act 
... , ' ..-l ... t ~ t;"'0 f ' -.. • ~f1• ., ..... ~ 
.. ,. t~~i~r~:Qffl:~i~ t~.~is~~-y~ur rlg~·.;nd obllgatiorls for.continuation of any 
,. ~~~IJ.•~YS\14..~ ~J1Employeftmustltlllki~~entsfo~payment 
of their portion of their benefit costs or dlacontlnuatton·oMJiose ciheflts will occur. 
FMLA leave may .!:>,, l@~n. inte,mittently otron·:a reau~ leave schedule in the 
circums~ of birth or placement of a child for adoption or fast.~ ~re, care for a 
.~~.' ,!~nJil.X ·, fflE!ID~ .. , 1·QJ,J0l)~t1:em~qyees own -ri~Ul,·"fi•alffl·~ .. dition with prior 
~~-8~§1.fr.oro ~he E~Eld Qfflclal,.or whel'l"~eil~ ~~~ssary." 
·rJ~~;#.¥.,~J;;~~~~~P.t,Y,~~:~~~~;~h;~~.-~~~ 
1fo?~!~;ht Coun, fs 12 
~t,~,~-"\l?J~,~,.UJ~.J~ifl8;,IS;for=reasans·:?~h~~ than ~~ort~I serious rffness. 
~91•• YQ:!e.r, _.mployees·pf Elmore,counfy are·entltlid to le~ve under FMLA 
In·~ .. !J. ~~· ' . . , . ' .. . ' . ·:;, ' . \,I I . 1. :)! ' ·' 
.:. ; 
~· • ::, • j 
* To care for a child following a birth or placement of a child with the employee for 
adoption or f9'!,r cant; ,. • ,~ . · · ·,, ,: 
•, •. ·~~ ... - ....... ,:~. ':',".!. '·'·; .-:· '(.'t ,.1, 
T9 ~"' for a sick child, spouse or parent who has a '·'serious' fiealth condition." 
. ·. ·. . '.~ ", ,. ~,. . . ~·· ' ',,_ ~-' ',~·.· * 
If tti~ .~mpto~~ hjm!hel'$~1f, ·1s unable to ~perform hfs or her own work 
responsibilities because of his/her own serious health condition. 
* 
To request FMLA leave please write a brief letter or ·memo to Elected Official 
indicating the reason for requesting FMLA leave and the expected d!,lration of leave. 
Note,;. ~o~r §Uf?e"(~s,9r or adn,lrrJJ1ratQr m~y request that you provid" certification by 
yo_u} physl9§tf). or JJJ!di.~ pra~oner inqicating the diagnosis arid probable duration 
o~ yo(Jf iJf~lcaf~Q!lditlon, or the medi9&I condition of your falffily member . 
• f •• ···.·,i_· -~ :, ···'; - • • .;~·.~ ·~ i•;~~, . ... ·· .. ;•· 
'Efmor~ gq~nty V!i!t ~turn. ttle employee to the same or an equivalent position after 
returnfrig fiorii FMLA leave, subject to the terms of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
n,,.,_,'?.,r,.ly, ~~ptf .Q.fl m~ be fQf,irtdMduals who; ~rider the )>'r~~ions of the FMLA are 
co.ii~.1.i;lj~ ·to t>E!- ~. "~ey et11Jplo~" whose extended' 'a~t!ence would cause 
"substantial and grievous economic Injury-. • 
Elmore County reserves the right to require periodic notices (determined by Elmore 
County) of your, or your family member's status and your intent to return to work. 
l • • .. ' •• ~ ' :·; •• ~· I • • ?; ! ,... . . . ; I .· _ ... , , . • 
Elmore county reserves the right to desig'nate any leave requesf as covered or not 
covered in compliance with the provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act. 
• .- .!. •. • • • ,, 
. " ! . . . .. 
If_ y9µ { h~v.et_any- qµeJtjons about your rights t.uider' FMLA please contact Elected 
Official. . .. . .. . · 
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. , ~ t,,. )os~mn~Cover:age Available to Employee, ,.,· · ··• : .· 
~ .' -~ ·fi:J#.;:i ,,:i·~',Ji.J~~:.r .. , ... ~\ i:.~ • • 1-:. :-1 ·~·'!·"~~ tti ;i'*'::~~ .~ .. -~~,~~ , .. 
. :.:. ~)D191'!&P\lotY p!:OVides compl'ehehsi'li lfealtti' l~~fa]~~ ro-em~oyees and offers 
. : )~jy ~v,.r.age at ttie amptoy~ii optibli: · 1nsutii'\at&vlria'ta6'i' riot start until so 
·days after an employee's starting date or the followi~ b{ll!O.P:~ p,nta1 and Vision 
.,, Jn!WJr'\91. 1$ pptlQJ'lal wi~:cost-~h~~·~c:tinall~ ~Y..~fr!~r.·cq\1~ '-1i\9 empl~yee. All 
-. C(?.V§A9f lt'-•YbJ~·tO. policy tetnfs' and ·ld*chaffi~e af'any\lme~ . Cli)ms procedures 
. irfrn~r~~~=!t:!:::::;~::t:"r::'~e~rlt)~8 ~~::~:~~ 
may be obtained from the personnel office . 
•• f•". '"'.. ·::., : . .,ct· ••• 'ti :,. '' . :···· .. ' .. : ... 
Limited life insurance coverage and limited dlsabiffty prcJOrams':are provided to full-
time employees. The terms of these prografT!S are contained In booklets and 
~$;fmlrJ~~e policies available for· inspection lh.., thit j:,ti!j!jdnnel office. Worker's 
compffllsatlon insurance covering Job-related Injuries Is provided for all employees. 
Q1r143stl9ns a~ut.worker's compen~atioh issties'shooltf pe directed to the personnel 
office,,, - :· , . ·.· ~ · · ~ · 
' •, : : ,:. ."' ,.:; > • • ' • ' • • • ; • 
The retirement plan of. Elmore County co-mbines"!Jenefrts 'of tiie Public Employees 
'. R;ii~i:n,ntSy_stem of ldaho '(PERSl)'with So'cial Secuiiti !FiCAj.' P~RSI charges a 
p~u;~o~ge.of an employee's gi'oh· salary, whicli'is presently exempt from Federal 
and State Income taxes, and Elm~re County mat~es ~h!~ With, ~'1 :~sfditional larger 
co~
1
ci:lltlon':'.. ~nta~-~~ personnel office· for ~rthEJr l.nt'o~it1,~10_1 • . • 
a. <;qoRn'@,tlo.n of Health Insurance Benefits for Retiring emptqyeEjS as Stipulated 
in ~~$O!lltion 62-86A. Not applicable for' empl9.Yi!9s hi~ aft~_r ~ate of adoption 
of this policy. ·,- · · ,., · · · 
. ·-~ I, • • 1 ... , • ~ • 1· •, 
In addition to the benefits listed on the previous pages, the following miscellaneous 
b~~efj~ ~~ avail~l?le_ to full-time regular employees: '· · · · · .. , . · 
, m :" ', 1 /• , (• ~ J~: ~ : • "; ., .• } > • ' ., ,: < < 
Elmore County offers the following miscellaneous benefi~ to i!~ ~mployees in 
~?:.9r~~t19'_'Nith tne terms of specific resolutiof\lapprovingany ·~~tiq_h programs, and 
in accordance with the policies or other documents which establisH the programs. 
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Accrued benefits for each full time employ~ ,c.pJl11,,,'1,4'~?Jlt4' ~It of tfJat employee 
If the employee transfers from one departlneril to another within Elmora County. 
Any such transfer wil n.ot ('9su .. It In a ~uctfon .Rf-1>.t"~M offl!IJf ng, s,parate and apart 
.,· from thost· r&al~'by'e_:m~olt,el si-a\iltlf ~@,~-. · · : . · 
:· .. , ·:r ~·~-~·t:;},i~~;u~~;~·~;l~·',;_'~·-'" <,; .. :,: .: ·.:1,w·u:,·· :··:·· ·. 
V: ~,~,~~~,~ rYA~M,tf(),N,: R~G~Ro-S'AN.~ ·ots.eu;,u~~- . 
A''. EVALUA1t(jffPRtxitiVREf I. .' . ,, •• ,,· ';.' • ,, •• 
' ',· ..... l.•. 
·!.~-··-~·~.\.;:·· ... ,·'rt·-.~ ..... _ ., \: · 
•· )·' ~ , _ , t"• •. ..,;:11'\o: •", , :• >" •• -/· ; > '1 ~ i I " 
·: 1. Sta_n~.~
1
ri,~~~~· ._ _. . . , ~. ,. <;-. ::: • -:: • , ··.:· _ . _ .. 
r, ·~··· •*~J, ~ • . ....... ,. - ; . 
. · · · ··. . Eacltemplbtee· rrfay lnitillli~ ~"ev~luated within six riionths of new employment 
then on a annual b~_sj~ \o, ~lf!Etq tt:ie perfqryna_nat, oHh~ employee in the job 
being pedoffl'led for Eimoi'e'Countyr. t~ch evaluation will be given on the basis 
of !)1~. di~ ~':'P,[Vi!'qr's .. o~_'.el"(~ij~na-,~ ttte ernplpyee's peffi!rmance, the 
a<?Cur,cv of~ ... ~rtti?f oy~·s1_ Y'Prk_. Ji:,_ ~.gltJ91)jO Ule qlj~ntlty, and_ additional efforts 
~~~.d~ \)x \h,~·.er:nP,ioy~ on_pe~atT: 9{ ~lmore ·Gounty: ~ach supervisor is 
autJ,oilzed t9 use ,ne.cessary e~,u~tlon tools. The superv1spr:may fill out an 
evalu~or'I fo·rtn, wnicti ~t,~ll pe pi~~ in. tt:Je employee's permanent personnel 
file~·' · · · · · · -~. . 
2. INTERVIEWS (E'1~fuatfo1,1} .· , 
, ,•,·. ':··-!·\•_,t . . ' 
Each evaluation shall be concluded with an interview between the evaluated 
empl9yLe~,.,~~~ thet 1,mrn,eg1,1~ ,~.~rvl~or in wtilch the employee WtU &e told what 
the- firfditid~ of ihe employer's evaluation are. Each employee will be given an 
oppo~lty to respond to the evaluatlqnJ>oth oraJ.ly; in which·case notes may be 
taken by the supervisor, or the employee may submit a written response to the 
employer'! ~~aP.,tPC?'l t9._ ~' pl~l. E!9i:. In, th~ e.mRIQY. ~~• -p~rsonnel file, provided 
that It I~ ~_red w,~ tri, e,nP,loy~r ~i\l. ,In 1 O days of thJt dale of the oral presentation 
of the evaluation·. · · . . - · 
"·-: t 
-~ . ' 
,~ ' ,; •,. .. 
B. EMPLOYEE PERSONNEL FILES 
1. Personnel Records 
Th~. official emeroye,! recbrd~}o,f@tT.~~ Cpunty ,~Quid. b~ k~pt in the office ot the 
· · Aud"Or::'5Wrlftin tti~. P,,-rs~r~ _ fi!~sa~I! Jj~JE?l?t. all ,records· of payroll, employee 
· perf6rtn_an~e~a1~,f!_~. ~~~1or,.~~,t~,11,9_qR!Q@r ~J~Y.tot materials related to the 
employee's servi~ Wifri ~lni9re ~oµ,ify~ Any_ s,t;1P~M.!SO_ry personnel c,r the employee 
· him or herself may contricutEf materials to the personnel files deemed relevant to the 
-18-
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em ... PlPY!le~~-R ...erfgrm. ance and. teriti~. Qfff. &atre_eif-iWa~ ... ll~.'ri Id ~lao be kept In the 
fllf,i \!.mBR~g~emej'lt.i_!I .,0Wrii'¥tef iw~~, ... ". · .. ~tA?!~al ~primand may be ema:=:::~.:~re:ti~~:!.·:t 11~"~:~~::~::n!i: 
tfme. Copies of materials In a personnel file are available to eJcl1 employee without 
charge with a lett~.,9f .. ntquasl . Personnel' flleii iHilt:,.nat,be removed from the 
premises. 
";. .... ".,.; ,;,.~· .·., . 'fl!<> , .. : . . '11~ ··: \ , i ; •• •• • •. :-.-. .. '.r_ :·.:~, 
; 2._ ~~~ t~t~~f,f'tei.- .l,; ,. ' :;· ·~--,·,·,. ·: ~: ,,~, '. ..• ' • 
1. C ,. ., 
1
lt I~ ·ttie··pa1~ ~ [ If ~~~\g.i'-,< > 1(i:n.lt~ -~~; t~~t~~ ~~rsonnel file for any 
employee. ThosEJ :ifc:>rfzicf'to eva · materials In a personnel file include the 
employ!le's superviSQr, administrator, clerical payroU personnel, members of the 
Boa~ ~ ~o~ffllffJ~,P•P,AA4 !1~~!mPlq~- :.9f.41Jl!J!.1f~·,Et-~>qpon · ,the 
lnherent:confiu1Jrn1a11,1 of peril>Me1 matters, a <ffofliirs to personnel files shall 
be only with authorization of the supervfsi~ .9fftc;f~-;11:lq~~ .,nJR~Y-''--~ the Boa,:d 
of Commissioners. Information regarding pel"i'olinet matters will only be provided 
to outs!<!• parties with a release from the empl~'":~flfl 9tt,,r:~Jrcµmstances where 
release 1s deemed appropriate or necessary witn ttie concurrence of both the official 
supervls~~~ ~~: ~~'!~ ~~~Jhe.,8!"Pj9Y~, aod th~ e,9~~- q(.~~mmlssionera. 
3. Management Of lhfom,'tfirgh In. e~PO~~! Filet. . -. . \ : . ~ " .. 
. .. ...... ~' .... ~· )r..a; .• :;. ··-t ~ '' \~ ,,,,; ',:. ' . ,,.. . ' . .. 
' E~ch, e~pl~y~ ., ~Ha~r ~- 'ij(6vtdt,. ~!1. :~PP.~~iiitv, ,~-~<;qni~,t. the contents of a 
p~rsonnel fil~.Wittiln6p,,a~;~ plaetmen!~ .I~f•-L• .. to ~!..SJP~ne by flffng of a written 
objectlqn· anct ·:expl~ati~li~.~~lc~lf '!'lt~~-~,l_nc!~~ ,JQ.!'.\b.EJ ~le along with the 
objectionable· m~terfa~: Jn , the· so}-,; ,u~fJ,1:iel)t 9f tne. S(:!IJ.!00~,:19 official, with the 
concurrence · of the ·Board· of· Comtnlisionars, any offan~ing material may be 
removed upon a showing by the employee that it Is inaccurate or misleading. Official 
reprimands should be kept O fffciat reP(lr:n~g~ ~VJ~ 1 9~ r~moyed if marked 
improvement Is shown, by written agreement 6f thef0fficial and employee but not 
before a two year pertoct. 
. , , ~ • • ,_;;.( ' ~i ' , fi- , ' • •, ' ' • ~ ' '.• . • J ~ I 
C. EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE PR<?_CED.\J~~~ ~NQ RRiN~IP.L~S 
: • r,.~~~.~. ": ··.• . ..! '·, . ,... 
1. Purpose of Olsclplirie Polley· 
,.H •. w • , ' 
. The· purpose:_o_~;~~tfh.ij di~~ieP11~.,~i1iPYJ>f -~ijor, County ls to estabRsh a 
consistent'J)l'oce<:lure for·malntali'irng suitable beh~'\llor,.~cl a productive working 
environment in the workplace. These procedures are directory in nature and minor 
variations of the processes set forth herein shall not affect the validity of any actions 
taken pursuant to this policy. · ' 
2. Disciplinary System Framework , ..... I ,, 
Elmore County adopts the .fol~!19 frame,~ort< fora~ons \Q be taken in the event 
th_. employtrieht pe>licf~ti' ~ _viol~e~' by. abY eijiploy~e subject.- to this manual. 
~~og~ssive::~ep~ ~at b!;!m_pl~J!i12t,9._i1rR?<1er, lg)Q"-9..~~. gj~iocentiyes to policy 
· v19lations. Ell\fo~ C9un'-Y.J,sei;ves: tn, rlgftt to ~l<e .~my.Q,f tb• prescribed steps in 
any order in~tlie eVeiif! tli~ ·a ~up~rvl~o,r' gi:t(ms a policy violi:ltion or' action of the 
. ,• " '· •; : . . . ; ~ . ·.~. ' ·• . '• .. . ,' . . ' 
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a. Oral waming. 
b. Written wamlng or reprimand. 
c. Suspension with or without pay. 
d. Demotion. 
e· e'mhS~on .... ; -, , ~ .. ,:, . , · 
.. f.· . dF'~· s!t : '.•, . ·, :.,.. '· .c· ,: 
• .i'''-' "1,ro,.i,_ ~-;.,. '0 •• 
4. ·· APRejlH-~g1 (Pris-Oep~j.or,{:, ... ~ ·. ,:,}. ,;,:/· 
h• ., ... ' • • • • ' ~ ' -~ .~. l .:. : ., ~ .' ~:. ·t•J . 
•. : "' ---,; 
r 
' ·~. 
The personnel pulley of Elmore County estab!!sn~~ th~, ri9b!tf~ f\Jll:-tlm.~ feg1:1Jar and 
pa,t-tlme employees to a hearing P,tiOt to.any final dedsro~·on·ffischarge, demotion 
with attendant change in pay, or suspension witho~ pay. f P~~cln ~ttprneys are 
no~ iu~J~ttq\ ~~-- P-'J~9.n.11@J 11~ng procedll!'9ibeln'a!~ · ,np~d to the 
rul, .. ,'! .. ~ 9~.s,,Jo. _.,_,_ c;c;,nflpJ:~ .. for the~r pro~lo~~~ .. ~e~. . ng,11:pJements of 
. p~ ~ fpr,~ny_t,~ h~ong to be field befote tlie S1:1Pfl!,J .~.ti~~ Official, 
untesi , .. , ~ w the. ernploy~e: ·· ' 1 • • ' .. ,. ';' ' I 'l • .. . .• 
a. The employee shall be provided notice of the· charges. (Nbti~ 6f Proposed 
Action) against the employee, an explanation of the employer's evidence, the 
, ~~op.p~e~ P,ersoi::mllll: ~C.tlQ.r;t, ai,9 .tlJe proce~ure for ~eque~N'i ~ .. ~,J~ng. 
b.- If requested, the etnpfoyee shati be hea~d: before the Supervising Efected Official 
witti tha.drai he~ri~g to last no longer than two hours, Unless.ot.t,~rwlse approved 
by the Supervising Elected Official. · , · J,J-l , ~-
c. Th~re !~al~ be a re~rc, maintaJn4K.f, including a tapEt reco,:dlng ·of th~ hearing. 
", .: .·:. ,-.:.:J .~.: ..;. ' • { , . ''· < ....: • ;,':'J-"1!::··;• :_-.· ' .• 
d;- The en,ploy_._,stJaith~ve ~I') Of)p()rtu.nity tq,be,represented by legal counsel at 
' his ()Wff experiie: ,: 'I ' , , , .... , . ,., , 
e. The purpose of the hearing shall be to provide th_e emj:)loyee afr opportunity to 
present evidence and to rebut the information upon which the proposed 
personnel action Is bas~. , , ,. ... . .. . ... ,. ~ · , a~·· · · · · 
• ' ~ • ·•"" ', ·, / • .•: I • ,- < : f' l r,"'\ ,_. \ ' • 
' The, request for, n~arirfQ m~st ;0e d~~i.v:.~,-~ !i:> tfie $.~Rli:vl,i_ng Eleet~.d: Offl,clal within three 
~Ja~~~:11~t:·:~:.::n:;e~;l'~~~ij'.dil1f~:,~l~e~~~~~ ~vr~e~: 
' ui1les'sjtJ~ g,termine<f :th·aftaaditionat time"stioula be gr~nted for any cea~n,dncluding a 
· request of the employee upon a showi_ng that additional time is needed to provide facts 
necessary to i:-espona to the charges. After the hearing, the decision of the Supervising 
Elected Official shall set forth in writing the reasons for the personnel action. 
191 
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VI. SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT 
A. REDUCTIONS IN FORCE (RIF) 
.. : '' ~ 'f 
When financial circumstances or changes of workload requt.,.~ -~:ffiore county reservee 
the right to reduce forces in such manner as it deems necessary tb rhaintain the affective 
functioning of Elmore County servi(:89. Seniority sh-11.Q~ ~fs.e.~ tgt~co~deratlon if 
possible. Decisions about the functions tcf be reduced I are riof subjict to the appeal 
procedure established by Elmore County. . . . . .. 
· Jf ~~IN~ft~€Nf.p~&:FeRe~ca <.· .. ,~.-,- . . ,< ::,::,::, :.,· 
· .,, ' · · ·~--~jf.9y-~ihp)~~~~ ~,~~~~~~fy ~rriplof.Rilnt aue to a ·i,Jdu(;·,!1.:..on ,~_force shall retain 
. · . ~a~ ~frt~Qh\O.,"tui:,:iJn. Jru ... · e ev,nt.of woi1<,f<frce r.:e~tin.~·.m.·g_. 'f.oP'op· .:Xti· . .r,rpm the date of . . tg~lff~~ , iffiAIQye.~sbaD retalmtprefi~~~ o~l'j'fo~qt,, fgt Yf.lllch they are fully 
quannlcfl which available service reqUlfements can be·~met. 
"', ·:-·- ! 
, , C. FJNA~J;Y.A~Ue.TIQN · ,. . 
. . 'Mh-!" ,~,;~~j~~; ~~pa;t~ from Elmore Cbl.ihty servi~. i~ cin iivaiuatlon has not been 
performed within the most recent s!x man.th_ P,~riqg_i, tt,~. !!JP.,t!,ffis9r m€1Y conduct an 
.- _eyEJ~a1to.11. 9fJt1~1lndM~~al's pe~ohn~~ce ~ror,' !~,·~es:1,ra!l~t(fm"m ~n;iployment. 
-·;.i\,".·,'.~111:.::··-::·-·~· ~.: ~· · . · : .. , 
D. RETIREMENT POLICY 
; -·. '.• :·· :~ , r~ L ,,.,·-_; •.;.-,, .. , 
Tnet ~tl,:ement policy of. Elmore Counlfshall comply In all respects with federal and state 
requirements respectin~ !"a.~~atory, ~~~rnero,.af'\d: t~,e .~t,~9,~9ns· established by the 
_f!ul:!~lc. Eq,ployee'a· Retirement System· of fdaho (PERSI) •. No employee shall be 
compelled to retire except In compliance with said acts. 
f;. CQl3RA BENEFITS _ -.: _._. · 
~ ""• ,. i:! .,•' ( ' ! I._ f. -,. •.· ; .. '. . . . ' , . 
Employees of Elmore County who currently receive medical benefits, who separate their 
empl0Y!,"e~t ~ay _Q~ eJl,9.!~J~ tc;,p~g~nu~ L. IJ!~~tcal.P.f,'1!'frts ~the employee~ ~ole cost 
and·exp·ense,.for'a~ llm!te~~-~r'r\~. !n •. a~ .; .. ce witt:t_ tn,,Consoli<;fated OmnlbUs Budget 
Rei;on~llatloff ~~-9f 1 R!f ~Q,~~},. ,, ~{. ¥PH .. h~y. ~ ~oY ·qq_~stiqns .regatdiiig. Y?Ul right to 
cont1nu~1our li~'al~ ~~~fa~i.J Jiff~f $.~p,~f~tlng frof!l Elm~ra County ~lease~ntact the 
PayrollGIE!rk. 1·- ,c , 1. · · • - .,. '":·· ·, • ·· ·· . 
• ', ,:-. • ~. ;_ ,, ·;;1~:r;•:•'' '.•' '.. "";~_·/¥ • ....: •• • ~Ft, : ,•" .:. :0, 
,,:, . 
} ,, .... -~ . ' 
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F. EXIT INTERVIEW 
Each employee who tenninates from employment with Elmore County may participate 
in an exit Interview W(~ the employee's supervisor, or in the event of involuntary 
termination with the p~raonnef officer. In such Interview, the supervisor shall notify the 
employee when certain benefits will terminate and when final pay will be issued. The 
employee wil infonn the interviewer about hfslher lmpre881ons of employment In such 
interview. An employee exit form wil be completed at this point and will be retained in the 
employee's personnel file. 
G. RESIGNATION POLICY 
Voluntary resignations will only be accepted if made in writing. Any oral resignations will 
be treated as leave without approval, unless authorized by the supervising official. Under 
leave without approval an employee may be tennlnated for "Job ~bandonment" after 3 
days of leave that has not received prior written approval. If the employee wants hfs 
formal records to indicate "voluntary resignation", they must do so In writing to their 
supervisor or the administrator. 
193 
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PIBSQNAL AND CQNBQENTIAL 
Cherri Nix, Custodial and Maintenance Employee 
Vence Parsons, Supervisor 
February _L 2012 
NOTICI OP DISCIPLINARY ACTION- NOTICI OF LAST CHANCE 
You are hereby notified that I belleve you have been Involved In acts or 
omiaslons for which any employee of Bmore County may be subject to dlaclpllne, up to 
dismissal from employment, pursuant to the Elmore County Persomel Polley. 
This Notice Is provided to make you aware of personnel action that Is being taken 
at this time and to allow you to meet with me or respond to me ID writing regarding any 
Information you desire rr.~ to consider with regard to these matters. Accordlngly. you 
wlll have untll J.illQ o'clock f.M .. on Monday, February 8, 2012 (flw daye from 
todaya date), to meet with me or to submit to me in writing any such response you 
desire me to place In your flle. Should you desire to meet with me, you must meet with 
me at 3:00 o'clock P.M., on Monday, February 6, 2012, In my office to discuss this 
matter. 
. Please keep In mind, that If you do not meet with me or submit your 
reeponae within the time allowed, I wlll base my decision upon the Information known 
to me at-that time and your failure to respond will constitute a waiver of this opportunity 
to provide a response to this proposed persomel action and the Information upon which 
It Is based. 
To assist you In preparing any response you may desire to submit, the following 
Is the information upon which I have relled to this point In this proceeding: 
1. On January 6, 2011, Dan Colllns verbally counseled you regarding errors In your 
performance. He then provided you with a written assessment on May 19, 2011. 
Mr. ColUns determined that you had Improved In some areas, but stlll required 
additional Improvement. You received a copy of that assessment Mr. Collins 
requested that you complete a dally log to tum Into him regarding your tasks. On 
December 20, 2011, I started as your supervisor. 
2. On December 'ZT, 2011, I provided you with a task 11st entitled ·e1more County 
Custodial and Maintenance Duties', which you signed. The task 11st was 
intended so that you and I had the same understanding regarding your dally, 
weekly, and monthly tasks. In the pay period from December 24, 2011, through 
OR\G\t~AL 
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January 23, 2012, I personally reviewed each of your bulldinga to detennlne If 
you had completed your assigned tasks. I have maintained a dally log(checkDst. 
Based on my personal review of your work the nexJ work day, I have found the 
following errors: 
a. December 28, 2011: failed to complete dally tasks: clean urlnal In LES 
buildlng; sweep downatalra and steps at extenalon office; vacuum carpets at 
E-911 and extension office; clean the sink In the woman's bathroom In the 
basement at the LEB aa there was stlD soda on It. Failed to complete weekly 
tasks: mop floors In Jwenila probation, E-911, growth and development, and 
extension office; waah windows In LEB, Juvenile probation, OMV, growth and 
development and extension office; or dust In any buildlng. 
b. December 29, 2011: failed to complete dally tasks: sweep floors In extension 
office; vacuum E-911, growth and development and extension office. 
c. December 30, 2011: failed to complete dally tasks: clean toilet In E-911 and 
extension office; sweep floors at LES, growth and development and extension 
office; and vacuum E-911, growth and development, and extension office. 
d. January 4, 2012: falled to complete dally tasks: clean urlnal In LEB and tollet 
In extension office: sweep floors at E-911, growth and development, and 
extension office; and vacuum at E-911, growth and development and 
extension; clean sink at LEB. 
e. January 5, 2012: failed to complete daily tasks: clean urlnal In LEB and toilet 
In extension office: sweep floors at E-911, growth and development, and the 
downstairs and steps at extension; vacuum carpets at OMV, E-911, growth 
and development and extension office; and clean sink at LES. 
f. January 6, 2012: failed to completed dally tasks: clean urlnal In LEB, sweep 
floors at LEB, growth and development and extension office; vacuum floors at 
growth and development and extension office; and clean sink at LEB and 
growth and development Failed to clean weekly tasks: mop floors·· in any 
building, dust in any building and clean the front porch/outside entry way at 
Juvenile probation. 
g. January 9, 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: clean urinal at LEB and 
clean toilets at Juvenile probation and growth and development; sweep floors 
at LEB, Juvenile probation, E-911, growth and development and extension 
office;. vacuum at Jwenile probation, E-911, growth and development, and 
extension office; stock bathroom at extension office; and clean sink at LEB. 
h. January 10, 2012: failed to complete daily tasks: clean toilet at juvenile 
probation and extension office; sweep floors at Jwenlle probation, E-911, and 
extension office: and vacuum at E-911, growth and development and 
extension office. 
1. January 11, 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: removed trash at extension 
office; clean toilets at Jwenlle probation, E-911 and extension office; sweep 
floors In any buildfng: vacuum at juvenile probation, E-911, growth and 
development and extension office; and stock bathroom at extension office. 
j. January 12, 2012: failed to complete daily tasks: clean toilet downstairs at E-
911 and extension office; sweep floors at LEB, E-911, and extension office; 
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vacuum floors at E-911, growth and development and most of extension 
office; and clean sink at growth and development. 
k. January 13, 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: clean toDets at LES, 
Juvenile probation, E-911 (downstairs), growth and development and 
extension office (downstairs); sweep flOOl'8 In any office; vacuum In any 
building. Failed to complete weekly tasks: mop floors In any building; waah 
windows at Juvenile probation and OMV; dust In any bulldlng; remove 
recyclables In Juvenile probation, E-911, and growth and development; and 
clean outside entry ways at Juvenile probation and OMV. On January 13, 
2012, you left me a volcemall at 8:32 p.m. (3.5-hour shift) advising you were 
leaving for the day as you reported you were done with your tasks for the 
night and you Intended to come In to work over the weekend to do help 
another employee steam clean some carpets. I observed very little cleaning 
and no vacuuming. 
I .. January 17, 2012: faDed to complete dally tasks: clean urinal in LEB and 
toilets at juvenile probation, E-911 (downstairs) and extension office; sweep 
floors at E-911 and ext-.nslon office: vacuum OMV (back), growth and 
development and extension office; and stock bathroom at growth and 
development. 
m. January 18, 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: clean toilets at LEB, 
Juvenile probation, E-911, and extension office; sweep floors at LEB, E-911, 
and extension office; and vacuum floors at Juvenile probation, E-911, growth 
and development and extension office. 
n. January 19, 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: clean toilets at LEB, 
Juvenile probation, and extension office (downstairs and some upstairs); 
sweep floors at LEB, and extension office; and vacuum floors at Juvenile 
probation, growth and development and extension office (floor mats 
particularly dirty). 
o. January 20, 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: remove trash at E-911 ; 
clean toilets at LEB, E-911 (downstairs), growth and development (only 
cleaned rim), and extension office (upstairs done poorly); sweep floors at 
LEB, E-911, and extension office: vacuum at E-911, growth and development 
and extension office; and clean sink at E-911 (downstairs). Failed to 
complete weekly tasks: mop floors at LEB, Juvenue probation and growth and 
developmen~ wash windows at E-911 and extension office; dust at OMV, e-
911, growth and development and extension office: and clean the outside 
entryway at juvenile probation. 
p. January 23, 2012: failed to complete daily tasks: clean toilets at Juvenile 
probation (done poorly) and extension office (downstairs); sweep floors at 
extension office; and vacuum at OMV (back), E-911 (done poorly), growth 
and development and extension office. 
q. January 24, 2012: failed to complete dally tasks: clean toilets at extension 
office (downstairs); sweep floors at LEB, E-911 and extension office; vacuum 
at Juvenile probation, OMV (back), E-911, growth and development and 
extension office; and vacuum at growth and development 
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I acknowledge that you completed some weekly tasks that are not accounted 
for herein. I also note that some other tasks were not completed weN. My 
reports and the recitation herein focused on the obvious eff01'9. 
I have noticed that you spend short periods of time In each of your assigned 
buildings. It appears that you have repeated entries Into each building. The 
fashion In which you perform your tasks may have led to your poor 
performance. 
3. On January 23, 2012, you submitted a time card that contained more hours 
worked than I had been able to verify. Your original time card reported a total of 
181 hours worked, 24 hours d holiday time, and 8 hours of vacation. According 
to your time card, you reported 3 hours of comp time accnied. I notified you that 
you needed to correct your time card and submit It to me again by January 24, 
2012. You advised me that you could not or would not change any of the 
reported time. At that time, I completed a corrected time card and submitted It to 
you. You signed the time card on January 25, 2012. In order to determine your 
hours worked, I reviewed the dally door reports from December 28, 2011, 
through January 23, 2012. Your shift Is Sunday through Thursday from 3:00 p.m. 
untll 12:00 midnight. I found the following erroneous entries: 
a. On December 28, 2011, you took approximately 2 and li hours for lunch and 
then left about 45 minutes early. I credited you with 5.5 hours rather than 8. 
b. On December 27, 2011, you left an hour early. I credited you with 7 hours. 
c. On December 28, 2011, you left 2 hours early. I credited you with 6 hours. 
d. On December 29, 2011, you took 1 and li hours for lunch and then left at 
approximately 10:41 p.m. I credited you with 6.5 hours. I noted you also 
retumed to the office at 12:04 p.m. for some reason. 
e. On January 4, 2012, you took lunch for approximately 1 and li hours. You 
then left work at 1 o p.m. I credited you for 5.5 hours. For some reason, you 
used your county-Issued entry key to access the courthouse at approximately 
7:53 a.m. on January 5, 2012. Aa you know, you were not scheduled to work 
at this time. It appears this was personal business as you did not go to the 
office at this time. 
f. On January 5, 2012, you left approximately 1 and li hours early. I credited 
you with 6.5 hours. 
g. You requested permission to come in to work on January 6 and January 7, 
2012, In order to shampoo the Department of Motor Vehicles. You reported 
hours on both days and told me you did the work. However, the door report 
shows that you made numerous emrlea Into other bulldlnga on both days. 
You appear to have been at OMV on January 8 as follows: 8:25 until 8:39, 
8:51 until 8:53, 9:00 until 10:08 and 10:11 until about 10:25. On January 7, 
you were present In OMV from 1 :29 until 1 :31, 1 :32 until 1 :35, 1 :38 until 2:46, 
and 2:48 untll 2:50. You then left about 3:08 p.m. so I credited you with only 
1.5 hours on January 7, Instead of the 2 hours you reported. 
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h. On January 8, 2012, you reported 7 hours on your time card. According to 
the time report, you appear to have left for an hour during your shift. You also 
left an hour early. Therefore, I credited you with 6 hours. 
I. On January 9, 2012, you took approximately 1 and ~ hours for lunch and left 
a half-hour early. I credited you with 7 hours. For some reason, you used 
your COll1ty-ls8ued entry key to acceat the courthouae at approximately 
11 :28 a.m. on January 1 o, 2012. Aa you know, you were not scheduled to 
work at this Ume. It appears this was personal business as you did not go to 
the office at this time. 
J. On January 11, 2012, you took approximately 2 hours for lunch. You then left 
work by 10:30 p.m. I credited you with 6 hours. 
k. For some reason, you used your county-Issued entry key to access the 
courthouse at approximately 12:00 p.m. on January 14, 2012, and the old law 
enforcement bulldlng twice around midnight on January 15 and 16, 2012. Aa 
you know, you were not scheduled to work at these times. It appears this 
was personal business as you did not go to the office at any time. 
I. On January 16, 2012, I could only account for 4 hours of work, so I credited 
you with that time. 
m. On January 17, 2012, you appear to have left work twice for what appeared to 
be lunch. Therefore, I credited you with 7 hours. 
n. On January 18, 2012, you appear to have been at work for the entire 8 hours, 
so I credited you with the 8 hours. However, In looklng at the reports, you 
kept jumping from buildlng to building for small Increments - 3 to 1 O minutes 
each from 7:12 untll 7:56. I do not believe you could have accompUshed any 
significant maintenance task during those Ume periods. In addition, you 
appear to have left early, but I was not able to confirm that, so I did not 
decrease your reported time. 
o. On January 19, 2012, you took lunch for approximately one and '4 hours and 
then left early at 9:30 p.m. Therefor&,, I credited you with 5. 75 hours. 
p. On January 22, 2012, you took an extra 16 minutes for lunch. You then left 
work for approximately one hour and 17 minutes:. I saw you at your residence 
during this time period. Finally, you left an hour early. I credited you with 5.5 
hours. 
Based on my calculations, you worked only 122.75 hours and were entitled to 24 
hours of holiday time. I increased your vacation time by 21.5 hours to 29.25 
hours In order to account for the 176 hours of time that should have been worked 
and/or credited to holiday time during this time period. Falslfylng a time card Is a 
very serious violation. 
Accordingly, you are hereby notified that, pending receipt of any written 
response by you to the information set forth and/or referred to herein and attached 
hereto, It is my intention to Impose the following dlscipUne: 
1. You commenced employment with Elmore County on June 1, 2007. 
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2. You are placed on Probationary Stahla for a period of one (1) year. Your 
probation will run untl February 1, 2013. You are, and remain, an at-will 
employee. 
3. I am providing you with a Warning that this Is your Last Chance to 
continue employment with Elmore County. 
4. This Notice will be placed In your personnel flle along with your written 
response to this Notice. Any written response must be submitted' to me -
within the time and date stated above unless you request addltlonal time 
from me. 
5. A failure to meet the goals set forth herein will subject you to termination 
at the conclusion of your year-long probationary period. A review of 
progress wil be made with you throughout this year-long period. If 
progress Is not evident, you may be subject to Immediate termination at 
any time during the probationary period. 
6. You w111, at an times hereafter. in the workplace: 
a. Perform your work In a professional and error-free manner; 
b. Report your time accurately on your tlmecarct, and 
c. Demonstrate proficiency In the dally and weekly custodial and 
maintenance duties you are required to complete. 
FURnlER, I WANT YOU TO KNOW I realize you have made significant 
contributions to Elmore County during the time that you have been employed here, and 
I believe that you can continue to make positive contributions during your continued 
employment with Elmore County. However, in view of your actions and omissions 
specifically set out herein, and because your acts or omissions have delayed the 
accomplishment of duties of our office, further acts, omissions and/or misconduct by 
you will not be tolerated hereafter, without the Imposition of more serious discipline 
lncludlng but not llmlted to potential termination from your employment. 
Although I belleve It Is unfortunate that I feel required to provide you written 
notice of these matters, prior verbal efforts by your then-supervisor, Dan Collins, to get 
you to improve your performance have failed, and I do not desire to revisit these issues 
with you. However, If that becomes necessary, you will not be able to claim that you did 
not have notice of such deficiencies and an opportunity to correct them. 
Please be advised that, since this matter involves proposed personnel action, I 
would recommend that no comment be made regarding this matter until a final decision 
has been made and this matter has been concluded. 
If you do not desire to respond to this Notice, but prefer that your employment 
records with Elmore County show that you terminated your employment by resignation, 
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please submit your written resignation to me on or before the expiration of the abov• 
noted response deadline, so that your records may be documented In accordance With 
your request and your final paycheck can be prepared and delivered to you. 
Dllllld 1h11 _L day cl F~,bruJry 2012. 
l4ub:_J~ 
VENCE PARSONS~ 
Affirmation of Service 
I, Vence Parsons, Supervisor, afflnn that I served the foregoing NCJICE OF 
DISCIPLINARY ACTION-NOTICE OF LAST CHANCE on Cherri Nix this day of 
February 2012, via hand delivery. 
,,., -
~ed~, 
VENCE PARSONS ~ 
I, Cherri Nix, hereby acknowledge that I received a copy of the foregoing Notice of 
Dlsclpllnary Action-Notice of Last Ctiance on the / day of February 2012. 
Cfl.-cz/1 
Cherri Nix "' 
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION - NOTICE OF LAST CHANCE - 7 
200 
EXHIBIT B • Page 7 ELMORE CNTY 294 
PROCEED TO VOLUME II 
